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Foreword
The pace of technological change has always been fast in the chemical 
industry. But a look back in history reveals more than just the speed of 
change; it also reveals the long-term continuities that shape a company. 
DSM is not the company it was a hundred years ago and it is not the com-
pany it was ten years ago. And yet there is one characteristic that has been a 
constant in the company’s history: the build-up of technological capabili-
ties and organisational structures for the longer term. It is a feature that has 
shaped DSM’s transformations and will continue to do so in the future. 
This book documents an important part of the company’s history and 
helps us to understand the interaction between change and continuity.
This book is not about R&D as such; it is about the results of R&D 
and the relationships between R&D and business. Companies have been 
facing these critical issues ever since they established R&D laboratories 
in the late nineteenth century, and they will continue to face them in the 
twenty-first century. This historical study shows how complex these issues 
are and how DSM’s response to them has evolved over the years. Cruci-
ally, this book underlines that we cannot afford to become complacent 
but need to continue to work hard to build mutual commitment between 
R&D and business.
This book also shows that no company can innovate on its own. In the 
case of DSM, this is as true today as it was when the company was foun-
ded and when it took its first steps into the chemical industry. DSM has 
always nurtured an openness and receptiveness towards its environment, 
and these have served the company well. The changes in the last decade 
have been particularly striking, with an increasing geographical spread of 
R&D activities, decentralised R&D governance and a systematic sourcing 
of external research and new business development opportunities within 
the framework of an open innovation model.
After more than a century, DSM is as vibrant as ever and very well pla-
ced to contribute to the sustainable development of society and industry 
through its constant innovations.
Jan Zuidam
Deputy Chairman of the DSM Managing Board 

Preface
In 1998, Jacques Joosten (Director of Corporate Technology at DSM) ini-
tiated a project to write a history of DSM’s research activities, with the aim 
of gaining a better understanding of the role of industrial research in the 
company’s development. He commissioned the Foundation for the His-
tory of Technology (Eindhoven, The Netherlands) to write this history. 
Ton van Helvoort, Eric van Royen, Judith Schueler and Frank Veraart car-
ried out the research and wrote reports on aspects of the history of research 
at DSM. Harry Lintsen compiled and edited a book on the basis of their 
work, which was published in 2000.1
 This collective volume, written in Dutch, was aimed at a broad audi-
ence. I have reworked and extended it, and the result is this book. My 
reworking of the material has resulted in a stronger emphasis on R&D 
projects. I have also placed more emphasis on R&D in relation to estab-
lished businesses. Additional research has deepened the cases mentioned 
in the Dutch book, and I have added two cases (caprolactam and fine 
chemicals). The scope of the lysine case has also been extended to include 
research on other amino acids, and attention is paid to the links between 
lysine and fine chemicals. 
 The reworking and extensions provide a fresh perspective on the devel-
opment of DSM and the role of industrial research in this development. 
The case of DSM may also appeal to an international audience. The com-
pany’s long and colourful history provides new insights into the history of 
R&D and the analysis of innovation processes.
I have been fortunate in being able to use the material that had already 
been collected and the reports that formed the basis of the collective vol-
ume.2 I also used material collected by Piet Vincken. His unpublished 
manuscript on the history of DSM enabled me to resolve several loose 
ends.3 Ernst Homburg supplied me with his research on the establish-
ment of caprolactam production and on industrial research at DSM in 
the 1990s. Our joint work on the history of DSM’s fertiliser business also 
provided input for this book.4 The urea case draws on my own previous 
work in this field and was part of my dissertation.5 Finally, I am grateful 
to Wim Hoogstraten (former director of DSM’s patents department) for 
compiling some patent statistics.
 I researched and wrote this book between September 2003 and Septem-
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ber 2005. An able committee, consisting of Ernst Homburg (Maastricht 
University), Jacques Joosten (DSM), Siep Schaafsma (formerly DSM 
Research) and Keetie Sluyterman (Utrecht University) guarded both the 
process and the content of the work. I have profited from their comments, 
suggestions and critical questions. Siep’s careful reading of drafts helped 
me to avoid many chemical errors and provided me with useful point-
ers for further research. He also provided me with quantitative data on 
the development of DSM’s research. At Eindhoven, Mila Davids and Jan 
Korsten acted as a sounding board for early testing of my ideas and took 
many organisational aspects of the project off my hands. Mila’s many re-
marks forced me to be more critical and precise. In the final stages of the 
work Vikas Sonak (DSM) took a fresh view of the project and the draft 
chapters, which clarified and improved the text. Henk Rhebergen did an 
excellent job editing the text.
 Last but not least, I want to thank all the people who were willing to 
talk to me about the development of DSM and its research (see the sources 
at the end of this book for a complete list of interviews). Their enthusiasm 
and humour have been a continuous source of inspiration. Several of them 
also read parts of the manuscript and provided invaluable comments and 
corrections. Herman de Rooij, Ruud Selman, Dick Venderbos and Jan 
Zuidam took time to read the complete manuscript and provided useful 
comments and critiques. It has been a privilege to have been able to work 
in this way.
Notes
1 H. Lintsen, Ed. (2000). Research tussen vetkool en zoetstof: zestig jaar DSM Research 1940-
2000. Eindhoven/Zutphen: Stichting Historie der Techniek/Walburg Pers.
2 See the sources for a list of these reports. In those cases where my text draws on these reports, 
I refer to the reports themselves, and not to the underlying sources. 
3 P.F.G. Vincken (2000). Van Staatsmijnen in Limburg tot DSM Chemie. Unpublished manu-
script.
4 E. Homburg, with contributions by A. van Rooij (2004). Groeien door kunstmest. DSM Agro 
1929-2004. Hilversum: Verloren.
5 A. van Rooij (2004). Building Plants: Markets for Technology and Internal Capabilities in 
DSM’s Fertiliser Business, 1925-1970. Amsterdam: Aksant. Dissertation Eindhoven University 
of Technology.
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Introduction: Research and Business in the 
Chemical Industry
“Industrial research is wonderful – if it pays off.” 1
Industrial research, or research and development (R&D), is a striking 
feature of innovation processes. In the twentieth century, large and well-
equipped laboratories, staffed by large numbers of researchers, replaced the 
lone inventor of the nineteenth century. Companies spent large amounts 
of money on these laboratories, aiming to improve existing technologies 
and to drive diversification. 
 But does it pay to do industrial research? Many products that are now 
ubiquitous, such as nylon, plastics and the transistor, would never have 
existed without the work of company-owned R&D laboratories. The com-
panies that pioneered these innovations have profited enormously from 
their investments in these facilities. On the other hand, many projects 
have failed or produced unexpected results. Because of this, the effective-
ness of R&D and its role in the development of a company are often ques-
tioned. The role of management, not just the management of the R&D 
organisation but above all the company’s top management and the man-
agement of its manufacturing organisation, is an important factor in this 
debate. Are R&D and business aligned? The relationship between R&D 
and other company functions, in particular marketing and production, 
has often been strained.
 This book confronts two essential questions in relation to R&D. First: 
what roles does industrial research play in a company’s development? And 
second: how does management direct the development of the company’s 
research activities? These two questions are essential but also complex to 
research and answer. This book uses a historical method and follows the 
chronological development of a number of R&D projects, which leads to 
an understanding of the complexity and persistency of these issues.
 This book analyses the Dutch chemical company DSM in depth. The 
company is over a hundred years old and has transformed itself several 
times. Having started life as a coal-mining company, it branched out into 
fertilisers, subsequently diversified into bulk chemicals and then became a 
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company active in fine chemicals and high performance materials.2 (Fig-
ure 1.1.) These three transformations reflect a striking and distinguishing 
characteristic of the company. Although DSM did not pioneer R&D as 
a method of invention and innovation, either in the chemical industry or 
in the Netherlands, it has built one of the largest industrial research facili-
ties in the country and has spent large amounts of money on R&D. The 
case of DSM offers an excellent opportunity to study the role of industrial 
research and the way in which it is managed.
 This introduction sets the stage for the next chapters. First the litera-
ture is reviewed to identify what roles R&D played in the development 
of companies and how the management of these companies affected the 
R&D organisation. The focus will be on the chemical industry, drawing 
examples from the electrical and other industries to call attention to sys-
tematic aspects of industrial research. Building on the review of the lit-
erature, the second part of this introduction will position DSM as a case 
study and outline the design of this book.
Figure 1.1. An overview of the development of DSM’s main activities.
Note: start years refer to years when production started. End years refer to closure in the 
cases of coal and coke, and sale in the case of plastics.
Transformation 1:
from coal and coke to fertilisers
Transformation 2:
from fertilisers to a diversified chemical company
Transformation 3:
from bulk chemicals to products  
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The History of Industrial Research: Patterns and Themes
The German dyestuffs industry was one of the first industries in which 
companies started to do industrial research. For some time, German com-
panies had simply copied the innovations of their French and British com-
petitors who were leading the industry. In 1877, a patent law was enacted 
in Germany that made it impossible to copy innovations as they now 
could be protected by patents. German firms developed industrial research 
as an answer, recruiting scientists and building laboratories to develop new 
products and processes and improve existing ones. The enactment of the 
patent law, a threat to the established route to innovation, was decisive in 
pushing companies towards R&D.3 
 In the United States, threats played a similarly important role in the 
creation of the first R&D laboratories. American Telephone & Telegraph 
(AT&T) responded to the threat that radio posed to telephone services 
with the establishment of an industrial research laboratory in 1911.4 Du 
Pont, an American chemical company and one of the first in the country 
to establish research facilities in 1902 and 1903, responded with R&D to 
the intention of some of its most important customers, the American army 
and navy, to enter its main business: explosives and particularly gunpow-
der. Du Pont continued to diversify by taking over innovative companies 
but increasingly vigorous anti-trust policies made this a difficult route to 
take in the 1920s, pushing Du Pont further towards R&D.5
 In general, large companies in chemicals and electronics pioneered in-
dustrial research and Germany and the United States were the leading 
countries. Threats, often commercial and/or technological, prompted firms 
to establish research laboratories. Historians have mainly studied pioneer-
ing companies, consequently focusing on the period between roughly 1870 
and 1920 and on organisational themes. In this period, companies had to 
find ways to organise and integrate industrial research laboratories in their 
organisations as a new form of technology development and innovation.6
 In the Netherlands, the electronics company Philips and the Bataaf-
sche Petroleum Maatschappij (BPM), the operational company of Royal 
Dutch/Shell in the Netherlands, established the first industrial research 
laboratories in the 1910s. At BPM, industrial research emerged gradually 
and as a reaction to competitive pressures to improve Borneo oil, one of its 
most important products at that time. At Philips, management intervened 
actively and reacted to a technological threat in its main business, the pro-
duction of light bulbs, by establishing a research laboratory. 
 The First World War catalysed the development of industrial research 
in the Netherlands as Dutch companies were cut off from their raw ma-
terials, their markets, or both. Several of them diversified into new busi-
nesses and established research laboratories to help diversification. Some of 
these laboratories did not survive the end of the war, but in the 1920s the 
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number of R&D laboratories started to grow and it continued to grow in 
the 1930s, while older laboratories grew in size.7 
 As the example of the Netherlands shows, by 1920 R&D was on the 
map in industry in general and an increasing number of companies started 
to do industrial research. The reasons for starting an industrial research 
laboratory shifted from specific threats to somewhat diffuse ideas about 
keeping up with the competition and industry standards. Increasingly, 
companies established research laboratories because their competitors had 
done so, and because they feared they would lag behind or that their stand-
ing would be harmed. This process continued above all in the 1930s, when 
R&D became an accepted and integral part of business.8 
 In the 1920s, pioneering companies turned to fundamental research, 
work that was not directly aimed at industrial applications but at gaining 
a thorough understanding of the problem under study. Du Pont, for in-
stance, started such a programme. It led to the development of neoprene, 
a synthetic rubber, and nylon. In the United States, the Second World War 
catalysed the turn to fundamental research. Large-scale projects funded by 
the federal government underlined the importance of R&D in general, 
and of fundamental research in particular. The successes, coupled to a be-
lief that fundamental research would inevitably yield new products and 
processes, convinced many companies to invest in this type of research af-
ter the war. Federal spending also continued. R&D became an industry.9
 In the Netherlands, the same pattern of growth can be seen. Philips 
started fundamental research before the war and invested heavily in this 
type of research after the war. Other companies also increased their R&D 
expenditure, and some of them started fundamental research programmes 
and invested in generic research such as analysis using the latest and most 
advanced technologies. Government R&D spending also increased, al-
though it never came to occupy the central place it did in the United 
States.10 
 Industrial research grew in size and scope after the Second World War, 
but the tide turned towards the end of the 1960s. The effectiveness of 
research, and above all fundamental research, in generating new products 
and processes came under scrutiny. At Du Pont, for instance, the involve-
ment of the research organisation in large scale, government-run projects 
of the Second World War had increased the management’s confidence in 
research. Fundamental research seemed to be the key to new products and 
processes. The 1950s and 1960s produced no new breakthrough products 
and technologies, however, and towards the 1970s the research organisa-
tion was refocused on commercial objectives, although Du Pont continued 
to invest heavily in R&D.11 
 David Hounshell argues that the Du Pont pattern is typical of many 
American companies: they all went through a period of fundamental re-
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search after the Second World War but refocused their priorities in the late 
1960s and in the 1970s.12 A similar conclusion was drawn from an analysis 
of managerial perspectives on research in the British chemical industry, 
and Ernst Homburg describes a similar pattern for the Netherlands. Af-
ter about 1965, the spectacular growth of the size and scope of industrial 
research in the Netherlands stagnated and some companies started to cut 
back on research. Emphasis was now put on the market, as wages had in-
creased, competition had intensified and saturation had become imminent 
on some markets. After 1965, companies cut back on fundamental research 
in particular, a process that continued in the 1980s and 1990s.13
 Another issue that emerged at several companies in the late 1960s was 
the isolated position of research. Kees Boersma and Marc de Vries have 
shown that research at Philips drifted away from manufacturing and mar-
keting after the Second World War. Homburg also cites the example of 
Philips and argues that such isolation was partly caused by the increased 
scale of industrial research after the Second World War.14 Highlighting the 
examples of the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) and Alcoa, large 
American corporations in electronics and aluminium, respectively, Marga-
ret Graham argues that centralised research facilities became generally iso-
lated in the 1950s and 1960s. Many companies centralised their previously 
decentralised technical activities and research. The research environment 
became highly competitive as increased federal spending prompted many 
institutions and companies to set up research facilities or to broaden the 
scope of existing facilities. Research laboratories, moreover, were increas-
ingly staffed with highly educated people, who were also more theoreti-
cally oriented than the previous generation of researchers and more loyal 
to their discipline than to the companies that employed them. Graham 
argues that corporate research, the research undertaken at centralised labor-
atories under the direct supervision of top management, became a ‘coun-
terculture’, an island populated by fundamental researchers.15
 Both Philips and RCA were large companies that operated with several 
divisions and a central (corporate) research laboratory, but Alcoa remained 
functionally organised. In their book about research at Alcoa, Graham and 
Bettye Pruitt note that the establishment of divisions had a negative effect 
on a company’s ability to carry out long-term research, particularly in the 
case of small, long-term projects that top management did not sponsor 
directly. This suggests that increased involvement of divisional business 
managers pushed research to the short term.16 
 Several recent studies of American industrial research practices in the 
1980s and 1990s show that companies focused research more on the short 
term than the long term, and formulated clear commercial and techno-
logical objectives for projects. They conducted less fundamental research, 
but increasingly cooperated in R&D with universities, research institutes 
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and competitors. These studies emphasise the contrast with earlier peri-
ods, and argue that in the 1950s and 1960s industrial research was typi-
cally centralised, technology-driven and knowledge-driven, and closed off 
from other company activities, particularly manufacturing and marketing. 
In the 1980s, however, the cost and technological complexity of projects 
increased, while management became increasingly concerned about the 
commercial pay-off from industrial research. Many companies began to 
focus their R&D efforts on business activities and decentralised research. 
Laboratories were set up at business unit level and divisional management 
became responsible for much of the funding of research. The overall aim 
was to link R&D with the company’s businesses. Research should not be 
undertaken to generate knowledge but to create new businesses or to im-
prove existing products and processes.17
 Decentralisation, increased cooperation and an increased focus on the 
short term are central themes that emerge from the literature on R&D in 
the 1980s. In management-oriented literature, increasing linkages between 
research and business are becoming the norm, and views on the practices 
of the 1950s and 1960s have become quite harsh. Roli Varma characterises 
the development of R&D management as a development from an ‘autono-
mous model’ to a ‘linkage model’. According to Varma, industrial research 
in the 1950s and 1960s was free from influence from business management, 
production and marketing, but progressed to a model with more linkages 
between all company functions. Philip Roussel, Kamal Saad and Tamara 
Erickson, consultants with Arthur D. Little, a firm with many clients in 
the chemical industry, describe basically the same development but char-
acterise it as a succession of three ‘generations’ of R&D management. Both 
Varma and Roussel et al. see the involvement of business management, 
marketing and production as a good thing.18
 The way in which the interface between research and the rest of the 
company was organised and how it developed over time are important 
themes, and the influence of business management is a crucial factor in 
this relationship. The short review of the history of R&D presented here 
also shows a pattern in the development of industrial research. In some 
countries and industries, industrial research developed sooner than in oth-
ers, but by the end of the First World War research was on the map every-
where. The build-up phase was followed by an expansion phase, typically 
after the Second World War, with increasing emphasis on fundamental 
research and an increasing isolation of the research organisation. In the 
late 1960s, the emphasis shifted to markets, where it has stayed although 
research expenditures have gone through some ups and downs. Moreover, 
companies increasingly started to cooperate in research and started to de-
centralise their laboratories in the 1980s.
 These patterns in the history of R&D seem to have been caused by 
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economics, as is clear in the shift of the late 1960s. Ernst Homburg, how-
ever, argues that firms also often copied each other’s strategic decisions 
on industrial research. According to Homburg, firms hold each other 
in a blindfolded embrace, not sure where to go, just ‘groping along the 
track’. The diffusion of contemporary management thinking through, for 
instance, research management associations, personal contacts and consul-
tants, led firms to move in the same directions. Homburg argues, more or 
less implicitly, that the difference between leaders and followers became 
increasingly blurred over the course of the twentieth century.19 
The Roles of Industrial Research in the Firm
Meeting Threats and Enabling Diversification
From the historical literature on R&D, two main roles of industrial re-
search emerge. First, R&D enabled companies to diversify and take up 
new lines of business; companies conduct research to enter a new business. 
Several Dutch companies started doing research during the First World 
War to help them establish new businesses. David Hounshell and John 
Smith’s well-known study of Du Pont similarly shows how research helped 
the process of diversification.20 Second, R&D enabled companies to meet 
threats; companies conduct research to support existing lines of business. 
Industrial research developed as a response to specific threats of a commer-
cial, technological or other nature.
 Diversification is one of the best-researched themes in the history of 
R&D and has received more attention than responsive, threat-induced 
research, although the latter has remained an important role of industrial 
research laboratories. In the dyestuffs industry, for instance, much of the 
work for new laboratories consisted of screening the work of competitors 
using the information published in patents or obtained through analysing 
products.21 Competitors often pose the main threat to a company. Re-
sponding to the innovations or other actions of competitors and defending 
the firm’s commercial and technological position is therefore an important 
role of an industrial research laboratory. This response typically entails cost 
reduction or product (quality) improvements.
 Threat-induced research will often be performed in relation to existing 
businesses to maintain or improve market position. William Utterback 
has built on the well-known life cycle concept to argue that different types 
of innovation are needed in different segments of the life cycle of a tech-
nology or a product. In the uncoordinated stage, a high rate of product 
innovations combines with a low rate of process innovations. This stage 
is followed by a segmental stage, during which a high rate of process in-
novations combines with a low rate of product innovations, and finally by 
a systematic stage with a medium rate of process innovations and a low 
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rate of product innovations. On the whole, products become increasingly 
standardised and competition on price becomes increasingly important.22 
 Utterback links market development to innovation processes. Particu-
larly in the systematic phase, the options for improvement are limited, 
perhaps requiring a different organisation and conduct of research. More-
over, Utterback’s model points to increasing technological maturity over 
time, or in other words, decreasing opportunities for innovation. Jeffrey 
Plotkin argues that chemical technology had reached the point of maturity 
by 1980. Efficient processes had been developed for most large-volume 
petrochemical products. The scale of plants had increased so much that 
the problems of scale-up and the risk involved in building a first-of-a-kind 
plant became prohibitive, while the economics of new processes were not 
attractive enough to shut down existing capacity (Plotkin speaks of ‘shut-
down economics’). In response, companies redirected their research away 
from process research but this redirection also reinforced maturity.23 
 In contrast to Plotkin, Joseph Bower argues in his book on the petro-
chemical industry around 1980 that new technology improved feedstock 
and energy efficiencies. In this way technology continued to have a large 
impact on the industry.24 Both Plotkin and Bower, however, point to the 
need to analyse research on existing products and not just focus on diver-
sification. An analysis of both areas is necessary to understand the role of 
industrial research in the development of a company. 
The Roles of Industrial Research and Innovation Strategy
As threat-induced research is linked with existing businesses, it also has a 
strategic dimension. Research enabling diversification is similarly linked 
with the strategies pursued by companies. Graham distinguishes two broad 
strategic categories in relation to industrial research: long-term, oppor-
tunity-generating work; and short-term, generic cost reduction. The first 
category can be linked to (possible) diversification, while the second can 
be linked to the maintenance of existing businesses and technologies.25 
 Louis Galambos, on the other hand, recognises formative and adaptive 
innovations in his analysis of the Bell System. He argues that Bell pursued 
both types of innovation at the same time, with the adaptive work focused 
on improving and systemising existing technologies, while the formative 
work focused on creating new technologies and shaping the direction of 
the telephone industry.26 
 Chris Freeman has tried to capture the different strategic roles of re-
search with a taxonomy of innovation strategies. He distinguishes between 
six strategies, but the crucial three are the offensive, defensive and imita-
tive strategies. A firm that pursues an offensive innovation strategy aims 
at achieving a breakthrough and being the first to market a new product. 
This risky, highly research-intensive strategy is the exception rather than 
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the rule. A firm that pursues a defensive innovation strategy is likely to 
invest almost as much in research as an offensive firm, but does not try to 
be first. A defensive company follows (at short distance) behind the lead-
ers in the industry, tries to appropriate a breakthrough, and improves this 
breakthrough if possible. Finally, a firm that pursues an imitative innova-
tion strategy conducts less research and does not try to catch up with the 
leaders in the industry but follows at some distance. Low costs, and the 
technological activities necessary to achieve low costs, are essential in this 
strategy.27 
 Freeman’s taxonomy has the advantage that it separates strategic 
goals more clearly from the actual research work than the concepts of 
Galambos and Graham. As in taxonomy, however, innovation strategies 
are ideal types, occasionally with porous boundaries. Also, Freeman’s imi-
tative strategy should not be understood as a strategy where firms simply 
‘imitate’ the innovations of others but as a strategy where low costs are 
emphasised.
 In Freeman’s taxonomy, enabling diversification can be linked to either 
an offensive or defensive innovation strategy, depending on whether a firm 
diversifies to establish a leading position or to catch up; or depending on 
whether the diversification embodies a breakthrough or an entry into a 
well-established field. A diversification might be called imitative when a 
firm enters a business in order not to miss the bandwagon and enjoys some 
specific advantage that enable it to compete. Meeting threats constitutes 
a defensive strategy: a firm responding to a change in its competitive or 
broader social and economic environment. The role of industrial research 
here is to maintain the firm’s existing businesses and technologies, and if 
possible to improve them.
 In R&D history, offensive diversification and offensive companies have 
received a lot of attention. Hounshell and Smith, for instance, analyse Du 
Pont, a company that invested heavily in R&D and grew into one of the 
largest and most innovative chemical companies in the world.28 Defensive 
companies have been studied much less, and therefore are an appropriate 
subject to analyse alongside threat-induced research: that is, the mainte-
nance of existing businesses and technologies. 
Other Roles of Industrial Research
Meeting threats and enabling diversification are not the only roles of in-
dustrial research that have been identified. Michael Dennis argues that 
R&D heightened entry barriers because firms wanting to enter a research-
intensive industry had to invest in research themselves. This relates to 
the argument of Homburg that pioneering companies put R&D on the 
map, thereby forcing others to follow. Wolfgang Wimmer has shown this 
process in his study of the pharmaceutical industry in Germany between 
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1880 and 1935, where the success of the research-intensive strategy of Bayer 
forced other, less research-focused companies to increase their investments 
in R&D.29
 Industrial research also heightened entry barriers by making product 
development proprietary, mainly through patenting. This enabled firms to 
increase their profits or control the rate and direction of technical change. 
Based on a case study from the American radio industry in the 1910s and 
1920s, Leonard Reich argues that companies tried to patent as much, and 
as close as possible to their competitor’s main businesses and core technolo-
gies. The extensive research that lay at the basis of this patenting drive was, 
according to Reich, rather undirected and sometimes barely connected 
to current commercial interests. Nevertheless, such patenting provided a 
defence against competitors and could lead to new business opportunities. 
It also created leverage in cross-licensing deals that were necessary when 
no single company could manufacture a product without infringing on 
another company’s patents.30
 In strong contrast with the example of Reich, Peter Spitz argues in his 
history of the petrochemical industry that in the 1950s and 1960s firms 
abandoned their control of technology by extensive licensing, leading to 
substantially increased competition in the market. Spitz argues that licen-
sing is one of the factors that caused the industry to become very competi-
tive, which in turn strained the profitability of companies.31
 Reich suggests that companies defended themselves with patents, but 
these companies operated offensively; they wanted to be the first and tried 
to monopolise markets and technologies. Again some large, innovative 
and offensive companies figure prominently in Reich’s work. The extent 
of control is a function of an industry’s structure. In the petrochemical 
industry, the leaders had a hard time maintaining their lead as many de-
fensive companies followed quickly in their footsteps and threatened to 
overtake their positions. Engineering contractors (companies specialised 
in engineering and construction of plants and suppliers of technology) 
also played an important role in this process as they had no production 
interests.32
 The desire of offensive companies to control the rate and direction of 
technological change suggests that these companies increasingly relied on 
in-house technological capabilities to innovate. There were also options 
to absorb outside sources of knowledge and technology, ranging from in-
dependent inventors and private laboratories to engineering contractors 
and the acquisition of innovative companies. Smith argues that absorbing 
outside inventions was a crucial skill in American industrial research in 
the 1920s. In economics, recent studies have emphasised the importance 
of tracking the development of technology outside the boundaries of the 
firm and of identifying possible options for acquisition. Research, and 
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technological capabilities in general, play a crucial role in this process and 
essentially contribute to absorptive capacity. From an innovation strategic 
perspective, absorbing outside innovations will typically be defensive. It 
might even be imitative when a company pursues a low-cost strategy and 
has the opportunity to acquire a plant to catch up with the state of the 
art.33
 Table 1.1 summarises the various roles of research discussed here and the 
relationship with innovation strategy. It suggests that industrial research in 
the role of ‘enabler of diversification’ can serve different innovation strate-
gies, whereas in other roles it is tied more to one particular strategy. This in 
turn suggests that the importance of these roles varies from one company 
to another.
 Outside the strategy perspective, in his history of R&D at Bayer, Georg 
Meyer-Thurow points to the training function of industrial research. In 
the early years of this company’s research laboratory, management often re-
cruited a chemist for its production activities from research, thereby gener-
ating a high labour turnover and giving the laboratory the task of training 
chemists that joined the company. Ulrich Marsch shows that the German 
chemical company Griesheim-Elektron made the inventing chemist also 
responsible for development work, and if this work was successful he or 
she was also made responsible for managing production.34
Table 1.1. Roles of research in the development of a company and innovation strategy.
Role of industrial research Innovation strategy
Offensive Defensive Imitative
Enabling diversification X (establish a lead) X (catch up) X (bandwagon)
Meeting threats X
Controlling technological change X
Increasing / developing absorptive 
capacity
X X
Business Management and Industrial Research
Business managers often played an important role in the practice of R&D. 
Homburg mentions the example of Jurgens, one of the forerunners of 
Unilever, where local business management frustrated every effort to coor-
dinate and manage research. In her analysis of RCA, by contrast, Graham 
points to the importance of RCA’s long-time top manager. He believed that 
research was necessary in order to compete and innovate, and provided a 
setting in which research could flourish. Either positively or negatively, 
business management played an important role in industrial research.35
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 There is also a link between the pattern identified in the history of 
R&D and management ideas about the role and importance of research. 
Successful projects, as well as ideas about the importance and management 
of research, fuelled the expansion of fundamental research after the Second 
World War. This faith was shaken in the late 1960s and many companies 
redirected their efforts to market-oriented research. Many other factors 
played a role in this switch, but the role of management cannot be ne-
glected. Galambos, writing about the pioneering phase of industrial re-
search, even argues that the momentum a research organisation creates can 
take the place of short-term, market-related business economic considera-
tions.36 
 Graham and Hounshell have tried to identify the key challenges that 
research and business managers face when dealing with R&D. Graham ar-
gues that corporate research has often been poorly understood by business 
managers, leading to tensions and unrealistic demands being placed on 
research. She argues that uncertainty is a defining feature of R&D projects, 
and is a feature that makes them hard to manage. When outcomes are 
uncertain, setting strict targets and just pouring in money and personnel 
has little effect. At some point, on the other hand, outcomes can become 
more certain and then an intensive and targeted effort might lead to re-
sults. However, it is difficult to determine when projects have arrived at 
that point. Research managers are fighting on two fronts: internally they 
have to decide which projects are viable, manage a broad array of possi-
ble outcomes and technologies in the uncertain phase of projects; at the 
same time they need to find support for projects from business manage-
ment, who are by nature focused more on the short term than on the long 
term. According to Graham, the interface between research and business 
management is crucial but difficult because of the nature of R&D. Some 
tension between research and business is unavoidable, and this tension can 
even be a source of creativity in research. Corporate R&D should develop 
a ‘technical vision’: a view of technological opportunities matched to the 
company’s capabilities that enables business managers to select the most 
promising lines of business. According to Graham, R&D can develop this 
vision in the area of tension between research and business.37
 Hounshell argues that three persistent problems have haunted R&D 
management ever since companies started to build research laboratories. 
He argues that the question of the best organisation of research has re-
mained open since the late nineteenth century. Hounshell sees the move-
ments from centralised to decentralised research as cyclic and, in an analy-
sis like that of Homburg, influenced by bandwagon behaviour. Closely 
related to the question of the organisation of research is the question of 
finding a balance between short-term and long-term research. Finding this 
balance is difficult because firms cannot invest in research strictly on a 
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short-term basis, but the results of long-term research are highly uncertain 
and unpredictable. This unpredictability is the final structural problem 
Hounshell identifies, arguing that no models have yet been developed that 
can capture the complex issue of research results quantitatively.38
 Hounshell illustrates his three persistent problems with the case of Du 
Pont, a company that pioneered return on investment calculations and 
that tried to use quantitative data in the decision-making process whenever 
possible. Du Pont tried to use a formal, quantitative research management 
system but with limited success. The system worked reasonably well for 
short-term projects, but management found that long-term projects could 
be better judged on the merits of the research itself, a system that remained 
in place until the 1960s. This system relied on management’s ability to 
understand research, and when they lost that ability, a quantitative system 
was again implemented. Hounshell strongly argues that this was an act of 
‘desperation’ because he sees no alternative to informed judgement in the 
management of research.39 
 Both Graham and Hounshell suggest that the management of R&D 
remains an open-ended process. This contrasts with the ideas of Varma 
and Roussel et al., as they suggest that companies have developed, or at 
least can develop, excellent R&D management structures. They imply a 
somewhat linear view of the development of industrial research, from a 
situation where business management and research diverged to a situa-
tion where they (increasingly) converged. The work of Graham shows that 
such convergence is difficult and also that divergence makes research use-
ful for companies. This debate provides a route to analyse research man-
agement.40
The Development of Technological Capabilities in Firms
Industrial research contributes to a firm’s technological and organisational 
competence: it enables a firm to develop technology and to organise this 
activity. Hounshell argues that organisational capabilities are vital in the 
diversification process and for the company’s long-term success.41 Apart 
from the training of personnel, the roles of industrial research are built 
on technology (patents, a new process, an improved product etc.). The 
technology that R&D generates, fuels the performance of its roles in the 
development of a company.
 Through projects, R&D builds organisational and technological capa-
bilities. Gary Pisano argues that research projects have a dual output: they 
generate technology a firm can use, but at the same time they generate 
generic knowledge, particularly about how to conduct R&D better and 
faster; in other words, research projects build organisational capabilities. 
Pisano argues that projects may also generate fundamental knowledge that 
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may be used in later projects but that technological knowledge is for the 
most part project-specific and cannot easily be transferred. For Pisano, 
industrial research is path dependent and cumulative: technology that was 
developed in the past enables a firm to start new projects but, at the same 
time, limits the options that may come into view.42 
 Pisano’s model also shows why research is unpredictable. The dual out-
put of R&D projects leads to secondary effects which in turn often make 
it hard to predict the outcome of research projects beforehand, particularly 
in the case of long-term projects, and to measure the returns from research 
afterwards. When the primary objective of a project fails, there may still 
be a payoff later: through a spin-off, through generic knowledge accumu-
lated, or through the ability to continue a line of research.43 
 Pisano’s study is tied in with a resource-based view of the firm. Fol-
lowing the pioneering work of Edith Penrose, firms are conceptualised as 
bundles of resources and competences that determine the direction of di-
versification. As such, firms do not branch out in all directions but tend to 
specialise in a few broad market areas or technologies. Penrose calls these 
market and technology bases, respectively. Path dependencies again play 
an important role.44 
 In a study of the American chemical firm Hercules Powder Company, 
established in 1912 as a result of an anti-trust suit brought against Du Pont, 
Penrose has tried to analyse the development of capabilities. She argues 
that from the company’s main line of business in 1912, explosives and spe-
cifically black powder and dynamite, it diversified into paints by building 
on experience in nitrocellulose, an important intermediate for its main 
line of business but a compound that could be used in paints as well. The 
research department of Hercules, established in 1919, also contributed to a 
shift in technology and market base. The research department investigated 
the chemical processing of wood to manufacture resins, turpentine and 
pine oil. Although it involved different technologies and markets, Penrose 
argues that there was a relationship with Hercules’ existing lines of busi-
ness through generic experience in chemistry.45
 Penrose analyses the shifting technology bases of Hercules by identify-
ing the elements of existing bases that enable new bases to grow. Specific 
bodies of knowledge were important in the case of this firm. Such bodies 
of knowledge can also be related to generic types of research work. Im-
portant in this respect are product and process research, development and 
engineering. Product research aims at new or improved products while 
process research aims at new or improved processes. Development can be 
undertaken to improve products but is also a form of continued process 
research, intended to make preliminary process designs. The process can 
need custom equipment for which designs are made during process re-
search. The process is also scaled-up from laboratory equipment to indus-
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trial size. Pilot plants may provide an intermediate step, enabling research 
on a scale of several tons per day for instance, and enabling preliminary 
market scans with the output of the plant. Pilot plants can also be used 
to improve products. Engineering, finally, leads to a design for an indus-
trial-size plant. Engineering involves establishing the configuration of the 
process and the way in which the equipment should be placed, and it also 
entails making the drawings and specifications that are necessary to con-
struct a plant.46
 Analysing shifts in technology and market bases is important for un-
derstanding the role of industrial research in the development of a com-
pany. Following Penrose’s approach, the challenge in analysing the growth 
of technological capabilities is to specify which elements of existing tech-
nology and market bases enable building of new bases. Following Pisano’s 
approach, an analysis of research projects and technology development 
can provide the input to shifting technology bases. Pisano’s dual output 
model also points to the importance of spin-offs from specific projects and 
generic knowledge and capabilities for building technology bases.
Design of the Book
So far, this chapter has reviewed the literature on R&D to specify patterns 
in the roles and management of industrial research. Through this review of 
the literature, the outline of the book can be detailed further. This chapter 
started out with two questions: the roles of industrial research in the devel-
opment of a company, and the management of industrial research. Now 
DSM as a case study has to be positioned and specified.
DSM’s Three Transformations
DSM differs from the companies typically chosen for R&D case studies. 
Historians have often studied large American or German companies that 
pioneered R&D in the period between roughly 1870 and 1920; companies 
such as Du Pont, for instance. Much less has been written about the period 
after 1920, and particularly about the period after 1980.
 DSM decided to establish a research laboratory in 1938, well after the 
pioneering phase of 1870-1920. Although the company grew into one of 
the largest companies in the Netherlands, it did not belong to the class of 
R&D pioneers in the chemical industry and in the Netherlands, nor did 
it belong to the largest and most innovative companies in the chemical 
industry for a long time in its history. Measured by sales, DSM ranked 
seventeenth in the top fifty of the world’s largest chemical firms in 1974, 
at a time when the company’s chemical businesses were going through a 
substantial expansion process. By this measure, the industry’s leaders were 
about three times larger than DSM. On the other hand, DSM was more 
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The main building of DSM’s Central Laboratory (Geleen, the Netherlands) in June 1954. 
Although the rural setting suggests otherwise, the Central Laboratory was built on DSM’s 
main production site, close to the production plants. The building is still being used for 
research purposes today.
Table 1.2. Top 50 chemical producers in the world, 1974.
 
Ranking Company Country Sales
Million dollars
1 BASF West Germany 8,542
2 Hoechst West Germany 7,795
3 ICI UK 7,331
4 Bayer West Germany 7,180
5 Du Pont US 6,910
17 DSM The Netherlands 2,645
50 Beecham UK 1,044
J. Wei, T. W. F. Russel & M. W. Swartzlander (1979). The Structure of the Chemical Industry. 
McGraw-Hill. Table 5.16, 172-173.
Note: sales for DSM exclude energy.
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than twice as large as the smallest company in this list. (Table 1.2.) 
 DSM is also an interesting case study in itself. The Dutch state estab-
lished DSM in 1902 as a coal-mining company but the company diversi-
fied in the 1910s and 1920s by building two large coke oven plants for the 
production of coke, an industrial fuel. From the production of coal and 
coke, DSM entered the chemical industry in 1930 by starting the produc-
tion of nitrogen fertilisers. The company bought the necessary technology 
from engineering contractors but started to build internal technological 
capabilities at the same time and in 1938 decided to establish the Central 
Laboratory, a central R&D organisation. 
 In the 1930s, DSM established a foothold in the chemical industry 
through fertiliser production and the establishment of its R&D organi-
sation. After the Second World War, the company expanded and diver-
sified further into the chemical industry. First, DSM started producing 
caprolactam, an intermediate for nylon; later the company moved into 
plastics and resins. Its R&D organisation expanded and diversified at 
the same pace. The company also established an engineering department 
(Chemiebouw) and a licensing subsidiary (Stamicarbon) shortly after the 
war. Chemiebouw and Stamicarbon played an important role in DSM’s 
innovation processes. Chemiebouw supported innovation and R&D with 
engineering capabilities; Stamicarbon developed into an extra outlet for 
research alongside DSM’s own production organisation.
 As DSM’s chemical businesses expanded, the company’s coal-related 
businesses declined. The coke oven plants closed in the late 1960s, and the 
last pit stopped production in 1973. The company now depended on its 
chemical businesses and had a large research organisation. DSM had di-
versified, but mainly produced bulk chemicals: products that are manufac-
tured in large volumes but with relatively low profit margins. In the 1980s, 
management took action and focused the company on markets in which 
DSM had a strong commercial and technological position, and started a 
search for products with a higher value-added than bulk chemicals. The 
company reinforced its activities in fine chemicals and high-performance 
materials and both gradually became central in DSM’s portfolio. The im-
portance of activities in fertilisers and synthetic fibre intermediates de-
clined, and recently the company sold its activities in bulk plastics.47
 Over the course of its long history, DSM went through three transfor-
mations: from coal and coke to fertilisers; from fertilisers to a wide variety 
of chemicals; and finally towards products with high value-added (Figure 
1.1.). These three transformations distinguish DSM from other chemical 
companies. Quite a few European companies diversified from coke and 
coke oven gas to fertilisers in the 1920s and expanded in the chemical 
industry after the Second World War, but not many of them have gone 
through a second and a third transformation. DSM provides much mate-
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rial for an analysis of the role of in-house research in the development of a 
firm.
 As part of the second transformation, the company took on the name 
of DSM in 1969. Before that year, this name had been used as an interna-
tional trade name only. DSM was an abbreviation of Dutch State Mines, a 
name that reflected what had been the official Dutch name: Staatsmijnen 
in Limburg. The change of name reflected that the company had moved 
away from coal.48
DSM’s Products
As DSM transformed itself from one business to another and to the next, 
it is important to analyse the shifts in its market and technology bases. Fol-
lowing Pisano and Penrose, the method of this book will focus on R&D 
projects. However, the choice of R&D projects should not be limited 
to diversification. Historical studies often focus on diversification, while 
much less has been written on the crucial role of R&D in the maintenance 
of existing businesses. In this book, R&D is analysed in relation to diver-
sification and in relation to the maintenance of existing businesses over 
the years.
 This book does not analyse all of DSM’s R&D and all of the company’s 
lines of business. Exemplary products have been chosen as case studies that 
reveal contrasting characteristics of the role and management of R&D, 
and of the company’s three transformations. In short, products have been 
chosen that reveal the nature of innovation processes at DSM. 
 The choice of products to analyse for DSM’s first transformation is 
straightforward. The establishment of fertiliser production is analysed, fol-
lowed by the process through which the company started to build inter-
nal capabilities. The improvement of the acquired ammonium sulphate 
process, and the development of a mixed fertiliser process on the basis of 
acquired patents, are central. This work also provides an entry into the 
decision-making process that led to the establishment of the Central Labor-
atory, DSM’s formal R&D organisation. Finally, the development of an 
alcohol process shows the first careful steps in fields outside fertilisers.
 After the Second World War, expansion and diversification character-
ised the development of DSM’s chemical businesses and of its R&D. The 
development of urea processes reflects this expansion. Urea developed into 
the main export fertiliser and DSM built a large production capacity for 
this product over the years. The company worked from its established ca-
pabilities in fertilisers to develop production technology for urea, but the 
Central Laboratory eventually propelled DSM into a position of techno-
logical leadership.
 The case of caprolactam, an intermediate for the synthetic fibre nylon, 
shows the diversification in DSM’s chemical businesses and in its research. 
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After starting the production of alcohol, DSM took a second, and much 
more important, step outside fertilisers with caprolactam. It involved a 
different branch of chemistry and required a broader scope in R&D than 
urea and other fertilisers. Caprolactam reflects the drive to broaden the 
Central Laboratory’s scope, and shows how this broadened scope mattered 
for R&D and the company. Through caprolactam, DSM built a new tech-
nology base and took an important step towards its second transforma-
tion.
 The caprolactam technology base was vital for the development of a 
process for the synthesis of lysine, an amino acid. This project failed in 
the market and this failure had important effects on the development of 
research policies in the 1970s. The lysine project, however, also had im-
portant technological spin-offs in the field of fine chemicals. In this way, 
caprolactam enables the analysis of a chain of R&D-based diversifications 
and links the second to the third transformation.
 The second transformation, from a fertiliser producer to a diversified 
chemical company, rested on several other products besides caprolactam, 
in particular polyethylene (a type of plastic), melamine (an intermediate 
for resins) and EPDM (a type of synthetic rubber). Like caprolactam, these 
products show the diversification in business and the increased scope of 
research. DSM’s fertiliser technology base provided a link with melamine 
(through urea) while polyethylene technology provided a link to EPDM 
synthetic rubbers and other diversifications in the field of plastics after 
1970. 
 Caprolactam, polyethylene, melamine and EPDM overlap as cases of 
DSM’s innovation processes. Caprolactam is preferred here because of the 
links with lysine and fine chemicals. In addition, it was DSM’s first major 
step outside fertilisers after the Second World War, and the technology 
base built in relation to caprolactam also fed polyethylene. Major develop-
ments in polyethylene, EPDM and melamine are reviewed, however, to 
balance the picture of DSM and its R&D organisation. DSM recently 
divested its activities in bulk plastics such as polyethylene, but before that, 
these products were a significant part of the company’s turnover and its 
R&D budget.
 To analyse DSM’s third transformation, this book will focus on fine 
chemicals in the period after 1970. In addition, the case of Dyneema®, a 
strong and stiff polyethylene fibre, shows the development of a product 
in the field of high performance materials. Today, Dyneema® is one of 
DSM’s most remarkable products. It originated from fundamental poly-
mer research in the late 1950s but was commercialised in the late 1980s. 
Dyneema’s® long history provides an interesting insight into the changing 
role of R&D and changing managerial expectations.
 Alongside fine chemicals and Dyneema®, research on urea and capro-
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lactam is followed from 1970 until 1990. The contrast between these two 
products is interesting. Urea declined in importance for DSM as a fertiliser 
and today is manufactured only as an intermediate for melamine produc-
tion. Caprolactam, in contrast, remained an important business for DSM. 
Urea and caprolactam are interesting cases to analyse the role of research 
in the maintenance, or decline, of existing businesses. 
 EPDM and melamine have also remained important products for 
DSM. The company also invested heavily in the expansion and diversifi-
cation of its plastics business until the 1990s. Caprolactam is preferred here 
because of its role in DSM’s second transformation. It is then followed 
further to analyse the role of R&D in the maintenance of existing busi-
nesses.
 This book ends in 1990. The material presented here provides a suffi-
cient basis for analysing the role of R&D in DSM’s three transformations 
as well as its role in the maintenance of existing businesses. In the pe-
riod between 1930 and 1990, moreover, management views of R&D went 
through a full cycle: from high faith to a more critical view in the 1970s, 
and again to more faith in the 1980s. This cycle can also be seen in DSM’s 
research expenditure. (See graph A2 in the appendix.) A short epilogue 
reviews some trends in the role and management of industrial research at 
DSM in the 1990s. In this way the book tries to build a bridge from his-
torical analysis to current practices, and tries to extend the cycle of R&D 
to the present. 
 The book is structured chronologically. The chapters follow a format 
and start with an analysis of business strategy and research organisation, 
followed by an analysis of research work. The first chapter considers DSM’s 
entry into the chemical industry, the initial build-up of capabilities and the 
establishment of the Central Laboratory. The next chapter deals with the 
period 1945-1970 and analyses urea, caprolactam and lysine, as well as the 
changing organisational structure of research and the shifting strategies. 
The last two chapters deal with the 1970s and 1980s respectively, again ana-
lysing urea and caprolactam but also Dyneema and the build-up of DSM’s 
business and research in fine chemicals. The book closes with answers to 
the central research questions and a short epilogue on the 1990s. 
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From Works Laboratories to Centralised 
 Research
Late in 1940, DSM’s researchers moved to a new, large and spacious labor-
atory building. Their relocation constituted an important change: the new 
building housed a centralised research organisation. However, DSM’s cen-
tralised research department grew out of its existing research organisation 
and out of its existing research effort. DSM was established as a coal-mining 
company in 1902 and branched out into coke in 1919 and into fertilisers in 
1930. Works laboratories at one of the coke oven plants and at the fertiliser 
works conducted not only routine quality control but also some research. 
The initiative to establish a central research organisation came from these 
laboratories. The works laboratory of the fertiliser works in particular proved 
crucial for the establishment of DSM’s central research department.
 In 1940, a dedicated research organisation was nothing new. Pioneering 
companies in the chemical industry had set the example in the late nineteenth 
century, and in the Netherlands in the 1910s. These pioneering companies 
often responded to a specific commercial or technological threat. DSM re-
sponded to a diffuse threat. The company thought that centralised industrial 
research ensured competitiveness. Pioneering companies had put industrial 
research on the map and DSM adapted to a well-established practice.
 The development of research from works laboratories to a centralised 
and dedicated research department is central to this chapter. The step to-
wards centralised research is analysed from an organisational perspective, 
focusing on how and why it grew out of works laboratories, and from the 
perspective of the research work done in the 1930s, focusing on how con-
tinuity was built between the works laboratories and centralised research.1 
Coal and Coke: The Establishment and Development of DSM in 
the 1910s and 1920s
At the end of the nineteenth century, private companies gave coal-mining 
in Limburg a boost. Coal had been mined in this region for a long time, 
but the entry of these companies, mostly with Belgian and German exper-
tise and capital, marked the beginning of large-scale industrial coal-min-
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ing in the Netherlands. The involvement of Belgian and German groups 
sparked a debate about the question of whether or not the Dutch State 
should intervene and perhaps even take up coal-mining itself. The result of 
this debate was the establishment of DSM in 1902. The State fully owned 
DSM and gave the company the right to exploit the coalfields in Limburg 
that had not yet been granted to private companies.
 Planning for the first mine started quickly after DSM had been estab-
lished. The company mined its first coal in 1908 and soon opened addi-
tional pits. Exploratory drilling showed that DSM’s second field contained 
bituminous coal, a type of coal that was suitable for the manufacture of 
coke but difficult to sell as an energy source for households. Coke was a 
fuel used for a variety of industrial purposes and in blast furnaces. It was 
produced by heating bituminous coal without letting in air or oxygen (so-
called dry distillation). A gas similar to the well-known coal-based town 
gas was produced as a by-product. At the end of the nineteenth century, 
engineering contractors developed industrial plants which gave operators 
the opportunity to recover and exploit the gas. It was used to supply the 
heat necessary to distil coal, but could also be sold to surrounding villages 
and cities. Coke oven plants of this type had other by-products as well.2
 When it became clear that DSM’s second field would produce bitumi-
nous coal, management soon considered taking up coke manufacture. In 
1910, they decided to build a coke oven plant, but construction of the pit 
and its adjacent installations took priority. In 1914, the well-known Ger-
man engineering contractor Hinselmann was hired to build a coke oven 
plant. To supervise the work of Hinselmann, and to manage the future 
production of coke, DSM appointed Daan Ross van Lennep, an engineer 
who had worked in the town gas industry.
 The outbreak of the First World War delayed the construction of the 
coke oven plant, but in 1919 DSM started production and a year later 
the installation operated at full capacity. The company expanded the coke 
oven plant as the production of bituminous coal increased. Another bitu-
minous coal field also came into production in 1926. Evence Coppée, like 
Hinselmann a specialist engineering contractor, built a second, very large, 
coke oven plant on that site. The installation started production in 1929.
 Through these two coke oven plants, DSM became a large manufac-
turer of coke and also produced substantial amounts of several by-prod-
ucts. Such diversification was explicit policy. DSM’s operating results in 
coal were rather poor and new businesses based on internally-available raw 
materials were welcome. Frits van Iterson in particular held this view. He 
had been a professor of mechanical engineering at Delft Technical Col-
lege (Netherlands, now Delft University of Technology) before he was ap-
pointed to DSM’s top management in 1914. In this managing board, Van 
Iterson became responsible for above-ground installations, including the 
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manufacture of coke and by-products, and soon became the driving force 
behind DSM’s diversification. Van Iterson held the opinion that the com-
pany ought to maximise the value of its raw materials. Coke manufacture 
made the company less dependent on the cyclic fluctuations of the coal 
market. DSM also tried to sell coke oven gas to surrounding municipali-
ties, but this proved to be difficult in the early 1920s. Towns and cities of-
ten operated their own facilities to produce town gas and were reluctant to 
buy coke oven gas from DSM. In the 1920s, however, another feedstock-
driven diversification came into view: large scale nitrogen fertilisers.
Nitrogen Fertilisers: DSM’s Entry into the Chemical Industry
Ammonia is the key intermediate for the production of nitrogen fertilis-
ers. From the middle of the nineteenth century, the town gas industry, 
and later the coke industry, formed the main source of supply. Both these 
industries extracted ammonia from the gas they produced. Most of it went 
DSM’s first coke oven plant, called Emma, in June 1926. In the foreground are the batteries 
of ovens in which coal was distilled. The resulting coke was discharged from the ovens and 
transported to the tower in the back, where it was cooled down, creating a characteristic 
steam plume. Coke oven plants produced coke, an industrial fuel, and coke oven gas, an 
important energy source and starting point for chemical operations. Production of coke 
pulled DSM into the chemical industry.
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into the production of ammonium sulphate, the result of a reaction of am-
monia and sulphuric acid. The amounts were relatively small, as ammonia 
production was linked to town gas or coke production, but could be sub-
stantial in the case of large coke oven plants. DSM produced ammonium 
sulphate as a by-product of coke manufacture as well, and dwarfed other 
Dutch producers because of the scale of the coke oven plants.
 In the early 1920s, the French engineering contractor Claude, followed 
by its German competitor Linde, and soon by several other companies as 
well, developed processes to extract hydrogen from coke oven gas. Hydro-
gen was an interesting product at that time. In 1913, the German chemical 
company BASF had put on stream the first ammonia synthesis plant in the 
world. BASF manufactured ammonia from its elements, hydrogen and ni-
trogen. Several engineering contractors followed BASF’s breakthrough and 
developed ammonia synthesis processes. Nitrogen could be produced from 
atmospheric air by cooling it to low temperatures, but the supply of hydro-
gen was more difficult. The technologies from Claude and Linde brought a 
cheap and abundant supply of hydrogen into view: coke oven gas. 
 There were many coke oven plants around the world and particular-
ly in Europe. With the availability of ammonia synthesis processes, and 
technologies to extract hydrogen from coke oven gas, a route to nitrogen 
fertilisers was open to manufacturers of coke. Moreover, the fertiliser mar-
Source: RAL, 17.26/ 19B inv. no. 387: De Nederlandse markt voor stikstofmeststoffen se-
dert 1921/22, ca. 1955. Note: Fertiliser years ran from 1 July in one year to 1 July in the 
following year.
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ket grew in the 1920s and particularly in the Netherlands (see graph 2.1). 
Most coke manufacturers already knew the fertiliser market as they often 
produced ammonium sulphate as a by-product. The route via ammonia 
synthesis would boost production tremendously, however.
 As a large manufacturer of coke, DSM was interested in the large-scale 
manufacture of fertilisers. For Van Iterson, the route to fertilisers via am-
monia synthesis was interesting primarily because it would use internally-
available feedstock and energy. Fertiliser production would consume large 
amounts of coke oven gas and also a large part of the electricity that the 
company generated in its own power station. Fertilisers opened up the 
possibility of making more money out of the coal and coke operations. 
Calculations of profits also showed promising results, but a thorough 
analysis of the market and DSM’s possible position was not made. DSM 
simply assumed there was a market for its greatly expanded production.
 At the end of 1925, the option of large-scale fertiliser manufacture took 
concrete shape for the first time, but it took several years before Van Iterson 
and Ross van Lennep detailed the final plans. Internal development of the 
necessary technology was not considered because DSM did not have the 
capability to do so, and because ammonia and fertiliser technologies were 
available from several engineering contractors.3 DSM chose to hire one 
of these contractors: the Belgian company Ammoniaque Synthétique 
et Dérivés (ASED), a joint venture of Coppée and Montecatini. Cop-
pée was an experienced engineering contractor that had worked for DSM 
before; Montecatini was the leading company of the Italian chemical in-
dustry and had developed its own ammonia synthesis technology. ASED 
built an ammonia plant for DSM, as well as a plant for the manufacture of 
ammonium sulphate. Construction of the new plants started in 1928. 
 DSM also took steps in the late 1920s to build a market for its fertilis-
ers. The company developed close relationships with farmers’ cooperatives 
in the Netherlands, who controlled the Dutch market, and built a network 
of sales agents abroad. In May 1930, DSM’s fertiliser works, called the SBB 
(Stikstofbindingsbedrijf, Dutch for ‘nitrogen fixation works’), shipped its 
first ammonium sulphate. Prices fell dramatically, however, because many 
other coke producers had decided to build an ammonia plant and boost 
their fertiliser production (Graph 2.2.). Most of them produced mainly 
ammonium sulphate and the market was oversupplied. IG Farbenindus-
trie, the conglomerate into which BASF had merged with some other ma-
jor German chemical companies in 1925, took the lead in establishing a 
fertiliser cartel and this cartel stabilised prices after 1932. Moreover, the 
Dutch government restricted imports of nitrogen fertilisers in 1934, after 
many other countries had done the same in the early 1930s. Finally, the 
Dutch fertiliser industry established a central sales office in 1935 (called 
central sales office for nitrogen fertilisers: Centraal Stikstofverkoopkantoor, 
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CSV). This sales office united Dutch producers and also became the sole 
importer of nitrogen fertilisers.4
 The cartel, import limitations and the CSV stabilised the fertiliser 
market. The SBB in the meantime cut its production costs, expanded 
production and diversified. In August 1931, DSM hired Uhde, a German 
contractor with extensive interests in fertiliser technologies, to engineer 
and construct a nitric acid plant and a plant for the manufacture of cal-
cium ammonium nitrate. Nitric acid was an intermediate necessary for the 
manufacture of this fertiliser.
 For the SBB, the first half of the 1930s was difficult but fertiliser pro-
duction incurred no losses and profitability improved substantially after 
1935.5 The SBB performed well in comparison to DSM’s other activities. 
Feedstock-driven diversification paid off in this way. Coal led to coke and, 
through coke oven gas, to ammonia and fertilisers. The availability of tech-
nology gave DSM the means to pursue this feedstock-driven course as 
engineering contractors built both the coke oven plants and the large-scale 
fertiliser production plants.
 The course DSM took with its diversifications into coke and fertilis-
ers shows that the Dutch government gave the company the freedom to 
develop its own policies. DSM was fully state-owned but in 1913 govern-
ment instructed top management to run the company like a private busi-
ness. Unlike other state-owned companies, DSM had no monopoly but 
Graph 2.2. Prices of ammonium sulphate and calcium ammonium nitrate in the 
Netherlands.
Source: RAL, 17.26/19B inv. no. 387: Het stikstoverbruik in Nederland. Bogers, 15 December 
1950.
[7] RAL, archief DSM 17.26/19B inv.no. 387: Het stikstoverbruik in Nederland, Drs. W. Bogers, 15 december 1950.
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competed with other businesses. To meet this competition, the company 
was given more freedom than the Dutch postal, telegraph and telephone 
services for instance, where the involvement of the Dutch government was 
much more direct. The instructions of 1913 were to remain the framework 
for the relations between DSM and the Dutch state until the late 1980s, 
when the government privatised part of the company.6
Keeping Up: The Establishment of the Central Laboratory
Works Laboratories at DSM
When the first coke oven plant started in 1919, DSM established a works 
laboratory near this plant for routine control of raw materials, intermedi-
ates and end products. This laboratory checked the quality of the coal used 
for coking, and also (among others) the by-product, ammonium sulphate. 
In the 1920s, the works laboratory of the coke oven plant also started to 
work for the mines. It tested air samples, which enabled control of ventila-
tion and was important for the safety of the miners. Almost 7,000 samples 
were tested in 1928. The works laboratory also tested the strength of con-
crete and other materials. Shaft derricks, cooling towers and other build-
ings were often designed in-house and made of reinforced concrete. Tests 
of building materials were important when DSM undertook expansion 
and revamping projects.7
The works laboratory of the Emma coke oven plant in 1923. The production of coke, coke 
oven gas and by-products was checked and supported by analysis. This routine work took 
up most of the time in the laboratory, but some research was conducted as well, although 
on a limited scale.
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 The expansion of the tasks and workload of the works laboratory led 
top management to upgrade this facility to a ‘Central Laboratory’ around 
1928. The name reflected the central position the works laboratory had de-
veloped in DSM’s organisation. DSM hired Honoré Pieters in November 
1928 to head the Central Laboratory. Pieters had studied at Delft Technical 
College and had worked at the analytical laboratory of this technical col-
lege before joining DSM.8
 Under Pieters, DSM’s Central Laboratory conducted some research in 
the late 1920s and in the 1930s, alongside the routine checks that con-
stituted its main task. The laboratory helped DSM’s production units 
solve problems and also worked on improvements of technologies in use. 
Research was conducted to improve the removal of sulphur compounds 
from coke oven gas, for instance, leading to the so-called wet-purification 
process. The laboratory also worked on the improvement of analysis tech-
niques, which could improve the speed and efficiency of its service work. 
Research work was small-scale, however. Service research was the Central 
Laboratory’s primary task.9 
 Besides the Central Laboratory, DSM established a Central Experimen-
tal Station (Centraal Proefstation) in 1929, focused on supporting DSM’s 
mining operations. The Central Experimental Station conducted service 
work and some research, particularly in relation to mechanical engineer-
ing problems. The Experimental Station investigated the transportation of 
coal in the mines and coal classification, among others. It was also involved 
in research on electric welding. Besides mechanical engineering, physics 
was an important discipline at the Central Experimental Station.10
 Besides the Central Laboratory and the Central Experimental Station, 
DSM had a sizeable technical organisation in relation to its coal operations 
for planning and executing projects. DSM was a large, technology-orient-
ed company.11 This organisation and its capabilities also played a role in the 
establishment of large-scale fertiliser manufacture. DSM constructed the 
buildings necessary to house the installations ASED supplied and designed 
the infrastructure around the plant. DSM also had a lot of experience in 
supervising the work of contractors. Still, the start of large-scale fertiliser 
manufacture presented a challenge to DSM. Van Iterson wanted to hire 
engineers and chemists who had the ability to comprehend the processes 
used in the SBB’s plants. In 1930, Van Iterson hired three academically-
trained chemical engineers to oversee the production of ammonia and 
solve operational problems to guarantee continuous production. These 
three engineers, Jan van Aken, Johan Goris and Herman Zelders, came 
from the Dutch company ENKA, a manufacturer of synthetic fibres.12
 The ammonia plant had Van Iterson’s special attention. He wanted to 
hire a physicist to work in the gas and air separation section of the ammo-
nia plant. With cryogenic technology, using extremely low temperatures, 
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hydrogen and nitrogen were manufactured there. Van Iterson could not 
find a physicist, but his contacts suggested Gé Berkhoff, an academically-
trained chemist. Berkhoff was hired in 1929 but he first worked at the cryo-
genic laboratory of Leiden University. He was subsequently transferred to 
Willebroek in Belgium, where ASED operated plants comparable to those 
they were building for DSM. Berkhoff then came to the SBB, where he 
coached Van Aken, Goris and Zelders. 
 In the early 1930s, the SBB established its own works laboratory for 
routine quality control of fertiliser production. Soon after its start-up, the 
ammonia plant operated fairly smoothly and the SBB manufactured ferti-
lisers without major problems. Berkhoff was appointed head of the SBB’s 
works laboratory, and both Goris and Zelders came along with him. Van 
Aken was transferred to the staff department of the SBB. A final organisa-
tional addition to the SBB was the establishment of a patent department 
in 1932. 
Bold Plans: Towards a Dedicated Research Organisation
In a short period of time, DSM built a large fertiliser works and learnt the 
day-to-day routine of fertiliser production. This was no small achievement. 
By the 1930s, however, chemical companies and firms in other industries 
The works laboratory of the SBB nitrogen fixation works. The laboratory’s main task was 
routine production control, but it was also responsible for two diversifications and an im-
portant improvement in ammonium sulphate manufacture. The SBB works laboratory was 
an important building block for the Central Laboratory.
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had established large, independent research laboratories, intended to im-
prove existing products and processes and to work on diversification. In a 
report on the activities of the Central Laboratory between 1920 and 1929, 
Pieters noted that research was a very important activity of his laboratory, 
but that it was sometimes hampered by inadequate facilities and a shortage 
of personnel, in particular qualified personnel.13
 In December 1928, a few months after the construction of the SBB 
had started, top management considered research to be of the highest 
importance for the company. Drawing on the examples of IG Farben in 
Germany and Philips in the Netherlands, DSM’s top management argued 
that ‘An industry of a large size can only flourish through private research 
(…).’ Nevertheless, the time had not come to establish a research labora-
tory because the fertiliser works was still under construction.14
 Seven years later, Pieters and Berkhoff put the question of whether 
or not DSM should establish a dedicated research organisation back on 
the agenda. In 1935 they proposed merging the Central Laboratory with 
the SBB’s works laboratory. The Central Laboratory would then become 
the works laboratory for DSM’s first coke oven plant, complementing 
the works laboratory that had in the meantime been established at the 
company’s second coke oven plant. The remaining parts of the Central 
Laboratory would be merged with the works laboratory of the SBB into a 
new organisation that should be located near fertiliser production. This or-
ganisation would become responsible for all material testing, routine pro-
duction control of fertilisers, and research for both the coke and fertiliser 
operations. Pieters and Berkhoff proposed bringing together the chemists 
working in DSM’s laboratories in a centralised organisation. Their focus 
on chemists reflects the establishment and early growth of the SBB. Pieters 
and Berkhoff argued that in this way better use could be made of the avai-
lable personnel, instruments and library. Moreover, they argued that the 
close contact between chemists was an important advantage.15
 Top management responded to Pieters and Berkhoff ’s proposal by 
establishing a committee, chaired by Berkhoff. Although Van Iterson was 
not part of this committee, he actively involved himself with the issue 
Pieters and Berkhoff had put on the agenda. Van Iterson visited several 
companies to familiarise himself with R&D practice. He emphasised that 
industrial research was necessary ‘to keep up’: DSM should establish a 
dedicated research organisation to prevent the company from becoming 
uncompetitive.16 In contrast, R&D pioneers like Du Pont and BASF of-
ten started doing industrial research because of a specific commercial or 
technological threat. For instance, the enactment of the German patent 
law was one of the reasons why German dyestuff firms built laboratories 
in the late 1870s and 1880s. For DSM there was no compelling reason to 
set up a research department. Van Iterson believed that industrial research 
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was a necessity to remain competitive. Berkhoff and others shared this 
view. The case of DSM shows that R&D had become an accepted part of 
business strategy in the chemical industry. The company adapted itself to 
established practices.
 In 1938, Berkhoff ’s committee drafted a plan for DSM’s new research 
organisation. The new plan no longer argued for a merger between the 
Central Laboratory and the SBB’s works laboratory but proposed a reor-
ganisation of all research work at DSM. Works laboratories at both coke 
oven plants and at the SBB would become responsible for routine produc-
tion control. The Central Experimental Station would remain independ-
ent and concentrate on issues related to coal-mining. All other work would 
be centralised in a new laboratory, to be located at the SBB, and to be 
called the Central Laboratory, taking over this name from Pieters’ labora-
tory.
 The committee also proposed expanding research work substantially. 
In 1938 the number of people working in all of DSM’s laboratories totalled 
147. The committee planned that this number would more than double to 
342 by 1941, with the new Central Laboratory accounting for 204 people. 
A large new building would have to be built. In addition, the committee 
proposed constructing a new building for the Central Experimental Sta-
tion to improve its facilities. These were ‘bold plans’, Berkhoff recalled in 
1990.17
 Although the plans were bold for DSM, leading Dutch industrial 
firms and leading nitrogen fertiliser producers were conducting research 
on a larger scale than DSM. Among the SBB’s direct competitors were 
companies like IG Farben, ICI from Great Britain and Montecatini from 
Italy. All had large research facilities. In 1938, IG Farben employed 124 
academically-trained people alone at its ammonia laboratory in Oppau, 
where BASF had put on stream the first ammonia synthesis plant in the 
world. In the Netherlands, Philips employed 476 people in research in 
1939. In the same year, the Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij (BPM), the 
Dutch operating arm of Royal Dutch/Shell, employed 1165 people at their 
research centre in Amsterdam.
 DSM did not lag behind other coke companies that diversified into fer-
tilisers in the 1920s and 1930s. There were two other producers of nitrogen 
fertilisers in the Netherlands: the Maatschappij tot Exploitatie van Kooks-
ovengassen (Mekog) in IJmuiden, which started production in 1929; and 
the Compagnie Neérlandaise de l’Azote (CNA) in Sluiskil, which started 
production in 1930. CNA opened a small laboratory in 1930, soon after 
production started. This laboratory mainly worked on improving the am-
monia plant. Mekog leaned heavily on BPM, one of its major sharehold-
ers, and lacked independent innovative capacity before the Second World 
War.
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 Berkhoff ’s committee also drafted ambitious plans for the content of 
the Central Laboratory’s research. Besides research on existing products 
and processes, work was planned that aimed at utilising the available raw 
materials to establish new lines of business. The use of nitric acid for the 
production of dyes and explosives was one of the topics considered. Re-
search on new products and processes was also planned, as well as funda-
mental research and some product research. Fundamental research would 
be focused on catalysis and crystallisation, for instance. Catalytic processes 
were the basis of the production of ammonia and nitric acid, two crucial 
intermediates for the production of fertilisers. Crystallisation was an im-
portant process in the production of ammonium sulphate.18 Fundamental 
research aimed at gaining a deep understanding of topics that were of high 
industrial relevance. The choice of topics for fundamental research was 
not based on scientific interest or just plain curiosity on the part of re-
searchers. Moreover, catalysis and crystallisation were difficult to research 
for universities because their organisations were oriented towards scientific 
disciplines.19 
 In 1938, top management approved the plans to organise a central re-
search department. They also approved the plans to build new facilities for 
the Central Laboratory and the Central Experimental Station. In Novem-
ber 1940, the first wing of the Central Laboratory’s building was put into 
use (at Geleen). In 1942, the new facilities of the Central Experimental 
Station were put into use (at Treebeek).20
 With the new Central Laboratory, DSM had a dedicated research de-
partment and had adapted itself to the established practice of R&D in 
the chemical industry. Organisationally, the Central Laboratory grew out 
of decentralised works laboratories. A decentral initiative, moreover, set 
DSM on the track of a centralised and dedicated research organisation. 
The proposal of Pieters and Berkhoff from 1935 put the issue of research 
back on the agenda and formulated an outline of a dedicated organisa-
tion.
Development of the Central Laboratory’s Organisation
After the Central Laboratory’s building had been put into use, three de-
partments were set up in 1941: Organic Products, Physical Chemistry and 
General Chemistry. The organisation was disciplinary and based on main 
branches of chemistry. Unlike the Organic Products and Physical Chemis-
try departments, the General Chemistry department was generic and was 
involved in, for example, chemical analysis. It also conducted research on 
corrosion, a common problem in chemical plants. In 1938, a permanent 
fertiliser pilot plant had been established at the SBB to investigate produc-
tion problems on scale. This installation remained the responsibility of the 
SBB to enable a close cooperation between research and production, and 
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to enable training of production personnel.21
 The organisation of the Central Laboratory changed through the split-
ting up of the General Chemistry and Physical Chemistry departments. 
Around 1944, Corrosion Research and Coal Research, mainly aimed at 
coke and related subjects, split off from General Chemistry. Inorganic 
Chemistry, mainly aimed at fertilisers, and Chemical Technology, mainly 
aimed at generic process research and equipment, split off from the Physi-
cal Chemistry Department. The name of the Organic Products depart-
ment changed to Organic Chemistry, marking the completion of the reor-
ganisation.22 
 In 1940, Berkhoff was appointed research director of the Central Labo-
ratory and Pieters was appointed as his deputy. Berkhoff had been hired 
for production support in the ammonia plant but his role in the establish-
ment of the Central Laboratory shows that he developed a strategic role in 
the 1930s. His appointment as research director completed this develop-
ment.
 The Central Laboratory, the SBB and the coke oven plants organisa-
tionally belonged to a chemical sector (Chemische Bedrijven), headed by 
Ross van Lennep, who in turn reported to Van Iterson in top management. 
In 1942, DSM merged the Central Laboratory, the Central Experimental 
Station and the SBB’s patent department into the Central Technological 
Research Organisation (Centrale Technische Onderzoekingsdienst, CTO). 
Berkhoff was appointed head of CTO on 1 January 1943 and continued 
to report to Ross van Lennep. Pieters became responsible for finance, per-
sonnel and other support functions of the Central Laboratory.23 (See also 
figure 2.1.)
 The outbreak of the Second World War seriously hindered the build-
up of the Central Laboratory. Staff was kept to a minimum to prevent 
the laboratory’s involvement in the German war effort. Diversification 
Figure 2.1. Organisational structure of DSM’s chemical sector after 1942.
Note: all other units outside the chemical sector have been excluded from this diagram.
Top management
Chemical sector
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seemed to be impossible, so researchers focused on the processes in the 
SBB’s plants. The ammonia and nitric acid processes were studied and 
catalysis research was taken up. The Central Laboratory also worked on 
products that could substitute scarce materials. Goris worked on a process 
for synthetic rubber in cooperation with staff engineers from the SBB. The 
success of these products was limited. For instance, rubber processors tried 
to make bicycle tyres from DSM’s synthetic rubber but the quality of the 
tyres was poor and the processing of the rubber difficult.24
 Although the war hindered the development of the Central Laboratory, 
the laboratory could work without major interference from the Germans 
and could steadily grow in size to a workforce of about 200 at the end of 
the war. By contrast, the laboratories of BPM were cut off from the rest 
of Royal Dutch/Shell and from its feedstocks. Researchers were posted to 
government agencies and to other companies, while researchers at Amster-
dam provided their services to other Dutch firms. At Philips, the research 
organisation started to function as a safe haven for researchers and scien-
tists who were faced with the prospect of unemployment or forced labour 
in Germany.25 
From Passive to Active: Research at the SBB’s Works Laboratory and 
the Establishment of the Central Laboratory
In its plan of 1938, Berkhoff ’s committee argued that the establishment of 
a new Central Laboratory followed from the development of DSM and 
from the work of the laboratories the company was already operating. The 
day-to-day operations of DSM asked for routine quality control but these 
activities expanded into research work. The committee characterised this 
as a trend from ‘a more passive to a more active attitude’.26 
 The links between DSM’s works laboratories and of the Central Labor-
atory indeed go beyond organisational links. Research at the SBB’s works 
laboratory in particular played an important role in the establishment of 
Central Laboratory. The new research organisation completed DSM’s 
build-up of technological capabilities in the chemical industry.
Diversification: Alcohol
Berkhoff ’s role in the establishment of the Central Laboratory shows the 
strategic role he developed. Before he and Pieters wrote the proposal to 
centralise research, Berkhoff had put the issue of diversification on the 
agenda. In October 1932 he wrote a report in which he outlined the posi-
tion of the SBB. Berkhoff expected that the price of fertilisers, ammonium 
sulphate in particular, would drop further, and that diversification was 
therefore necessary. He listed possible fertilisers but also pointed to other 
products.27 The SBB’s works laboratory was already working on one pos-
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sible diversification outside fertilisers: the production of alcohol.
 Research on alcohol started in 1931. Goris, who had been transferred to 
the SBB’s works laboratory together with Berkhoff, conducted the crucial 
work on this project. Research started with a review of the available lit-
erature. It was known that alcohol could be manufactured from ethylene, 
using concentrated sulphuric acid. Several companies used this route in 
the 1920s, but DSM would use ethylene from coke oven gas, and more-
over on a large scale. That was a departure from established practice. In 
the manufacture of hydrogen in the coke oven gas separation section of 
the ammonia plant, a fraction was released that contained ethylene. It was 
used to fire equipment but production of alcohol promised to be a more 
profitable use. 
 As the route to alcohol was known, research focused on process de-
velopment and engineering. In 1935 a pilot plant was constructed and the 
decision to build an industrial plant was taken in December of that year. 
Research continued, however, and in 1938 construction of the plant start-
ed. In 1940 it was in regular production. It was the first plant in the world 
that produced alcohol on the basis of ethylene from coke oven gas, a real 
breakthrough.
 During the construction of the alcohol plant, DSM hired several equip-
ment manufacturers for specialist tasks, but the alcohol plant primarily 
relied on in-house work. Innovation strategy was offensive. The develop-
ment of the alcohol process shows that research at the SBB’s works labora-
tory enabled a diversification shortly after DSM had entered the chemical 
industry. Capabilities were being built fast.
 Diversification, and research that led to diversification, were feedstock-
driven. Again, DSM simply assumed there was a market. For the sale of its 
product the company struck a deal with the central sales office of the other 
alcohol producers in the Netherlands in 1939.28 
Diversification in Fertilisers: The Start of Mixed Fertiliser Production
Around the time when the SBB started production of alcohol, it also 
started producing mixed fertilisers. Straight fertilisers such as ammonium 
sulphate contained only one of the three plant nutrients (nitrogen, phos-
phate, potassium) while mixed fertilisers contained two or all three. They 
could be manufactured by chemical processes or by dry-mixing several 
straight products. Mixed fertilisers were typically produced in a wide vari-
ety of formulations.
 In 1937, Berkhoff put the possibility of mixed fertiliser production on 
the map. He argued that mixed fertilisers were attractive to DSM from a 
commercial point of view, given the demand for them and the price level. 
Berkhoff also expected that, in the long term, fertilisers with a high con-
tent of plant nutrients would dominate the fertiliser market. Mixed ferti-
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lisers presented an option to adapt to this trend because they contained 
little else beside plant nutrients. Calcium ammonium nitrate, for instance, 
contained marl.
 In his report, Berkhoff reviewed the available options to start mixed 
fertiliser production. He considered that DSM should produce only one 
grade and should not aim at product diversity. This implied that he fo-
cused on chemical processes, in which there were two basic options. To 
obtain a product with phosphate, the necessary ingredient was phosphate 
rock, which was mined in several places around the world. Phosphate rock 
could be treated with sulphuric acid, a practice commonly used in the 
well-established manufacture of superphosphate, the main straight phos-
phate fertiliser. Treating superphosphate with ammonia led to ammonium 
phosphates, a mixed fertiliser with nitrogen and phosphate. 
 Another route to mixed fertilisers treated phosphate rock with nitric 
acid. This process also led to products with nitrogen and phosphate but 
these were called nitro phosphates. Several companies had investigated this 
route in the 1920s, but with mixed success as product quality was poor. In 
1928, the Norwegian company Odda Smelteverk developed a nitro phos-
phate process that promised to lead to marketable mixed fertilisers with 
calcium nitrate, a straight fertiliser, as a by-product.
 Berkhoff expected that Odda’s process would give the SBB a strong 
position in the production of mixed fertilisers. He felt that the costs of 
treating phosphate rock with nitric acid instead of sulphuric acid would be 
lower, and that the SBB would therefore be able to meet the competition 
of the superphosphate industry. Packaging and transportation costs were 
low when calculated on the basis of plant nutrients because the content 
of plant nutrients was high. This gave farmers the opportunity to save on 
fertilisers. For this reason, Berkhoff expected mixed fertilisers to have a 
promising future.
 Odda, however, had taken out patents on its process, but had not de-
veloped the process on an industrial scale. Buying a plant from an engi-
neering contractor was not possible, simply because they had not devel-
oped the necessary technology. Establishing mixed fertiliser production 
therefore imposed higher demands on the SBB’s internal capabilities than 
the entry into the fertiliser business in the late 1920s. Berkhoff did not 
consider this a problem. At the end of 1937, DSM established contact 
with Odda. Berkhoff was present at the first meeting with the Norwegian 
company. At this meeting it became clear that DSM could obtain a license 
on Odda’s patents. Odda valued the involvement of DSM and hinted at 
the possibility of further technology sales when DSM had developed the 
process. Negotiations continued for several years, but were hindered be-
cause IG Farben had taken over an option on Odda’s German patents and 
also tried to patent its variant of the Norwegian process in the Nether-
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lands. DSM prevented this by opposing IG Farben’s patent application, 
but could now only buy Odda’s Dutch patents. Odda and DSM struck an 
agreement in principle in 1939. Two years later, just before the plant was to 
go on stream, DSM finally bought the patents.
 Alongside the negotiations with Odda, research on the mixed fertiliser 
process had started. Jean Plusjé, who had just graduated from Delft Tech-
nical College, was hired for this project in 1937. In the following year he 
developed the Odda process on laboratory scale, without making major 
changes to the Norwegian technology. Development work started in 1938 
and two pilot plants, a small one and a larger one, were built in that year.
 In June 1938, only six months after the first contacts with Odda, DSM’s 
top management decided to build a mixed fertiliser plant. It was part of 
a larger expansion programme that boosted the production of ammonia, 
nitric acid and calcium ammonium nitrate as well. In 1941 the production 
of mixed fertilisers started, but it had to be stopped a year later because 
of a shortage of phosphate rock, the basic raw material of mixed fertiliser 
production. After the war, however, mixed fertiliser production was taken 
up again and expanded to become an important product for the SBB.29
 As in the case of the alcohol process, the SBB’s works laboratory initi-
ated and enabled diversification in mixed fertilisers. Odda’s patents pro-
vided a springboard into this field, but the Norwegian process had to be 
developed into an industrial process. Besides development, some process 
research was also necessary. In-house research work complemented exter-
nal technology in this way. Innovation strategy was defensive. In the case of 
alcohol, DSM pursued a more offensive innovation strategy and external 
technology played no role. In other words, the role of external technology 
varied according to DSM’s innovation strategy.
 
Incremental Innovation: The Improvement of the Ammonium Sulphate Process
The SBB’s works laboratory not only initiated and enabled diversification. 
After Berkhoff had been transferred to the works laboratory, the improve-
ment of the SBB’s ammonium sulphate was one of the first projects he 
was involved in. It was also a project in which he performed the role of 
researcher.
 Ammonium sulphate was the SBB’s only product until the calcium 
ammonium nitrate plant went on stream. Competition came from the 
Dutch town gas industry and from foreign manufacturers, particularly 
from BASF, the leading company in the fertiliser industry at that time. 
Ammonium sulphate was the main nitrogen fertiliser, but in the late 1920s 
and early 1930s many other operators of coke oven plants had started 
manufacturing fertilisers with ammonium sulphate on a large scale. The 
market was oversupplied and prices were dropping. (See also graph 2.2.) 
BASF, moreover, had succeeded in improving the quality of its ammonium 
52 the company that changed itself
sulphate. Nitrogen fertilisers had a tendency to cake: they attracted water, 
making the particles stick to each other and form one solid mass. Another 
unwanted feature was the formation of dust (small particles) in fertiliser 
bags. BASF had succeeded in reducing caking and dust formation in its 
ammonium sulphate. The German company exported large amounts of 
fertilisers to the Netherlands and to several other markets in which the 
SBB was also active.
Berkhoff started working on ammonium sulphate in 1931. This ferti-
liser was manufactured with ammonia and sulphuric acid through a crys-
tallisation process in saturators, basically vessels made from a material that 
could withstand the corroding effect of the acid. Berkhoff investigated 
how crystallisation worked and whether it could be modified to improve 
product quality. Berkhoff ’s research led to changes in operating procedure 
and to changes in the design of the plant. The SBB’s staff engineered the 
plant modifications and altered the installation while production contin-
ued. By September 1933 they finished this work.
 Berkhoff also investigated the influence of sulphuric acid. He found 
that certain impurities led to small crystals, and worked out a procedure 
to bind the impurities and prevent the formation of small crystals. Finally, 
the SBB introduced a coating, a common procedure in the fertiliser indus-
try to prevent or reduce caking by adding a compound to the fertilisers. 
In this case, some gas oil covered the ammonium sulphate crystals and 
reduced the product’s tendency to cake.
 With the improved ammonium sulphate process the SBB innovated for 
the first time, only a short time after large-scale fertiliser manufacture had 
started. Product quality improved crucially through Berkhoff ’s research 
at the works laboratory, enabling the SBB to meet the competition. Simi-
lar improvements were made to other acquired plants as well. Van Aken 
modified the production of calcium ammonium nitrate for instance; these 
modifications were put on stream in March 1935.30 In the improvement of 
the ammonium sulphate process, research meant development work but 
some engineering had to be done as well. 
Research at the SBB in the 1930s
The research performed at the SBB’s works laboratory played an impor-
tant role in the development of DSM’s chemical businesses in the 1930s. 
In the first place, it enabled DSM to defend existing market positions. The 
quality of the SBB’s ammonium sulphate had to be improved to remain 
competitive. Berkhoff ’s research played a crucial role here. In the second 
place, research led to diversification. The SBB’s works laboratory initiated 
diversification in mixed fertilisers and alcohol. Its research also enabled 
these two projects. 
 Berkhoff was the crucial figure at the SBB’s works laboratory. Hired 
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for production support in the ammonia plant in 1929, his research formed 
the basis of the improvement of ammonium sulphate. At the SBB’s works 
laboratory, Berkhoff developed a strategic role. He wrote a report on di-
versification in 1932 and, with Pieters, put the issue of a dedicated research 
organisation on the agenda three years later. Berkhoff also initiated the 
mixed fertiliser project. Berkhoff ’s appointment as the Central Laborato-
ry’s head in 1940 clearly indicates how much his role had changed in the 
eleven years he had worked for DSM.
 Berkhoff ’s work on ammonium sulphate also shows the continuity in 
subjects researched at the SBB’s works laboratory and the Central Labora-
tory. Research on crystallisation started when Berkhoff investigated the 
ammonium sulphate production process, and was included in the Central 
Laboratory’s research programme in 1938. Similarly, Zelders had started 
research on corrosion while he was at the SBB’s works laboratory, and he 
set up this research at the Central Laboratory in 1941. Plusjé and Goris 
also transferred to the Central Laboratory. Plusjé moved to the Central 
Laboratory in 1940 to work at the Physical Chemistry department. In 1943 
he became head of the Inorganic Chemistry department. Goris had be-
come head of the Organic Chemistry department a year earlier. People and 
projects formed the bridge between the SBB’s works laboratory and the 
Central Laboratory.
 Research by Pieters’ works laboratory also influenced the Central Labo-
ratory’s research programme. This explains why, for example, the Central 
Laboratory continued to do research on coke oven gas purification. Other 
projects included pyridine, a fine chemical that could be produced from 
coal tar, a by-product of town gas and coke manufacture. Pieters’ labo-
ratory had started limited research on pyridine at the end of the 1920s; 
this research was related to coke oven gas purification. Pieters and a col-
league aimed to remove the small amounts of pyridine, and also phenol, 
by changing the process by which benzene was removed from coke oven 
gas.31 
 In 1935, Pieters’ laboratory had also started work on phthalic anhydride, 
a compound that was used in paints and that could be manufactured from 
naphthalene, a by-product of the coking operations. Research on this 
compound continued after the establishment of the Central Laboratory. 
A small pilot plant was started in May 1941, but operated for a short time 
only due to the German occupation of the Netherlands. After the war, the 
Dutch paint industry urgently needed phthalic anhydride. Although re-
search had continued, it would still take time before a plant could be built. 
Engineering contractors offered industrial processes, however, and DSM 
decided to buy a plant from the American contractor Foster Wheeler to 
save time. DSM started producing phthalic anhydride in 1951 but it did 
not become an important product for the company. Production ceased in 
1963.32
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 Research at Pieters’ works laboratory related primarily to the coke oven 
plants, reflecting the origins and location of this facility. Its role in the 
SBB’s main research-based diversifications was small, although the work 
on phthalic anhydride provided a foundation for the acquisition of exter-
nal technology.
 
The Establishment of the Central Laboratory
Diversification at DSM was feedstock-driven in the 1920s and 1930s: coal-
mining led to the manufacture of coke; coke oven gas led to ammonia and 
fertilisers. Another driver of diversification, besides the availability of feed-
stocks, was the availability of technology. Engineering contractors built 
two large coke oven plants in the 1910s and 1920s; ASED and Uhde built a 
large fertiliser works between 1928 and 1932 with plants for the production 
of ammonia, nitric acid, ammonium sulphate and calcium ammonium 
nitrate. 
 DSM rapidly built capabilities in the chemical industry. The SBB hired 
capable engineers and chemists and built a works laboratory. Pieters’ works 
laboratory and DSM’s central coal-related technological organisation fur-
ther added to these capabilities. The SBB’s works laboratory played a cru-
cial role in the alcohol and mixed fertiliser diversifications and in the im-
provement of ammonium sulphate product quality. Research at DSM in 
the 1930s initiated and enabled diversifications, and also improved existing 
technologies. Research, too, was feedstock-driven. The availability of eth-
ylene led to research on alcohol, and nitric acid linked the mixed fertiliser 
project to existing businesses. 
 In the 1930s, research at DSM was done without a formal, dedicated 
research organisation. Nevertheless, this research built a foundation for the 
establishment of the Central Laboratory, the centralised research depart-
ment that grew out of the decentralised research organisation of the 1930s. 
Pieters and Berkhoff put centralised research on the map at DSM and 
both were transferred to the Central Laboratory. Several other researchers 
from DSM’s works laboratories were also reassigned to the new research 
organisation. 
 Berkhoff personifies the road to the Central Laboratory. Hired for 
production support in ammonia, he became head of the SBB’s works 
laboratory. He worked on ammonium sulphate but soon developed a 
strategic role. In his strategic role, Berkhoff initiated diversifications and, 
together with Pieters, wrote the proposal to centralise research. His ap-
pointment as head of the Central Laboratory completed his development 
in the 1930s.
 Besides Berkhoff and Pieters, Van Iterson and Ross van Lennep were 
important in the development of research and the SBB in the 1930s. As 
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head of DSM’s chemical sector, Ross van Lennep translated Van Iterson’s 
vision into operational practice. Van Iterson was the driving force behind 
DSM’s diversifications into coke and large-scale fertiliser manufacture. He 
also decided that the SBB should not remain dependent on engineering 
contractors, and hired several engineers and chemists to give fertiliser pro-
duction a foundation of technological know-how. From this perspective it 
is clear that Van Iterson embraced the issue of research. The SBB did not 
confront a specific commercial or technological threat like the R&D pio-
neers had done. DSM decided to establish the Central Laboratory in 1938, 
after the difficult period in fertilisers had been overcome. According to 
Van Iterson, research was necessary to keep up and remain competitive.
 People and projects built continuity and laid a foundation for the es-
tablishment of the Central Laboratory. Histories of research at DSM have 
somewhat neglected this foundation, particularly in relation to the research 
work at the SBB’s works laboratory in the 1930s.33 The Central Laboratory 
grew out of the research organisation and the research work of the 1930s. 
After the Second World War, DSM embarked on a process of expansion 
and diversification in its chemical businesses, and the Central Laboratory 
similarly grew in size and scope.
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Expansion and Diversification: R&D after the 
Second World War
In the 1930s, Frits van Iterson had set DSM on the chemical industry track, 
and his successors extended this track. DSM developed into a diversified 
chemical company by expanding its existing chemical businesses, by diver-
sifying into new fields and, from the late 1950s onwards, also by tapping 
other feedstocks besides coke oven gas. Top management invested heavily in 
research as they strongly believed it was a necessity. Research management 
emphasised the importance of ‘science’ and claimed freedom to explore 
subjects that interested them. The importance of fundamental research, re-
search not aimed at immediate industrial application, increased.
 Research increased in scale and scope, which meant that it could effectively 
defend existing market positions, and that diversifications increasingly rested 
on in-house research. Research also shifted DSM’s technology base: enabling 
the company to branch out from fertilisers into other sectors of the chemical 
industry. (Table 3.1 summarises the role of research in diversification.)
 In the 1920s and 1930s, most companies in industries like chemicals 
and electronics had become convinced of the necessity of doing indus-
trial research. After the Second World War they expanded their research 
operations to an unprecedented scale, placing emphasis on scientific and 
fundamental research as well as long-range research in a broader sense. 
At some companies, however, the industrial research department drifted 
away from production and marketing functions and became isolated.1 This 
divergence has led students of research management to pass a harsh judge-
ment on the practices of the 1950s and 1960s.2
 At DSM, research was independent but not isolated. The Central La-
boratory developed its own views of the interests of the company and took 
initiatives, but this did not mean that research diverged from production, 
marketing or business strategy. Business management expected research to 
take initiatives and structures were in place to link research to business.
 The role of research and the convergence with business also becomes 
clear from the three main cases analysed in this chapter: urea, a fertiliser; 
caprolactam, an intermediate for nylon; and lysine, an amino acid. The ex-
ample of urea shows the increased scale of technological development after 
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Product Start of Production Area of application
Ammonium sulphate 1930; stop: 1966 Fertilisers
Calcium ammonium nitrate 1932 Fertilisers
Alcohol 1940; stop: 1960 Industrial uses
Mixed fertilisers 1941 Fertilisers
NPKs 1949 Fertilisers
Phthalic anhydride 1951, stop: 1963 Paints
Urea 1952 Fertilisers
Caprolactam 1952 Fibre intermediates
Polyethylene 1959 (LDPE, ICI process) Plastics





EPDM rubber 1967 Rubbers
Lysine 1968; stop: 1969 Food/ feed additives
Acrylonitrile 1969 Fibre intermediates
Legend:
External technology Importance of research Initiated by research
- No important role for 
external technology.
No role for research 
work.
No or small role for 
research.
+ Technology acquired in 
the form of a process or 
research work starting 
from process competitor.
Small-scale research 
project/large role for 
external technology.
Important role for 
research.
++ Plant acquired. Research work crucial 
for establishment of 
production.
Crucial role for research.
Table 3.1. The role of research in DSM’s major diversifications, 1930-1970.
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Sources: table 3.1, text and E. Homburg (2004). Groeien door kunstmest: DSM Agro 1929-
2004. Hilversum: Verloren. 312. P. F. G. Vincken (2000). Van Staatsmijnen in Limburg tot 
DSM Chemie. Unpublished manuscript. 194-195, 219-220.
Note: end of production is included when it falls in the period until 1990.
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the Second World War, and the increasing importance of research. The 
example of caprolactam shows the increased scope of research and how this 
increased scope mattered for projects. The case of lysine shows how the 
capabilities acquired through caprolactam research built a new technology 
base and how this enabled the lysine project. DSM built a lysine plant but 
closed it soon after start-up. Finding a market proved to be difficult. 
 Together, the cases of urea, caprolactam and lysine show the expansion 
and diversification of DSM’s chemical businesses and its research. How-
ever, in its development from a fertiliser producer to a diversified chemi-
cal company, DSM also started producing polyethylene, EPDM synthetic 
rubber and melamine. In this chapter, some of the main characteristics of 
R&D in these products are reviewed as well. Polyethylene and EPDM are 
less standardised products than urea and caprolactam, necessitating appli-
cation research and extensive product development.
The Growth of DSM’s Chemical Businesses after the Second World War
“I see the further expansion of our coal upgrading industry as an attrac-
tive task lying before us,” Daan Ross van Lennep said on the occasion of 
his official appointment to DSM’s top management on 14 February 1947. 
During the war, Van Iterson had retired and Ross van Lennep had taken 
his place. Ross van Lennep’s speech shows that he intended to continue 
the work of Van Iterson and broaden the company’s base. DSM took this 
course after the Second World War. The company expanded its existing 
businesses and diversified into new fields. In the late 1950s, however, DSM 
was to start loosening the ties between coal and chemicals.3
Upgrading Coal
When Ross van Lennep delivered his speech in 1947, expansion was being 
targeted at existing products and diversification, but the direction diversi-
fication should take was still unclear. Ross van Lennep mentioned resins, 
dyestuffs and paints as attractive areas for diversification. These products 
suited DSM’s feedstock position and the Central Laboratory had done 
some work on them during the 1930s and 1940s. Through research work, 
however, leading companies like Du Pont, ICI and IG Farben had opened 
up the field of plastics and synthetic fibres. These dynamic and innovative 
sectors attracted a lot of attention and showed high growth rates. World 
production of plastics, for instance, grew by 1330% between 1945 and 1964. 
The Central Laboratory had also conducted preliminary research in these 
areas during the Second World War and shortly after. This research focused 
on intermediates for synthetic fibres and resins, to be manufactured on the 
basis of benzene and naphthalene from coal tar, a by-product of the coke 
oven plants. Some work had also been done on ethylene and polyethylene, 
the latter being a plastic developed by ICI in the 1930s.4
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It soon became clear what course DSM would steer. The company 
chose to enter the plastics industry. This industry was easier to enter than 
the dyestuffs industry, which had been the cradle of the large-scale Ger-
man chemical industry at the end of the nineteenth century. Plastics also 
suited DSM’s structure because they were manufactured in bulk. Besides 
plastics, the company entered the field of fibre intermediates with capro-
lactam, and also diversified further in fertilisers.5 Production of mixed fer-
tilisers with nitrogen, phosphate and potassium, so-called NPKs, started 
in 1949. The Central Laboratory developed a process for the production 
of NPKs on the basis of the nitro phosphate process. A urea plant went 
on stream three years later. In the late 1960s, finally, DSM started produc-
tion of several products that were closely linked to earlier diversifications. 
The Central Laboratory developed a melamine process that used urea as 
feedstock, instead of calcium cyanamide, and developed a lysine process 
that used caprolactam as feedstock. Its research work on polyethylene was 
important for the start of EPDM synthetic rubber production.6 (Table 3.2 
lists DSM’s most important diversifications.)
 Although chemicals increased in importance for DSM, it still relied 
on coal for its feedstocks. The links were either direct, through the coke 
oven plants, or indirect, through utilisation of an intermediate or product 
manufactured from coal-based feedstocks. (See table 3.2.) In this way, di-
versification continued to be feedstock-driven.
Coal and Chemicals Diverge
Ross van Lennep died in 1949, shortly after his appointment to DSM’s 
top management. Jan van Aken succeeded him. Van Aken was one of the 
engineers hired for troubleshooting in the ammonia plant, but he moved 
into management positions in the 1930s. Van Aken was chosen as head 
of the chemical sector in 1947 when Ross van Lennep became one of 
DSM’s top managers.7 After Van Aken’s appointment to top management, 
Jef van Waes became head of the chemical sector. In the 1930s Van Waes 
had worked for the Compagnie Neérlandaise de l’Azote (CNA), another 
Dutch manufacturer of nitrogen fertilisers.8
 Towards the end of the 1950s, Van Aken, Van Waes, and others in the 
chemical sector increasingly saw the strong feedstock connections between 
coal and chemicals as a constraint. Underlying this view was an analysis 
of DSM’s position in the chemical industry. Dynamic markets for capro-
lactam and plastics, and competition from research-intensive companies, 
called for major investments by DSM to keep its current position, which 
management nevertheless considered strong. Expansion became the key 
word for Van Aken and his close colleagues. DSM would have to diversify, 
build large plants and secure a supply of cheap feedstocks. A presence out-
side Limburg, elsewhere in the Netherlands or abroad, would also have to 
be established.
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Sources: P. Tans (1977). Van Staatsmijnen tot DSM: Hoofdlijnen van de ontwikkeling. 
Land van Herle 27(3), 87-103, in particular 96-98. T. van Helvoort (2000). Staatsmijnen 
gaat polymeriseren, 1945-1970. H. Lintsen, Ed. Research tussen vetkool en zoetstof: zestig jaar 
DSM Research 1940-2000. Eindhoven/Zutphen: Stichting Historie der Techniek/Walburg 
Pers, 44-59, in particular 49, 53. P. F. G. Vincken (2000). Van Staatsmijnen in Limburg tot 
DSM Chemie. Unpublished manuscript. 104-105, 172, 191, 198-199.
Notes: 
i  LDPE = Low Density Polyethylene, manufactured with the ICI process.
ii  HDPE = High Density Polyethylene, manufactured with the Ziegler process. The ICI 
and Ziegler processes made it possible to produce a variety of polyethylene types with 
different characteristics.
iii  This plant went on stream in 1961 and cracked naphtha.
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Table 3.2. DSM’s expansion in chemicals: its most important diversifications and feed-
stocks, 1945-1970.
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 Securing cheap feedstocks meant that chemicals and coal would no 
longer be tightly connected. After the Second World War, natural gas and 
petroleum feedstocks became available for European chemical companies 
at low prices, enabling them to follow the example of the American chemi-
cal industry that was already manufacturing products on the basis of these 
feedstocks. DSM, however, also manufactured coal and coke, making a 
switch to natural gas and petroleum feedstocks difficult. The plans de-
veloped in the chemical sector disturbed the management of DSM’s coal 
sector and several of Van Aken’s colleagues in top management, causing 
tensions in the company. Van Waes and Gé Berkhoff left in 1961; their 
departure meant the removal of the management layer just under the top. 
The caprolactam plant in 1952. Caprolactam was DSM’s first major step outside fertilisers, 
a step that was initiated and enabled by the Central Laboratory. R&D played an important 
role in many of DSM’s diversifications in the 1950s and 1960s.
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Graph 3.1. Operating profit from chemicals and other activities, 1935, 1955 and 1965.
Sources: DSM annual report 1935. RAL, 17.26/34 inv. no. 12: Waarom hebben Staatsmijnen 
Chemische Bedrijven gesticht, 11 May 1946. RAL, 17.26/ 18C inv. no. 176: Bedrijfseconomisch 
Verslag 1955, 1965.
Note: similar breakdowns for operating profit are unfortunately not given in the sources.















































arjan van rooij  67
Van Waes went back to CNA, while Berkhoff accepted an invitation to 
become the first rector of the newly established Twente Technical College 
(Netherlands, now University of Twente).9
 Despite the different opinions and tensions, DSM’s management took 
an expansive course for the chemical sector, building large plants, switch-
ing to natural gas for fertiliser production and petroleum feedstocks for 
other chemical products. The company also established joint ventures. Ex-
pansion of the chemical sector meant that DSM increasingly relied on its 
chemical businesses. The share of chemicals in the company’s operating 
profit increased from 29% in 1935, to 43% in 1955, and further to 86% in 
1965 (Graph 3.1.). The profile of DSM’s chemical businesses also changed. 
Plastics and fibre intermediates grew from 10% of chemical turnover in 
1955 to 47% ten years later (Graph 3.2). For research, expansion in chemi-
cals would mean increased room to take initiatives for diversifications and 
further develop existing products and processes.
The Organisation and Management of Research
After the Second World War, many companies increased their research 
expenditure. In the history of industrial research, the 1950s and 1960s in 
particular seem to be marked by an emphasis on fundamental research, 
and by a divergence between research on the one hand and production and 
marketing functions on the other. At Philips, for instance, relations be-
tween research and production divisions were difficult and research drifted 
away from the rest of the company. Other histories have shown the same 
pattern. Margaret Graham argues that research became a ‘corporate coun-
terculture’: an island of fundamental research.10 
 The experience of these companies has had a strong influence on the 
literature on the management of R&D. Philip Roussel, Kamal Saad and 
Tamara Erickson characterise research management in the 1950s and 1960s 
as first-generation R&D. Companies hired talented people, provided ex-
cellent facilities, and hoped for results. The intuitions of R&D managers 
determined the course of research without the involvement of business 
managers, and R&D was not integrated within overall business strategy. 
Roussel et al. argue that first-generation R&D is a ‘strategy of hope’ as 
companies failed to integrate research and business. Roli Varma similarly 
argues that industrial research in the 1950s and 1960s was ‘autonomous’. 
R&D managers controlled research, while business managers accepted 
research uncritically. According to Varma, the R&D function generated 
ideas and then turned them over to business managers for further develop-
ment.11
 Like other companies, DSM invested heavily in research after the Sec-
ond World War. The number of researchers working at the Central Labor-
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atory increased to over a thousand in the 1960s, and research expenditure 
increased from 3.9% of chemical turnover in 1949 to 6.8% in 1969. (See, 
in the appendix, graph A1 for personnel figures and A2 for research expen-
ditures.) This expansion had consequences for the organisation and man-
agement of research. The case of DSM shows a different pattern, however, 
than the companies typically studied by historians of industrial research.
Research Becomes Corporate
Central Laboratory was part of CTO, which in turn was part of DSM’s 
chemical sector that also included the SBB and the coke oven plants. The 
coal-mining operations formed DSM’s other main sector. Auxiliary de-
partments for sales, economics and personnel complemented the coal and 
chemical sectors (Figure 3.1.).
 DSM’s technological organisation in chemicals further expanded after 
the war. In 1945, DSM established Chemiebouw as the central engineer-
ing department. Chemiebouw oversaw the work of engineering contractors, 
or engineered the plants itself, and sold some licenses on DSM’s chemi-
cal technology. A licensing subsidiary, called Stamicarbon, complemented 
the central research and engineering departments. DSM established Stami-
carbon in 1947 to exploit some of the company’s coal-related technologies, 
but Stamicarbon took over chemical licensing from Chemiebouw in 1952. 
Stamicarbon mostly licensed DSM’s fertiliser technologies, but from the late 
1960s onwards other processes as well.12 (See graph A3 in the appendix).
 In October 1945, researchers from the Central Experimental Station 
proposed a new organisation for CTO. They argued that the nature of the 
work of CTO differed fundamentally from that of other parts of DSM, 
Figure 3.1. DSM’s organisational structure until 1949.
Note: a specification of the coal sector and the auxiliary departments has been excluded 
from this diagram. The patent department has also been excluded. 
Top management
Coal sector Chemical sector Auxiliary departments
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and that CTO should therefore become a ‘totally independent unit’ whose 
head should report directly to top management. In other words, research 
should become a corporate activity. The report these researchers wrote, 
however, left the Central Laboratory out of the picture. Their plan for 
a new organisation and the operational plans for research included only 
coal-related research as conducted by the Central Experimental Station.13
 As a result of the report of October 1945, the Central Experimental Sta-
tion moved to one of DSM’s central auxiliary departments in November 
of that year. The station was removed from CTO but did not become a 
corporate unit. The reorganisation had caused some unease at the Central 
Laboratory, but CTO remained in place.14 In 1948, however, top manage-
ment decided to abolish CTO and to restructure the Central Laboratory’s 
management. Berkhoff remained the highest manager of research, report-
ing to the head of DSM’s chemical sector. Berkhoff ’s task became a stra-
tegic one and was concentrated on the broader research picture. He was 
responsible for the coordination of research with the production function 
in DSM’s chemical sector. Berkhoff also coordinated external contacts, 
including contacts with possible licensors.15
 The responsibility for day-to-day management of research at the Cen-
tral Laboratory moved from Berkhoff to Dick van Krevelen. Van Krevelen 
had studied chemistry at Leiden University and had followed courses at 
Delft Technical College (now Delft University of Technology) to familiar-
ise himself with subjects related to the chemical industry. He had worked 
as an assistant to Hein Waterman, a professor at Delft who had many con-
tacts in industry, on projects sponsored by Royal Dutch/Shell. Due to the 
war he could not find employment there, and went to DSM instead. He 
was stationed at the General Chemistry department of the Central Labora-
tory, and from 1943 onwards at the Physical Chemistry department, where 
he worked on various subjects.16 In his position as research director, Van 
Krevelen reported to Berkhoff. 
 In 1948, Pieters was appointed to head a new safety department of the 
chemical sector. At the Central Laboratory, Jan Selman took over respon-
sibility for the laboratory’s administration and support functions. Selman 
had joined DSM in 1946 to work at the patent department. Like Van 
Krevelen, he reported to Berkhoff. 
 The changes in management structure signalled that the Central Labor-
atory would grow in the years to come. Strategy, research management and 
operational issues were separated. In 1949, moreover, the chemical sector 
was reorganised when Van Waes succeeded Van Aken. The division of re-
sponsibilities between Berkhoff, Van Krevelen and Selman remained the 
same but the Central Laboratory became a corporate unit. Berkhoff now 
directly reported to Van Aken in top management. The chemical sector 
became mainly involved in production, although Chemiebouw continued 
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to be part of it. Van Waes also had a staff at his disposal that played a cen-
tral role in preparing investment proposals (Figure 3.2).17
 In several steps, DSM arrived at an organisation in 1949 that made 
research a corporate activity. Before that year, research had been part of the 
company’s chemical sector. Like the reorganisation of 1948, it showed the 
importance attached to research.
The Internal Organisation of Research
The Central Laboratory remained a corporate department after 1949. The 
laboratory’s internal organisation continued to change, however. With the 
extra money and the extra people that became available for research after 
the Second World War, Van Krevelen set to work to expand the Central 
Laboratory’s organisation. The laboratory expanded, not only in scale but 
also in scope. For instance, the analysis department expanded, specialised 
and invested in new methods such as mass spectrometry. In 1951, Johan 
Goris started building a Semi-Technical department that aimed to do re-
search on equipment and work on problems as an intermediary step be-
tween laboratory scale and pilot plant scale.18
 The pilot plant organisation also expanded and specialised, among oth-
er things in Inorganic Pilot Plants (for fertilisers) and Organic Pilot Plants 
(for caprolactam for instance). Responsibility for the pilot plants was split. 
Personnel was on the payroll of the SBB, but reported to Berkhoff. In 1949, 
Jean Plusjé became responsible for the Inorganic Pilot Plants besides his 
job at the Central Laboratory as head of the Inorganic Chemistry depart-
ment. Plusjé moved full time to the SBB in 1953 and became director of 
the nitric acid and calcium ammonium nitrate plants. The fertiliser pilot 
plants remained the responsibility of his successor at the Central Labora-
tory. In 1955, moreover, Willem van Loon was appointed as director of all 
pilot plants under Berkhoff. Van Loon had worked on a new coal gasifica-
Figure 3.2. DSM’s organisational structure after 1949.
Top management
Coal sector Auxiliary departments Central Laboratory Chemical sector
Staff Chemiebouw
Central Experimental 
Station Coke oven plants SBB
Note: a specification of the coal sector and a further specification of the auxiliary departments 
has been excluded from this diagram. The patent department has also been excluded.
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tion process and had headed the Central Laboratory’s main department 
involved in that research.19 
 In 1955, Selman transferred to the personnel department at DSM’s 
headquarters and his responsibilities were taken over by Van Krevelen. Van 
Krevelen’s tasks now included both the day-to-day research process and 
the support functions. In outline, Berkhoff managed research strategically 
and supervised a director of research (Van Krevelen) and a director of pilot 
plants (Van Loon) (Figure 3.3). 20
 Van Loon accepted an invitation to become professor at Eindhoven 
Technical College (Netherlands, now Eindhoven University of Technol-
ogy) and left at the end of 1956. His departure coincided with a reor-
ganisation of the Central Laboratory. In 1957, the Product Development, 
Analysis and Testing, and Fundamental Research sectors were established. 
Each sector held several functionally-organised departments. The term 
‘sector’ came from the SBB, where groups of related plants had already 
been organised into sectors and placed under the responsibility of a single 
manager. The nature of the various research activities determined their 
grouping into sectors. The Product Development sector conducted prod-
uct and process research that was focused on applications in existing plants 
or on diversification, and organised pilot plant work. In this sector, the 
Inorganic Chemistry department mainly concentrated on fertilisers, while 
the Organic Chemistry department conducted research on caprolactam, 
for instance. Research on plastics like polyethylene was concentrated in a 
Plastics department established in 1958 (Figure 3.4). 21
Figure 3.3. Outline of the Central Laboratory’s organisation after 1955.







Director of pilot plants
(Van Loon)
Research departments Inorganic Pilot Plants Organic Pilot Plants  
72 the company that changed itself
 Through a process of expansion and specialisation, the number of re-
search departments increased. The organisation of sectors encompassing 
several departments counterbalanced the increased specialisation. The pi-
lot plants were also integrated with the remainder of the Central Laborato-
ry’s organisation with the introduction of sectors. The full range of R&D 
activities, from fundamental research to development and service research, 
was now part of a single organisation. 
 In 1963, the sector organisation was changed, to bring it more into line 
with the main branches DSM operated in: the Feedstocks and Inorganic 
Products Research and Development sector focused on fertilisers and coke 
oven gas, and increasingly on oil; the Polymers Research and Development 
sector focused on plastics; Organic Products Research and Development 
focused on caprolactam and other organic products; and finally the Basic 
and Fundamental Research sector focused on generic issues and conduct-
ing fundamental research.22
Freedom and Constraints: The Management of Research
Van Krevelen managed the expanding research organisation with an em-
phasis on ‘science’. He believed that the Central Laboratory should have 
a good standing in the academic community and that researchers should 
be free to explore subjects of interest. On the other hand, Van Krevelen 
knew very well that the context of a production company imposed certain 
constraints on research. In his opinion, managing research entailed finding 
a balance between the freedom dictated by research and the constraints 
imposed by the context of a production company. Van Krevelen devised 
many organisational schemes to tie research to production. These schemes 
Figure 3.4. Outline of the Central Laboratory’s organisation after 1957.
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included not only the organisation of sectors but also the organisation of 
projects, for instance, which changed continuously.23
 Van Krevelen also invested in fundamental research and supportive 
generic research, and tried to nurture exploratory research aimed at new 
activities. The Central Laboratory had started conducting fundamental re-
search during the Second World War. The Physical Chemistry department 
investigated catalysis, the backbone of the production of ammonia, which 
in turn was the backbone of fertiliser production. 
 After the war, a debate arose at DSM and other companies about the 
way in which fundamental research should be organised. The impor-
tance of fundamental research was not questioned. In June 1947, Henk de 
Bruijn, head of the Physical Chemistry department, visited BASF’s main 
site in Ludwigshafen, Germany, as a member of the allied inspection 
teams. He was impressed with the organisation and scope of BASF’s re-
search, and a year later proposed to establish a separate organisation for 
fundamental research alongside the Central Laboratory. Berkhoff agreed, 
but Van Krevelen did not. Van Krevelen attached somewhat less impor-
tance to fundamental research than De Bruijn, and in his opinion DSM 
should not copy BASF’s example. Van Krevelen won the debate and spread 
fundamental research over several departments, in close contact with other 
research activities. In 1957, however, fundamental research was concen-
trated in a sector.24
 Many other companies increased their fundamental research expendi-
ture. Du Pont and IG Farben had started this trend in the chemical indus-
try in the 1920s; Philips started it in the Netherlands after the war. Philips 
and its head of research, Gilles Holst, exerted a powerful influence, not 
only through their policies but also through their people. Cor van Heer-
den for instance had worked at the research laboratories of Philips during 
the war, but in 1947 switched over to DSM. He became head of the fun-
damental research sector ten years later.25
 The increased fundamental research effort illustrates the increased room 
for research. DSM’s chemical sector management believed that research in 
general would pay off, and this belief rested on an analysis of the chemical 
industry. Industrial research is of paramount importance in a dynamic in-
dustry, where the life cycles of products and processes are short but where it 
takes a long time to develop a new product or process. In a capital-intensive 
industry such as the chemical industry, moreover, developing the wrong 
product or process has disastrous consequences. Stagnation means decline. 
DSM had to keep up, otherwise it would be overtaken by competitors. As 
a consequence, research strategy closely followed business strategy.26 
 Van Krevelen, Berkhoff and Van Aken fundamentally agreed on the 
importance of industrial research, but were also aware of the high cost of 
research. In addition, they believed that the chances of accurately predict-
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ing research results were slim, and that it was inevitable that many projects 
would fail. In a conference lecture in 1968, Van Aken quoted the Dutch 
saying that costs come before results (de kost gaat voor de baat uit). The 
patience to wait for results, and the faith that results would come in some 
way or another, became crucial in the management of research.27
 The arguments that Van Krevelen used to show that research mattered 
for the company were mainly qualitative. In a report of July 1955, he ex-
plained his two-track policy of freedom and constraint, and argued that it 
is difficult to express the value of research in terms of money. According 
to Van Krevelen, research produces results only indirectly. A new plant 
based on a new process, for instance, is as much the result of the work of 
engineers and others as it is the result of the work of researchers. Moreover, 
some research results, for instance an improved understanding of a prob-
lem, are hard to quantify. With the results that could be measured, Van 
Krevelen tried to show the value of research: he calculated that the costs of 
doing research were lower than the amount of money DSM saved through 
rationalisation and other improvements in relation to existing business-
es.28
 In 1959 Van Krevelen left to become director of research in the top 
management of the Dutch company AKU, a large producer of synthetic 
fibres. Van Krevelen’s departure (a few years before that of Berkhoff and 
Van Waes) occurred in a climate of rising tensions between DSM’s chemi-
cal and coal sectors. No major changes in research philosophy occurred in 
the 1960s, however. Frits Sixma, who had worked as an advisor in organic 
chemistry for DSM since 1956 and had been a professor in the same field 
at the University of Amsterdam since 1957, replaced Van Krevelen. Sixma 
also took over Berkhoff ’s tasks in 1961, unifying the operational and stra-
tegic management of research. When Sixma died in 1963, Leen Revallier 
replaced him (see also figure 3.5). Revallier had studied in Delft and in 
Figure 3.5. Outline of the Central Laboratory’s organisation after 1963.
Note: a specification of the research departments has been excluded from this diagram.
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1949 went to the Central Laboratory where he worked on fertilisers at the 
Inorganic Chemistry department under Plusjé. Four years later Revallier 
headed the department, and in 1957 he was appointed as head of the Prod-
uct Development sector. A more elaborate policy committee structure was 
put in place to coordinate research, production and top management, but 
in outline both Sixma and Revallier continued the policies of Van Krevelen 
and Berkhoff.29
 In terms of the emphasis on science and fundamental research, increas-
ing investments in R&D and an expanding organisation, the history of the 
Central Laboratory may seem to be comparable to the histories of other 
industrial research laboratories. However, the example of DSM is different 
in several respects. In the first place, Van Krevelen emphasised the impor-
tance of ‘science’ but at the same time devised many structures to make 
research and business converge. At the Central Laboratory, moreover, all 
types of research, from fundamental to service research, were tightly inte-
grated. Secondly, Berkhoff, Van Krevelen’s superior, bridged research and 
production in his contacts with Van Aken and Van Waes. After Berkhoff, 
Van Krevelen and Van Waes had left the company, a more elaborate com-
mittee structure was put in place to manage research, but the communica-
tion lines between top management, research and production remained 
short. Finally, business management believed that research should take 
initiatives and gave research the freedom to do so. They did not accept 
research uncritically, but accepted the uncertainty of research work, and 
hoped and trusted that results would come. This was a strategy of hope, 
but not of blind hope. At DSM, research and business did not diverge. In 
the second part of this chapter, three cases are analysed to show how re-
search took initiatives and how research, marketing and production related 
to each other.
Expansion: Urea
Expansion characterised DSM’s chemical sector after the Second World 
War, and expansion characterised the development of processes for the 
manufacture of urea, a compound made from carbon dioxide and ammo-
nia. With its relatively high nitrogen content, urea is an excellent fertiliser, 
but it can also be used for the production of plastics and resins. In 1964, 
DSM had the second largest urea site in the world and stood on the brink 
of expanding its capacity further. This new plant used a new process, effec-
tively making DSM the technology leader in urea. The Central Laboratory 
played a central role in the development of this new process, but DSM’s 
involvement with urea began in 1946, when Chemiebouw, DSM’s engi-
neering department, started evaluating the possibilities of urea produc-
tion. Research only gradually came to occupy a central position in urea.30
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Research and Urea Production
DSM entered the urea field relatively late. BASF had put the world’s first 
urea plant on stream in 1922. Du Pont, ICI and Montecatini followed the 
German company in the 1930s, while other firms developed urea processes 
after the Second World War. In developing a process and establishing pro-
duction, two problems had to be solved. In the first place, the synthesis of 
urea took place in two steps, in the first of which an intermediate formed 
that was highly corrosive, leading to problems relating to equipment de-
sign as well as operations. Moreover, urea production led to substantial 
amounts of off-gases that had to be processed into by-products (once-
through processes) or recycled in some way or another (recycle or recircu-
lation processes). 
 At the time Chemiebouw began its study in 1946, no companies were 
offering technology, so this route of entry was blocked. In the 1930s, Van 
Waes had worked on urea synthesis when he worked at CNA, another 
Dutch manufacturer of nitrogen fertilisers. CNA operated a pilot plant, 
where in 1938 Van Waes found that addition of some oxygen could reduce 
corrosion during synthesis. It was an important discovery, but Van Waes 
feared that someone at CNA headquarters in Brussels or at Montecatini 
would take credit for his work. Therefore, Van Waes did not tell his supe-
riors of his discovery.31 
 After he moved to DSM, Van Waes resumed his work on urea, as head 
of the then new engineering department Chemiebouw. Engineers used 
the addition of oxygen in the process they worked on but still confronted 
many other problems, making the road to an industrial plant a long one. 
At the end of 1946, DSM approached ASED, the engineering contractor 
that had built the ammonia plant and that had close relations with CNA, 
and asked ASED to engineer and construct a urea plant. Because both 
companies had not finished their research, they decided to join forces. 
DSM and ASED would develop a urea process together, using the CNA 
pilot plant that would be shipped to DSM. A formal contract, signed in 
April 1947, formed the basis for the cooperation.
 The pilot plant arrived in May 1947 and was put into operation in 
January of the following year. As early as the end of 1948, DSM decided to 
build a plant with a capacity of 15 tons per day. The pilot plant worked as 
a once-through unit. In 1949, the Central Laboratory’s Inorganic Chem-
istry department, the core of DSM’s fertiliser research, investigated the 
possibilities of recycling the off-gases. The SBB’s staff proposed using a 
once-through process, however, because the amount of by-products would 
be low at the capacity the plant would have and because a plant using a 
recycle process would require a larger investment. After this decision had 
been taken, the pilot plant stopped in October 1949. Chemiebouw started 
to work on the engineering of the 15-ton once-through plant. Construc-
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tion started in 1950, and two years later the plant could be put on stream, 
producing ammonium sulphate from the off-gases. Production staff had to 
tackle many initial problems, however, and researchers from the Inorganic 
Chemistry department assisted in solving them.
 Through the work of ASED/CNA and Van Waes, DSM could enter 
the field of urea quickly. Internal engineering work complemented inputs 
from the other companies; Chemiebouw was therefore at the heart of 
DSM’s entry in urea, and the Central Laboratory to a far lesser extent.
Recycle Processes
DSM entered the urea field quickly, but late, and with a once-through 
process. This developed into a problem in 1953, when planning started for 
a second urea plant with a capacity of 150 tons per day. Recycling at least 
some of the off-gases became necessary because the volume of by-products 
would otherwise be too large.
Part of the laboratory of the Corrosion Research department in 1956. Research into the 
causes and prevention of corrosion played a crucial role in the urea sector.
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 By the time DSM started its first once-through plant, other companies 
had already advanced to recycle processes. Montecatini led the field, and 
also offered licenses on its technology. In August 1953, Van Aken and Van 
Waes, now head of DSM’s chemical sector, travelled to Italy to talk to 
Giacomo Fauser, Montecatini’s top engineer, and tour the urea plant at 
Novara. Van Aken, Van Waes and their staffs thoroughly evaluated the 
possibility of acquiring technology but rejected it in December 1953. Van 
Waes’s oxygen addition gave DSM a small, but crucial, advantage over its 
competitors in combating corrosion in urea synthesis. In addition, the 
work that had been done was evaluated positively, and confidence was 
high that DSM would be able to develop the necessary technology in-
house.
 DSM pushed ahead with the development of recycle processes, a 
partial recycle process at first, where part of the off-gases was processed 
into by-products, and later a full recycle process. Plants were built in an-
ticipation of the development of recycle technology and first operated as 
once-through units. The Inorganic Chemistry department started doing 
systematic research on urea, assisted by the Semi-Technical department 
and the specialised Corrosion department. Herman Zelders had built up 
a great deal of knowledge on the causes and prevention of corrosion, and 
that knowledge was vital in urea. The work of the Central Laboratory in-
creasingly became crucial while Chemiebouw focused on its core task, the 
engineering and construction of plants.
 In 1955, the Inorganic Chemistry department also started fundamental-
ly-oriented research, aimed at understanding the processes of urea synthe-
sis. It built on theoretical insights (relating to phase rules) first applied at 
DSM in research on the nitro phosphate process. Fundamentally-oriented 
research on urea paid off quickly when in 1960 Piet Kaasenbrood devel-
oped a new approach to recycling the off-gases of urea production. The 
off-gases were expelled with carbon dioxide, one of the reactants, in a strip-
per: a bundle of tall tubes. The full spectrum of the Central Laboratory’s 
process research got involved to develop the process, called the stripping 
process. In 1965, DSM decided to build a plant, which went on stream two 
years later. 
 In 1968, a year after DSM’s plant had been started, Revallier proposed 
that Kaasenbrood be awarded a substantial bonus. Revallier called the 
stripping process ‘one of the most important technological contributions 
to the fertiliser industry’.32 Compared to full recycle processes, stripping 
technology reduced energy consumption and simplified mechanical de-
sign. Moreover, less equipment was needed. The advantages of the process 
resulted in reduced production and investment costs. Stripping technol-
ogy was a breakthrough and gave DSM a leading position in urea technol-
ogy. Stamicarbon, DSM’s licensing subsidiary, sold nine stripping plants 
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even in 1967 and continued to sell many licenses in the following years. 
(See graph A3 in the appendix.) Stamicarbon in this way profited from 
the development of the stripping process. In turn, DSM could learn from 
Stamicarbon. The first two licensed stripping plants had units that were 
about 100 tons larger than DSM’s own plant, and in this way provided an 
opportunity to learn how to scale up stripping units.
The pilot plant for the urea stripping process, started up in 1964. The stripping process 
resulted from fundamental research into urea synthesis. It represented a considerable im-
provement compared with conventional  processes and put DSM in a leading position in 
urea technology.
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 From a late entrant in the 1940s, DSM developed into a leading player 
in the 1960s. Chemiebouw had enabled the company’s entry, but the Cen-
tral Laboratory gradually took the lead. DSM initially followed a defensive 
innovation strategy, aimed at entering the field and at catching up, but 
developed an offensive strategy as the company caught up with the leaders. 
Crucial factors were the decision not to buy technology from Montecatini 
but to rely on in-house capabilities, and the decision to start fundamental 
research on urea. 
Research and the Marketing of Urea
DSM expanded rapidly in urea. In the course of seventeen years, the com-
pany decided to build three plants (the once-through, recycle and strip-
ping units) and these installations were almost continuously expanded. 
Production rose from 8 tons per day in 1952 to 500 tons in 1970, a spec-
tacular increase.33
 This spectacular growth indicates a booming market for urea. When 
Chemiebouw started working on a urea process, DSM targeted plastics 
and resins as outlets for its plant. In 1953, a market scan showed that this 
market was small in the Netherlands and that urea resins production by 
DSM might offend the two existing Dutch manufacturers. DSM conse-
quently chose to concentrate on the fertiliser market. 
 This switch from resins to fertilisers had important consequences for 
research. Dutch manufacturers of nitrogen fertilisers sold their products 
through the CSV, a central sales office. Urea customers were mainly located 
abroad, in India, China and, to a lesser extent, the United States. DSM in-
creasingly relied on export as the production of urea increased. In Asia, urea 
consumption grew fast, but the Indian and Chinese governments bought 
all the fertilisers they needed through central offices. These organisations 
had tremendous power on the fertiliser market and kept prices low, forcing 
urea manufacturers to stay focused on low cost even as demand grew.
 For the Central Laboratory, the crucial consequences of the switch 
from plastics and resins to fertilisers related to product quality. Urea was 
the same compound no matter what the market was, but different markets 
valued different properties. Urea for the manufacture of plastics and resins 
had to be as pure as possible. Fertiliser-grade urea should not cake dur-
ing transportation and storage, should not be dispersed by the wind, and 
farmers should be able to apply it easily. Initially, the same white powder 
that was sold to plastics and resins firms was marketed as fertiliser, but it 
caked and was dispersed by the wind during application. These problems 
confronted all manufacturers and hardly any firm marketed fertiliser grade 
urea of fine quality.
 At the end of 1952, DSM started to work on the improvement of the 
quality of urea fertiliser when the Central Laboratory’s Inorganic Chemis-
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try department conducted tests with so-called prilling. In this procedure, 
molten urea was sprayed from the top of a tower. Little drops formed, and 
as these drops fell, they solidified into evenly shaped little balls called prills. 
In two years’ time, a process was developed and a prilling tower could be 
built near the second urea plant. The prills DSM manufactured were ex-
cellent. Other companies developed prilling as well but needed additional 
drying and/or coating, while DSM’s prills could be marketed directly. Re-
search had been done on coating, some of this work was done at the SBB’s 
works laboratory, but coating proved to be unnecessary.
 Besides the shape of fertiliser grade urea, the amount of biuret in the 
product also developed into a problem after DSM chose the fertiliser mar-
ket as its main outlet. Biuret had a damaging effect on some plants and 
caused caking, both of which were unwanted. Agricultural research set 
the maximum level of biuret at 2%, but DSM aimed at 1% because its 
competitors could manufacture urea with that amount of biuret and were 
actively marketing their products as such. The Inorganic Chemistry de-
partment worked on the biuret problem and found that the unwanted 
chemical formed particularly during prilling. In 1956, researchers found a 
solution and the product-finishing section of urea manufacture was modi-
fied. Two years later, competitive pressure again forced the Central Labor-
atory to find ways of decreasing the biuret content further, this time to 
0.3%. Again the product-finishing section was modified.
 Although the SBB’s works laboratory also conducted some research on 
coating, the Central Laboratory played a central role in product quality 
research. This type of research was crucial for the marketing of fertiliser-
grade urea and enabled DSM to switch markets from resins and plastics 
to fertilisers. Prilling was developed pro-actively, while pressure from com-
petitors was the driving force behind research on ways to decrease the 
amount of biuret. 
Expansion
DSM entered the urea field through engineering work, but the subsequent 
development of processes and the work done on product quality shows the 
increasing importance of research after the Second World War. The addi-
tion of oxygen during synthesis as a way to combat corrosion gave DSM 
a small lead over its competitors. Further research extended this lead and 
gradually DSM developed an offensive innovation strategy. Consequently, 
research overtook engineering and became vital in urea, enabling DSM to 
build a leading position technologically and contributing to DSM’s com-
mercial success in urea.
 Within the Central Laboratory, in the case of urea the Inorganic Chem-
istry department played a central role, assisted by researchers from other 
departments if necessary. The majority of the research work in relation 
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to urea focused on industrial application and proceeded in close contact 
with production management, the engineering department and the licens-
ing operation. Van Krevelen’s emphasis on ‘science’ in the management 
of research did not mean that the interests of research and production 
diverged. 
 Stamicarbon sold many stripping plants and a large portion of urea 
capacity in the world became based on DSM technology. The develop-
ment of the stripping process propelled DSM into a position of techno-
logical leadership in urea. Fundamental research laid the foundation for 
the stripping process. This example shows that fundamental research can 
have a large commercial pay-off, both directly for DSM’s own production 
and through Stamicarbon. The case of urea also shows that fundamental 
research originated in a desire to understand the processes fully and in a 
desire to design simpler and cheaper plants. The incentive to start this 
research came from industrial practice. 
Diversification: Caprolactam
“Very interesting! Every large chemical company should make intermedi-
ates for synthetic fibres,” Van Iterson wrote in the margin of a technical 
report on synthetic fibres of November 1939.34 The report and Van Iterson’s 
reaction put synthetic fibre intermediates on the map at DSM, but the 
outbreak of the Second World War prevented the company from taking 
up research in this field. After the war, intermediates for synthetic fibres 
were again taken up. DSM focused on caprolactam, an intermediate for 
nylon, and initiated large-scale research to develop a process. While urea il-
lustrates the expansion in scale of research at DSM in the 1950s and 1960s, 
caprolactam illustrates a process of diversification, both in research and in 
business.
The World of Synthetic Fibres
Again DSM entered relatively late. In 1935, Wallace Carrothers of Du 
Pont had succeeded in producing a polyamide fibre from adipic acid and 
hexamethylene diamine (HMD), which reacted to form nylon salt, which 
in turn was polymerised by polycondensation and spun into fibres. Du 
Pont named the new fibre ‘nylon’, invested heavily in its development, 
and started production in 1938. At IG Farbenindustrie in Germany, Paul 
Schlack also succeeded in producing a polyamide fibre. He started from 
caprolactam, which was polymerised and spun into fibres. Not long after 
Du Pont started production, IG Farben followed; but the German product 
(nylon 6 with the trade name Perlon) had properties that were somewhat 
different from those of the American product (nylon 6.6). In May 1939, 
Du Pont licensed its nylon spinning technology to IG Farben, excluding 
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the German company from the American market at the same time.35
 At DSM, the report of November 1939, written by Tom Niks, at that 
time working at the SBB under Goris, initiated research into fibres. Niks 
proposed a route to HMD starting from phenol, a chemical made from 
benzene, which, in turn, was available from coke oven gas. Profitability 
of benzene sales had declined in the late 1930s and DSM was looking for 
other outlets. Phenol promised to be one of these outlets, to be used in 
the manufacture of resins, but Niks’ report also put the intermediates for 
nylon 6.6 on the map. Feedstocks again dominated thinking at DSM. 
 DSM was not the only Dutch company investigating nylon. The Al-
gemene Kunstzijde Unie (AKU), created by a merger of the German Ver-
einigte Glanzstoff-Fabriken (VGF) and the Dutch ENKA in 1929 and one 
of the largest synthetic fibre producers in the world, started research into 
nylon in May 1939. AKU concentrated on nylon 6.6, Du Pont’s product, 
and investigated adipic acid, HMD and nylon salt. In February 1940, the 
first meeting of representatives of AKU and DSM took place. Only three 
months later, German forces invaded the Netherlands, ending the contacts 
between the two companies. Both AKU and DSM, however, continued 
their research and in 1942 AKU once again tried to enter into a partnership 
with DSM but Ross van Lennep did not want to take a decision until after 
the war.
 The Central Laboratory investigated the feasibility and possible tech-
nical problems of nylon intermediates production on a small scale after 
November 1939. In 1941, more substantial research started on HMD, adi-
pic acid and nylon salt, but the war put a damper on these efforts. The 
phenol plans initially gained more momentum as in 1940 DSM reached 
agreement with the German company Rütgerswerke for a license on their 
phenol process. The plans included the construction of a phenol plant of 
2,000 tons per year, aimed at the resins market, but this had to be can-
celled in 1941, again due to the war.36
The Establishment of Caprolactam Production
In 1946, DSM re-established contact with AKU and this time both com-
panies quickly reached an agreement: DSM would focus on the interme-
diates, while AKU would focus on the spinning process – a division of 
labour that suited the capabilities and market positions of both companies. 
Polymerisation was of interest to both AKU and DSM, but AKU was 
ahead in its research and secured this step as well. 
 In the meantime, AKU had also negotiated with Du Pont, but Du 
Pont would not license its nylon technologies to AKU, one of its main 
European competitors. On the other hand, the Dutch authorities confis-
cated the Dutch patents of IG Farben and made them available to DSM 
and AKU. Through the VGF, AKU also had some knowledge of German 
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developments in caprolactam, although unwilling VGF managers limited 
the extent of the transfer. Reports of Allied technical inspection teams 
also became available. For these reasons, AKU directed DSM towards 
caprolactam in 1947. DSM stopped research on intermediates for nylon 
6.6. Representatives of AKU and DSM visited Germany to inspect capro-
lactam and nylon 6 plants to gather information.
 At the Central Laboratory, researchers soon established the outline of 
the caprolactam process through information on German nylon develop-
ments. The process started from hydroxylamine and cyclohexanone, and 
proceeded via cyclohexanone oxime to caprolactam (Figure 3.6.). Hydrox-
ylamine sulphate could be produced by reacting ammonium nitrite with 
sulphur dioxide. Sulphur dioxide was available from the sulphuric acid 
plants, while DSM chose to use the off-gases from the nitric acid plants to 
produce ammonium nitrite37 (Figure 3.7.). 
 For cyclohexanone, DSM selected the IG Farben route: a process that 
started from phenol and proceeded via cyclohexanol to cyclohexanone.38 
Based on: J. J. McKetta (1976-1999). Encyclopedia of Chemical Processing and Design. New 
York & Basel: Marcel Dekker. 68 volumes, vol. 6, 1978. Figure 2, 76.
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(Figure 3.8.) The starting point for phenol could be benzene, a compound 
DSM could obtain from its coke oven plants. With phenol, moreover, 
DSM could also enter the resins market as shortly after the war the com-
pany had not yet made a strategic choice between fibre intermediates and 
resins. The choice to base cyclohexanone on phenol in this way gave an 
extra impetus to the Central Laboratory’s research on this compound. In 
1946, Berkhoff visited a number of American phenol producers to inves-
tigate the possibilities of acquiring technology, but not many options pre-
sented themselves. In 1947, however, Daniel Tyrer, an American, licensed 
his phenol process to DSM. The process needed to be developed to indus-
trial scale, a task the Central Laboratory took upon itself in the following 
years. In 1949, a pilot plant was built and four years later industrial phenol 
production started. Tyrer, impressed with the process worked out at the 
Central Laboratory, granted DSM the right to exploit the process world-
wide, with the exception of the United States. However, major problems 
arose after DSM started the phenol plant. Although the plant had been 
designed with a capacity of 6,000 tons per year, only 500 tons could be 
produced in the first year. Major changes had to be made to the plant in 
1954 but production costs remained too high and the installation remained 
unreliable. The Central Laboratory failed to solve the technological prob-
lems. In 1955, the phenol plant closed and DSM decided to buy phenol.39
 In the route to caprolactam, phenol had to be converted to cyclohex-
anone, which proceeded via cyclohexanol (Figure 3.8.). Researchers in-
tended to work out these processes themselves, but in 1950 ran out of time. 
AKU progressed more quickly than DSM and aimed to start an industrial 
plant for nylon in 1952. To speed up, DSM decided to acquire know-how 
for the steps phenol – cyclohexanol – cyclohexanone. Chemiebouw con-
tacted a number of firms that had this know-how and, together with the 
Central Laboratory, selected Montecatini in 1950. The Italian company 
Figure 3.8. Cyclohexanone preparation.
Note: these figures fall into the cyclohexanone preparation box of figure 3.6.
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Figure 3.7. Hydroxylamine preparation.
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operated a phenol – cyclohexanol process in an industrial plant but was 
still working on the following step. Montecatini did not want to sell know-
how for this step until the process had run in a pilot plant for a number 
of months, and until its catalyst had been tested. The Central Laboratory 
in the meantime also continued its research, and late in 1950 developed 
Semi-technical installation for research on cyclohexanone, May 1951. Cyclohexanone was 
an important intermediate in the production of caprolactam. The semi-technical depart-
ment of the Central Laboratory had been created a short time before this photograph was 
taken. It investigated processes on a scale between the laboratory bench and the pilot plant. 
Cylohexanone research was one of the first – and most important – projects of the new 
department.
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a catalyst that had promising characteristics and seemed to work better 
than the Montecatini catalyst. DSM changed the licensing agreement with 
Montecatini accordingly, and the Semi-Technical department developed 
the process for the conversion of cyclohexanol to cylohexanone further. 
Goris, who had worked on caprolactam in previous years, set up this de-
partment in 1951 and the cyclohexanol – cyclohexanone process initially 
took up much of the Semi-Technical department’s time.40 
 The other steps in the production of caprolactam also required exten-
sive research. In 1949, the Organic Chemistry department of the Cen-
tral Laboratory developed a continuous process for the preparation of 
cyclohexanone oxime. Two years later, in cooperation with the Organic 
Chemistry department, the Aerodynamics department, a department of 
mainly physicists that had roots in coal-related research, adapted DSM’s 
cyclone for use in the rearrangement of cyclohexanone oxime to capro-
lactam. DSM’s cyclone had been developed at the end of the 1930s for the 
separation of coal from the stones that were inevitably mined with coal. 
According to Van Krevelen, who had been involved himself, the cyclone 
gave DSM’s caprolactam process its own ‘special character’.41
 DSM built a pilot plant for caprolactam in 1948/49 on the basis of its 
research, and on the basis of a design supplied by AKU in 1947. In 1949, 
the work of both DSM and AKU had progressed to the extent that the 
planning for industrial plants could start. The research cooperation was 
formalised in a contract, signed in February 1950. In October 1949, AKU 
had succeeded in landing a non-exclusive license on Du Pont’s nylon pa-
tents, but without any technical assistance. The choice of caprolactam and 
nylon 6 strengthened AKU’s position and Du Pont had also come under 
the scrutiny of the American anti-trust authorities, forcing it to license 
more than before. In 1952, DSM started industrial production of capro-
lactam in a plant with a capacity of 3,600 tons per year.
 In establishing nylon production in the Netherlands, AKU and DSM 
could profit from German know-how; but in-house research was crucial 
to solve the many problems that remained and to develop a process on an 
industrial scale. Catalysis and process research capabilities, built in relation 
to fertilisers, had enabled DSM to start the caprolactam project, but as the 
project progressed it boosted these capabilities further and also crucially 
strengthened capabilities in organic chemistry, a field in which DSM had 
gained a foothold through the alcohol process of the 1930s. Nevertheless, 
the leading role of AKU in DSM’s research is striking. AKU put DSM 
on the track of caprolactam, and AKU was in fact the market for DSM’s 
product. In the early years, DSM exported a few tons of caprolactam but 
these amounts were small. 
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Improving the Process
After the plant had come on stream in 1952, research on caprolactam con-
tinued and concerned all steps of the process. For instance, the production 
of ammonium nitrite from the off-gases of the nitric acid plants had a 
low efficiency. Research on possible alternatives that had been started at 
the Organic Chemistry department in 1949 had yielded few results. In 
July 1950, Niks, who was now in charge of developing the production 
of caprolactam and other organic products at the SBB, visited Hermann 
Zorn from the Swiss company Holzverzuckerungs AG. Zorn, a former IG 
Farben expert on caprolactam, had continued his work in Switzerland. 
Through Inventa, the Holzverzuckerungs AG sold much of his technol-
ogy. Zorn put Niks on the track of another route to ammonium nitrite: 
from ammonia and carbon dioxide, ammonium carbonate could be made, 
which in turn could be reacted with nitric oxides to form ammonium 
nitrite (Figure 3.9.). This promised to be a highly efficient route and Niks, 
Berkhoff and others considered buying this process. Instead, when the 
off-gases of nitric acid production no longer provided enough ammonium 
nitrite, Zorn’s route became a subject for research. Under the umbrella of 
fertiliser research, a process was developed quickly and a pilot plant built 
in 1953. A year later, a commercial installation started at one of the nitric 
acid plants.42
 Zorn not only informed Niks on ammonium nitrite, but also on the 
purification of caprolactam. Again, several researchers suggested buying 
Zorn’s method, but research continued as well. AKU had little faith in 
Zorn’s know-how and preliminary research at the Central Laboratory 
failed to reproduce Zorn’s claims. A number of strict criteria had to be 
met in the production of caprolactam because contaminations interfered 
with the polymerisation and spinning processes. Research on the purifica-
tion of caprolactam started in full around the time the commercial plant 
was under construction. The Analysis department of the Central Labora-
tory worked on the identification of contaminations in caprolactam from 
the plant and developed methods for this identification. The SBB’s works 
laboratory also worked on this, and AKU suggested polymerising caprol-
actam from the plant on laboratory scale as a quality test. Researchers from 
Figure 3.9. Ammonium nitrite and hydroxylamine preparation.
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the Organic Chemistry department in particular worked on processes to 
purify caprolactam, together with other Central Laboratory departments 
and Leo Kretzers, one of the caprolactam plant’s staff engineers. In 1958, 
a new method of caprolactam purification was implemented in the plant, 
but purification and contaminations remained a subject for research in the 
following years.43 
 Research on purification and ammonium nitrite are just two examples 
of research aimed at improving the processes used in the caprolactam 
plants. These processes were also changed and improved on other points, 
and almost continuously. The importance of such research can hardly 
be overestimated. Purity in particular was crucial, again giving AKU a 
central role in DSM’s research. The effects of Niks’ visit to the Holzver-
zuckerungs AG similarly show that the research process in relation to 
caprolactam was more or less open, and at least partly directed by outside 
incentives.
Feedstocks: The Cyclohexane Oxidation Process and another Phenol Plant
After the closure of the phenol plant, DSM manufactured caprolactam 
from acquired phenol. Benzene could be processed into cyclohexane, 
which in turn could be oxidised to cyclohexanone and cylohexanol. This 
presented a route which would again base caprolactam production on in-
ternally available feedstocks. With increasing petroleum-refining capacity 
after the Second World War, moreover, cyclohexane became available at 
low prices and presented a long-term threat to phenol-based caprolactam 
production. For both reasons, the Organic Chemistry department started 
researching cyclohexane oxidation in 1952. Cyclohexane oxidation, how-
ever, was only used industrially for the production of adipic acid and the 
initial results of the Central Laboratory’s research were poor: the process 
had a low efficiency and adipic acid was an unavoidable by-product. Re-
searchers branded the process uneconomical.44
 Two years later, however, research on the oxidation of cyclohexane 
started again, triggered in particular by the expected availability of cy-
clohexane from the petroleum industry. Finding suitable equipment and 
a suitable method for the processing of the oxidation product into cyclo-
hexanol and cylohexanone posed problems, but in 1956 a semi-technical 
oxidation unit was built. In the same year, Spencer Chemical, an American 
chemical company, showed an interest in licensing DSM’s caprolactam 
process. Spencer’s starting point would be cyclohexane, not phenol, and 
this stimulated research. In 1959, the Central Laboratory had progressed to 
the stage where the preparations for an industrial plant could start. In 1961, 
DSM decided to build a plant which came on stream a year later. Spencer 
eventually did not acquire DSM know-how as they decided not to set up 
caprolactam production when their projected price offered to a potential 
client was undercut by a competitor.45
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Graph 3.4. Expansion of caprolactam capacity at DSM, 1952-1966.
Source: RAL, 17.26/ 34 inv. no. 789: Verloop productie, kostprijs en opbrengst caprolactam 
1952-1966. Bedrijfseconomische afdeling, Kikken, 26 May 1967.
Graph 3.3. Cost prices and market prices for caprolactam at DSM, 1952-1966.
Source: RAL, 17.26/ 34 inv. no. 789: Verloop productie, kostprijs en opbrengst caprolactam 
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 Stamicarbon profited from the cyclohexane oxidation process because 
most of its licensees preferred cyclohexane over phenol as starting point 
for caprolactam. At DSM’s site in Geleen (Netherlands), only a relatively 
small unit was built. At the Central Laboratory, moreover, research by the 
Catalysis department led to a shortcut in the phenol-to-cyclohexanone 
process and an industrial unit started at about the same time as the cy-
clohexane plant.46 
 Finally, alongside research, production staff evaluated the possibilities 
of restarting phenol production. As caprolactam production was being ex-
panded continuously, production of feedstocks had to keep up. In 1958, 
production staff decided that developing the cyclohexane oxidation pro-
cess would take too long to cover immediate feedstock demands, and they 
started talks with Durez Plastics and Dow Chemical, both American com-
panies. Dow had plans to build a phenol plant in Rotterdam (Netherlands) 
based on its own process, starting from toluene and proceeding via benzoic 
acid to phenol. Dow’s researchers were still working on the development 
of the process, and initial cost calculations showed that it might be more 
expensive than conventional routes. DSM still chose to cooperate with 
Dow. It considered Dow an attractive partner and also expected the price 
of toluene to fall because the petroleum industry made increasing amounts 
available from its refining operations. DSM also managed to make Dow fi-
nancially responsible for all the technological risks. DSM and Dow joined 
forces by establishing a joint venture, later named the Chemische Industrie 
Rijnmond (CIR).47 
 Construction of the phenol plant began in Rotterdam in 1962, and 
two years later it could be started up. At that time, phenol prices dropped 
and Dow lost its interest in the project, selling its stake in CIR to DSM 
in 1964. The phenol plant had many teething problems that led to poor 
financial results and required substantial research. The Dow process gene-
rated tar alongside phenol, and research focused on reducing the amount 
of tar and also tried to find ways to process it into a useful product. The 
Central Laboratory got the phenol plant going, but its competitive posi-
tion remained weak.48 
 Despite the problems with the plant, DSM remained committed to 
CIR and to phenol as a starting point for caprolactam. Because of de-
velopments in phenol, the role of the cyclohexane oxidation process at 
DSM’s own production site remained somewhat marginal. It does show 
the long-term view of researchers as the process did not solve any immedi-
ate problems. It also shows that research took initiatives, and was able to 
take such initiatives relatively independently of production management 
in DSM’s chemical sector. Moreover, DSM started research on cyclohexane 
oxidation without being prompted by AKU. In matters of feedstocks and 
process research, DSM had accumulated much experience over the years 
and took decisions on its own.
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 The cyclohexane oxidation process represents research with a broader 
scope than the research on purification, for instance, as it presented an 
alternative to the route in operation. Both types of research for existing 
businesses were undertaken in an attempt to maintain profitability. Prices 
for bulk chemicals typically declined over time, and with declining prices, 
profit margins also declined.49 Caprolactam prices followed this pattern, 
but DSM tried to combat these falling prices through expansion and re-
search and succeeded in maintaining a profit margin, albeit a declining one 
(Graph 3.3.). It is difficult to assess the relative importance of expansion 
and research in the maintenance of profitability because DSM expanded 
caprolactam capacity almost continuously (Graph 3.4), reaching the mile-
stone of 100,000 tons per year in 1966. Graph 3.3 indicates, however, that 
DSM went through a steep learning curve right after the plant went on 
stream.
Threats and Research
Although capacity reached 100,000 tons per year in 1966, only approxi-
mately 73,000 tons were sold in that year. A year earlier, production had 
also remained well below capacity. Market prices were also dropping fast, 
narrowing the gap with cost prices (Graph 3.3). The poor results of phenol 
manufacture also strained profitability.50 
 This first hitch in the development of caprolactam turned out to be 
temporary, but influenced research. In 1966, Revallier, DSM’s R&D man-
ager, wrote in his notes to the annual report for top management that 
‘change’ characterised caprolactam technology and the market for fibre 
intermediates. Revallier noted that BASF and Bayer were planning major 
expansions of their caprolactam capacities in Antwerp, and that ICI and 
Du Pont were planning expansions of their nylon 6.6 capacities on the 
mainland of Europe. The extensive technical sales services of ICI and Du 
Pont inspired respect as well. Revallier also expected increased competi-
tion between nylon 6, nylon 6.6 and polyester due to improvements in 
the spinning process of the latter two fibres. Finally, other companies had 
new routes to caprolactam under development that particularly promised 
to lower the amount of ammonium sulphate. This by-product had a heavy 
influence on the economics of caprolactam production. The market for 
ammonium sulphate was mainly located in the Far East and had a cyclical 
character. The expansion of caprolactam production had led to increasing 
amounts of ammonium sulphate which, from time to time, were hard to 
sell. The promise of the development of ammonium sulphate-free capro-
lactam processes also meant that the link between fibres and fertilisers 
could be loosened, opening the door to fibre intermediates for companies 
that did not have fertiliser activities.51 
 Revallier noted a number of ways in which research was responding 
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to these developments. In the first place, the research on the process used 
in the production plant broadened to include alternative processes. DSM 
set up its own sales service department and investigated the possibilities of 
manufacturing other fibre intermediates. These research lines characterise 
DSM’s caprolactam research from the late 1950s onwards.
 The central Laboratory had already investigated alternative processes in 
the early 1950s, but this research gained momentum after about 1960. The 
1960s saw many activities in caprolactam and fibre intermediates generally, 
and patents of other companies typically motivated the start of research 
at the Central Laboratory. A substantial number of these projects started, 
but by 1965 one had become the most important: the route to caprolactam 
via caprolactone. Patented by the American company Union Carbide, the 
process omitted the preparation of cyclohexanone oxime and proceeded 
via cyclohexanone to caprolactone, and in turn to caprolactam. In 1961, 
the Organic Chemistry department started research on this process, but 
had trouble inventing around the patents of Union Carbide. In 1966, re-
searchers found a route via the co-oxidation of cyclohexahone with benzal-
dehyde, a chemical available through the Dow phenol process. The capro-
lactone process could be integrated with the phenol process, resulting in 
an almost closed process with no ammonium sulphate by-product and 
lower investment costs. (Figure 3.10.) The processing of the co-oxidation 
product proved to be difficult, however. Research continued for a number 
of years, but the caprolactone process did not get off the ground. Union 
Carbide built a plant in the 1960s but closed it down a number of years 
later.52
 As in the case of the cyclohexane oxidation process, the Central Labor-
atory had taken the initiative to start research on the caprolactone process 
and had taken a long-term view of DSM’s interests. From the perspective 
of research it was desirable to at least reduce the production of ammonium 
sulphate, and the caprolactone project was one way of achieving this goal. 
Other projects on alternative processes also failed to produce results. Incre-
mental improvements to the existing plant proved to be an effective way of 
remaining competitive.
 Another way of remaining competitive was by providing service: solv-
ing problems that customers were confronted with in processing. An ex-
pected increase in competition, as well as DSM’s gradually broadening 
customer base, made such service important. The technical sales service 
of competitors served as examples for the Central Laboratory’s own serv-
ice department, which was initially called Spinning House (Spinhuis), but 
soon afterwards Fibre Intermediates. The department was established in 
1960 with Goris as its first head. Emile de Roy van Zuydewijn was engaged 
as an advisor. De Roy van Zuydewijn investigated plastics and fibres at 
Eindhoven Technical College, and had been research director of Nyma, a 
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small Dutch rayon producer. Zimmer, a German engineering contractor 
specialised in the field of polymerisation and spinning technology, built 
the necessary installations. Fibre Intermediates worked on solving prob-
lems of customers but, for example, also tried to stimulate caprolactam 
sales by developing Reaction Injection Moulding (RIM), a technique to 
polymerise caprolactam in a mould in the presence of a catalyst and other 
additives. Several companies showed interest in DSM’s RIM know-how 
and conducted tests, but these contacts did not develop into substantial 
sales. Shortly after the establishment of Fibre Intermediates, the Central 
Laboratory started service and application research in plastics as well.53
 Fibre Intermediates built a base of fibre know-how concerning capro-
lactam and nylon 6 and other fibres. The competition between nylon 6 
and other fibres, or fear of this competition, repeatedly led to research. 
Intermediates for nylon 6.6, polyester, the growth fibre of the 1950s and 
1960s, and acrylic fibres, another class of fibres that emerged after the Sec-
ond World War, appeared on the agenda of the Central Laboratory from 
time to time. In 1954, Van Krevelen and his colleagues in the management 
of the Central Laboratory sketched the dilemma for DSM in the research 
programme: there were many potentially interesting routes to many po-
tentially interesting products, but researchers had to cover the whole field 
because no choices could be made; the company had to rely on a part-
ner.54 
Figure 3.10. The DSM caprolactone process.
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 This mechanism is clear, for example, in DSM’s research on nylon salt, 
the intermediate for nylon 6.6, in the late 1950s.55 In April 1955, AKU told 
DSM of its intention to build a nylon 6.6 pilot plant. AKU manufactured 
large amounts of nylon 6 as well as rayon, a fibre based on cellulose, and 
thought that nylon 6 would replace rayon for use in tyre cords, the fibres 
used to reinforce the carcass of car tyres. Amerenka, its American subsidi-
ary that manufactured rayon tyre cord, already planned to make a switch 
to nylon 6. Major American tyre companies, stimulated by Du Pont and 
Chemstrand, the two major American manufactures of nylon 6.6, con-
sidered nylon 6.6 more attractive than nylon 6, however. AKU wanted 
to follow but did not want to manufacture nylon salt, the necessary in-
termediate, in-house. Only BASF marketed this compound, and AKU 
turned to DSM as a second supplier. DSM committed itself to producing 
the intermediates. After it had become clear that the know-how for the 
process could not be bought, the Central Laboratory’s Organic Chemistry 
department, the Semi-Technical department and the Organic Pilot Plants 
rushed to get to the pilot plant stage. The project also involved: Chemie-
bouw; DSM’s business economists; Niks, at that time head of SBB’s sector 
A machine for drawing and twisting yarn at the Fibre Intermediates department of the 
Central Laboratory in 1965. The department was equipped with the machines that DSM’s 
caprolactam customers used to manufacture nylon. It helped solve customer problems and 
worked on product development. The Central Laboratory had similar departments to sup-
port DSM’s plastics business.
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that included caprolactam; and Kretzers, one of the staff engineers of the 
caproalactam plant, who was to be appointed as its head in December 
1956. DSM took the development of a nylon salt process very seriously.56
 By 1955 it was no secret that production of nylon salt revolved around 
hexamethylene diamine (HMD) and adipic acid. (Figure 3.11.) For adipic 
acid, European companies used a route that started from phenol and pro-
ceeded via cyclohexanol to adipic acid. The Central Laboratory reworked 
this process on the basis of data from technical literature, with most of 
the data originating from ICI. At the time nylon salt came into the pic-
ture, the Central Laboratory also worked on its cyclohexane oxidation pro-
cess that resulted in adipic acid as a by-product. Integrated production of 
caprolactam and nylon salt therefore became inevitable but also spurred 
research on cyclohexane oxidation. The integrated route became the focus 
of research and, as early as 1955, pilot production of cyclohexane and adipic 
acid started. With HMD bought from other companies, a first batch of 
nylon salt was produced.
 The known route to HMD proceeded from adipic acid via adiponitrile. 
Researchers found the step from adipic acid to adiponitrile difficult and 
also hired an Italian advisor for the step to HMD.57 Researchers also found 
an alternative route to HMD, however, proceeding from caprolactam via 
Figure 3.11. The nylon salt, cyclohexane oxidation and caprolactam processes.
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epsilon-aminocapronitrile. This route had been found and patented in 
1950 by TNO, the Dutch semi-public organisation for applied research, 
but these patents had expired and did not hinder DSM’s research. Produc-
tion staff also evaluated the available options and considered the route 
starting from caprolactam the most attractive as it gave DSM an option to 
develop a process that was not already being used by another company.
 Finally, two options existed for the production of nylon salt: HMD 
could be neutralised with adipic acid in the presence of water or alcohol. 
In 1955, the Central Laboratory focused on the alcohol route because the 
nylon salt produced with the water route was hard to purify and therefore 
required very pure HMD and adipic acid. In July 1956, however, AKU 
formulated preliminary standards of quality for nylon salt that were hard 
to meet with the alcohol route. Work on the water route resumed and 
research started on purification methods.
 In 1956, only a year after research had started, the Organic Pilot Plants 
had a full nylon salt process in operation on pilot plant scale. A year later, 
researchers cut the ties between caprolactam and nylon salt production 
when they found a way to process the cyclohexane oxidation product to 
cylohexanol and cyclohexanone without adipic acid, or vice versa, to pro-
duce mainly adipic acid. 
 In a short time, the Central Laboratory achieved pilot production of 
nylon salt. The evaluation of several routes to a desired end product or in-
termediate was typical of research in organic chemistry. In the case of urea, 
basically one chemical route existed and the emphasis of the research was 
on the technology needed to realise this route on an industrial scale. The 
short time it took to reach the pilot plant stage with nylon salt shows the 
extent to which organic chemistry capabilities had grown after the Second 
World War. The development of the alcohol process in the 1930s had laid 
a small foundation for these capabilities but they were greatly expanded 
through caprolactam research. Through caprolactam, DSM developed a 
new technology base.
 Negotiations with AKU over sales of nylon salt went less smoothly 
than research. AKU was also negotiating with BASF and used this to put 
pressure on DSM. In 1957, after a year of pilot plant operations at DSM, 
AKU radically readjusted its expectations of nylon 6.6. AKU had aimed 
at tyre cords for car tyres. Tyres with cords made from nylon 6.6 suffered 
from so-called flat-spotting: they became less round after a car had stood 
at the same spot for a while. Improvements in conventional tyre cords, 
moreover, cut off nylon 6.6’s entry. The Central Laboratory’s research and 
the pilot plant stopped immediately. In 1958 and 1959, the pilot plant made 
occasional production runs when AKU had managed to secure orders for 
nylon 6.6, but in 1959 the pilot plant was dismantled.58
 AKU started DSM’s research on nylon salt and cancelled it. The un-
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foreseen cancellation gave researchers a hangover, but shows that DSM 
relied heavily on AKU. DSM could not choose between potentially int-
eresting fibre intermediates on its own. DSM had contact with the market 
for synthetic fibres only through AKU. In contrast, when AKU had put 
DSM on the track of nylon salt, the Central Laboratory could choose 
between alternative routes to HMD, for instance. In process research on 
caprolactam, and in the related fields of organic chemistry and catalysis, 
the Central Laboratory accumulated a lot of experience in a relatively short 
period of time and did not need a partner to direct research.
Diversification
The Central Laboratory researched caprolactam extensively, with AKU 
providing help at crucial crossroads. The establishment of production, the 
improvement of the production process, alternative processes and alterna-
tive products all received attention. Research took initiatives and started 
projects out of concern about the long-range prospects of caprolactam 
production. Production management hardly interfered with that kind of 
research. The caprolactam research shows the faith management had in re-
search, and the room it gave to research; it also shows that these parameters 
of research management not only applied to fundamental research. 
 At the Central Laboratory, caprolactam cut across the inorganic/org-
anic divide in the organisation. The Inorganic Chemistry department also 
conducted some research on caprolactam; the Analytical department per-
formed crucial work on purification; and the Semi-Technical department 
solved many equipment problems. In general, caprolactam relied more 
on the increased scope of the Central Laboratory’s organisation than urea; 
Van Krevelen’s scope-building paid off in caprolactam. Process research, 
catalysis and organic chemistry developed into strongholds and were cru-
cial for the establishment and maintenance of caprolactam production. 
Research played a central role in caprolactam production, even though 
AKU took crucial decisions for DSM. The Central Laboratory’s work laid 
the vital link in the chain toward industrial production and enabled DSM 
to take advantage of the fast growing market for nylon 6 and its intermedi-
ates.
 Like urea, the caprolactam project fitted DSM’s expansive business 
strategy in chemicals. Also like urea, DSM entered caprolactam relatively 
late and aimed to catch up with the leading companies in the field. Both 
projects were primarily technology-push. In urea, DSM knew the fertiliser 
market; in caprolactam, AKU provided DSM with a link to the market 
and, in the early years, in fact was DSM’s market. The markets for urea 
and caprolactam, moreover, grew fast. Entering known and fast growing 
markets with a technology push posed few difficulties.
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More Diversifications: Polyethylene, EPDM and Melamine
Caprolactam represented a major step outside the field of fertilisers, but 
DSM diversified further in the 1950s and 1960s. Production of, and de-
mand for, synthetic fibres grew fast after the Second World War but plas-
tics boomed as well. DSM entered this field through polyethylene. Tech-
nological links led to the development of EPDM synthetic rubber. Finally, 
feedstock links led from urea to melamine, a product that could be used 
in the manufacture of thermoset resins. As in the case of caprolactam, the 
Central Laboratory played an important role in these diversifications.
ICI and Ziegler: DSM’s Entry into Polyethylene
Like nylon, polyethylene was a new material from the 1930s. Eric Fawcett 
and Reginald Gibson, researchers from ICI, discovered polyethylene in 
1933. They polymerised ethylene under very high pressure. ICI had a pro-
duction plant in operation by 1939 and during the Second World War the 
new material found ample use but mainly as cable insulation.59
 The discovery of polyethylene followed from ICI’s research program 
on high-pressure chemistry. The British firm had close contacts with the 
Dutch professor Teun Michels, who was an authority in the field. The 
outbreak of the war prevented further contacts between ICI and Michels. 
Ross van Lennep, however, asked Michels in 1942 to become an advisor 
for the Central Laboratory’s research on ammonia synthesis. Like ICI’s 
polyethylene process, ammonia synthesis proceeded at high pressure.60 In 
October of the following year, and with Michels’ help, the Central Labora-
tory also started to research the purification of ethylene with the ultimate 
goal of polymerising this compound. Ethylene was available from the coke 
oven gas separation section and DSM was already manufacturing alcohol 
from this compound61 (See chapter 2.). 
 In 1946, just after the end of the Second World War, a section of DSM’s 
coal sales office made a quick market scan and contacted several potential 
Dutch customers. This scan showed interest in polyethylene, but DSM 
needed a license on ICI’s patents before it could manufacture this plastic. 
DSM approached ICI in 1946, but the British company did not want to 
license its technology. By being persistent, DSM eventually got a license 
and secured access to the know-how necessary to build a plant and intro-
duce the product. ICI and DSM signed the contracts on 1 April 1957. 
 In the meantime, the landscape had changed dramatically. Late in 1953, 
Karl Ziegler of the Max Planck Institut für Kohlenforschung discovered a 
catalyst that could polymerise ethylene at atmospheric pressure. The re-
sulting polyethylene differed from ICI’s product. The Ziegler catalyst led 
to products with a high density that were more rigid and stiff than ICI’s 
low density, more flexible products. Because of its different characteristics, 
high-density polyethylene (HDPE) promised applications that differed 
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from those of low-density polyethylene (LDPE).62 Comparable discoveries 
were made at Du Pont, Standard Oil of Indiana (later Amoco) and Phil-
lips Petroleum. Ziegler had no production interests and decided to license 
freely. He licensed his catalyst only, and not a process. Ziegler’s licensees 
had to develop a process.63 
 Berkhoff and Van Krevelen attended a lecture by Ziegler at an industry 
fair in Frankfurt, shortly after Ziegler had made his discoveries. Berkhoff 
and Van Krevelen quickly recognised the importance of the new catalyst 
and called Ziegler on the way back to Limburg to inquire about the pos-
sibilities of a license.64 In parallel, Berkhoff and Van Krevelen formed a 
small group of researchers from coal research and the Organic Chemistry 
department in March 1955. The research of this group was aimed at under-
standing the polymerisation of ethylene with a Ziegler catalyst.65 Research 
was limited to fundamental investigations because DSM had not yet ob-
tained a license. In April 1955, the company made an official request for 
this license. Negotiations did not take long and DSM obtained a license in 
November that year.
 Ziegler’s work and his willingness to license unexpectedly opened a 
second option to enter polyethylene. DSM took this opportunity and mo-
bilised its resources quickly, but at the same time negotiations with ICI 
continued. Early in 1957, top management decided to go for both ICI and 
Ziegler. The products were complementary and competitors were moving 
in the same direction as DSM. Top management gave priority to LDPE, 
however, because an established market existed for this product and be-
cause ICI had proven technology. 
 While research on the Ziegler process continued, Chemiebouw started 
working on the engineering of an LDPE plant. They used drawings and 
specifications supplied by ICI. The British firm also helped DSM train its 
future operators. The licensing contract stipulated further that ICI would 
help DSM with know-how relating to the processing and applications of 
LDPE. In September 1957 DSM signed a similar contract with the Ameri-
can company Spencer Chemical. This company made a request to buy 
DSM’s caprolactam technology in 1954. After the decision had been taken 
to build an ICI polyethylene plant, Spencer and DSM agreed on an ex-
change of know-how. In return for DSM’s knowledge concerning capro-
lactam and nylon salt, Spencer provided DSM with its knowledge of low-
density polyethylene. Spencer had licensed the ICI process in 1952, but 
had improved this technology and had experience with it. The exchange of 
know-how proceeded more to the advantage of DSM when Spencer decid-
ed to call off its plan for caprolactam and nylon salt production.66 Finally, 
in March 1958 DSM signed a contract with the TNO Plastics Institute that 
had much experience in application research on plastics. DSM contracted 
TNO for application research on polyethylene and gained the opportunity 
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to take over researchers from TNO that had worked on assignments from 
DSM.
 Application know-how was crucial in plastics. Converters needed in-
formation on the properties of a material, on how it would behave in 
the machines they used, and on the characteristics of the end product; 
manufacturers of plastics typically supplied this information. The Central 
Laboratory had to organise application research in plastics. The Materials 
Research and Semi-Technical departments did this research before 1958. 
Materials Research worked on quality control and testing of materials like 
concrete and alloys that were used by the company. In 1958, two new de-
partments were organised: Plastics Technology, where application research 
was done with plastics processing machines; and Plastics Research, where 
testing methods were developed and properties of materials were investi-
gated. These departments were combined in a sector named R&D Poly-
mers in 1963, together with a department that conducted process research 
on HDPE (called Polymer Development).67 
 In 1959, DSM started its LDPE plant. It had a capacity of 10,000 tons 
per year but soon proved too small. DSM continuously expanded this 
installation in the 1960s. The market for polyethylene was booming and 
grew fast. Through the development of new types, the application area 
expanded to include packaging of all sorts, toys, pipes, household goods, 
etc.68 In 1958, DSM established a sales office for plastics (Verenigd Plastic 
Verkoopkantoor, VPV) together with AKU, which marketed certain nylon 
types for use in the plastics industry. 
 The VPV built a service and troubleshooting laboratory as well, ena-
bling the Central Laboratory to concentrate its application research on 
product development and improvement. This would become an impor-
tant task for the Central Laboratory in the 1960s. Competition came from 
other producers of polyethylene and other materials. Product improve-
ment and expansion of the number of types was crucial to keep up and 
improve market positions. The Central Laboratory also worked on im-
provements of the LDPE process to make it safer and more reliable, and 
to cut costs. As production capacity increased, prices fell and DSM had to 
cut its production costs to remain competitive.69
 DSM entered polyethylene by licensing the ICI process. The main 
challenge for the Central Laboratory was to build up application research 
in relation to both the processing and analysis of polyethylene. This was a 
crucial addition to DSM’s technological capabilities, as caprolactam and 
fertilisers were much more standardised products than polyethylene. By 
1961 DSM manufactured no fewer than 185 types of LDPE.
 DSM needed ethylene to produce polyethylene and also to produce 
alcohol. Initially, enough ethylene could be made available from coke oven 
gas. In 1957, when DSM decided to diversify into both LDPE and HDPE, 
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it became clear that not enough could be produced from this source. Pro-
duction staff had already started exploring other possible methods to man-
ufacture ethylene, including those starting from hydrocarbon feedstocks 
that were already widely used in the United States and that were increas-
ingly being used in Western Europe. DSM hired Stone & Webster, one of 
the leading engineering contractors in the field, to build a naphtha cracker. 
This installation started in 1961 (table 3.3) and marked the first time that 
DSM did not use coal-based feedstocks. A second, much larger, cracker 
soon followed and the alcohol plant was also closed in 1960, freeing ad-
ditional ethylene for plastics manufacture. Finally, DSM was connected 
to a pipeline network between several companies in the Benelux and Ger-
many.70
 The Central Laboratory evaluated different routes to ethylene in the 
1950s and investigated hydrocarbon-based ethylene production in an at-
tempt to optimise the process. The field was dominated by engineering 
contractors and DSM, like most other companies, relied on these compa-
nies for the engineering and construction of its crackers.71
 
Development of a Ziegler Process
As in the case of LDPE, DSM tried to acquire process know-how along-
side the catalyst. Ziegler and his institute did not provide such knowledge, 
but many other companies were working on industrial processes. The Ger-
man chemical firm Hibernia had already built a pilot plant by April 1955. 
Van Waes and Berkhoff visited this installation that month and tried to 
come to an agreement. Hibernia, however, had tied itself to Chemische 
Werke Hüls.
 In September 1955, the vice-president of Koppers Company visited 
DSM. This American conglomerate had also acquired a Ziegler license 
and offered DSM its process know-how. In October and November 1955, 
Berkhoff and Van Waes travelled through the United States and visited not 
Table 3.3.	DSM’s naphtha crackers.
Sources: DSM annual reports 1967, 1971, 1975. Naftakraker wordt in bedrijf gesteld. Nieuws 
van de Staatsmijnen 1961, 10(15),  NAK 4 in bedrijf. DSM Limburg Nieuws 1979, 29(5), 1. 
Installation Start Stop Capacity
tons of ethylene/ year
1 1961 1971 30,000
2 1967 1975 (explosion) 135,000
3 1971 350,000
4 1979 450,000
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only Koppers, but also Phillips Petroleum and other firms. Koppers made 
a very good impression. Berkhoff and Van Waes thought that Koppers 
had already developed a process. Koppers preferred joint research with the 
Central Laboratory and both companies signed an agreement to that end 
in February 1956. In May of that year, the American company Brea Chem-
icals, a subsidiary of Union Oil Company of California, was included.
 In 1956, the Central Laboratory shifted into high gear and engaged 
its full spectrum of research capabilities to develop a process. The Or-
ganic Chemistry department, which also investigated caprolactam, played 
an important role. The Central Laboratory also expanded its scope for 
polyethylene when it started systematic fundamental polymer research 
in 1956. The Central Laboratory’s catalysis group and the department for 
fundamental coal research took up this work. Van Krevelen had initiated 
research into the constitution of coal to maintain coke quality. In rela-
tion to polymers, fundamental research was aimed at building a scientific 
foundation for the future production of plastics. Research included work 
on catalysis, developing analysis methods and studies of molecular weight 
distribution. Research into the latter subject was aimed at gaining a bet-
ter understanding of the relationship between the production process, the 
catalyst and the product’s characteristics. In this way, industrial interests 
played an important role in fundamental polymer research. Moreover, uni-
versities were doing little in the field of polymers at that time. In 1957, the 
Central Laboratory created a dedicated department, called Fundamental 
Polymer Research, under the umbrella of the Basic and Fundamental Re-
search sector.72
 In January 1956, several researchers, including the small group that had 
been formed in 1955, visited Ziegler’s Max Planck institute for the first time 
and got full insight into the work that had been done up to that point. 
Soon afterwards, the first information from Koppers also became available. 
This made it clear that many technological problems remained. Because 
of these problems, polymer yields in Koppers’ process were too low. The 
product also proved corrosive for processing equipment and this problem 
threatened a successful introduction of DSM’s HDPE. In June 1956, re-
searchers visited Ziegler to discuss this problem, but other licensees had 
not met a corrosion problem.
 The Central Laboratory soon moved to the pilot plant stage, aiming 
primarily at process development. Researchers started from a design sup-
plied by Koppers. Construction of the pilot plant started in June 1956. In 
September of the following year, the installation could be started with a 
batch operation. Research soon started to make the process continuous. 
The Central Laboratory also maintained the study of catalyst composition 
and behaviour. Product quality, and consequently the areas of application, 
were tightly connected to the catalyst used, and variations in that catalyst. 
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Table 3.4. Ziegler licensees up to 1955.
Source: H. Martin (2002). Polymere und Patente: Karl Ziegler, das Team, 1953-1998. Zur wirt-
schaftlichen Verwertung akademischer Forschung. Weinheim: Wiley-VCH, 151-153.ii
Note: 
i  Shell Chemicals UK bought Petrochemicals Ltd. in the mid 1950s. F. McMillan (1979). 
The Chain Straighteners. Fruitful Innovation: The Discovery of Linear and Stereoregular 
Synthetic Polymers. London: The MacMillan Press, 135. McMillan does not date this take-
over more specifically.
ii  Du Pont (with contract year 1955 and start of royalties in 1966) has been excluded from 
Martin’s list as they had comparable in-house technology and licensed only to get a 
look at Ziegler’s work and avoid patent litigation. (See: D. A. Hounshell & J. K. Smith 
(1988). Science and Corporate Strategy: Du Pont R&D, 1902-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 491-497, particularly 493-494). For the average interval this makes little 
difference.





Petrochemicals Ltd.i UK 1952 1957 5
Montecatini Italy 1953 1957 4
Hoechst Germany 1954 1957 3
Ruhrchemie Germany 1954 1957 3
Hercules Powder Co. USA 1954 1958 4
Ameripol
(Goodrich, Gulf Oil)
USA 1954 1961 7
Koppers USA 1954 1963 9
Dow Chemical USA 1954 1961 7
Union Carbide USA 1954 1957 3
Hibernia/ Hüls Germany 1955 1957 2
Monsanto USA 1955 1963 8
Mitsui Chemicals Co. Japan 1955 1958 3
Esso USA 1955 1960 5
Pechiney (Naphthachimie) France 1955 1958 3
Houilleres France 1955 1960 5
DSM Netherlands 1955 1963 8
Average 5
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Process development, product development and research on the catalyst 
proceeded hand-in-hand. This was one of the defining characteristics of 
the research on HDPE.
 In 1959, the Central Laboratory finished research in the pilot plant. The 
next year, DSM decided to build a plant with a capacity of 7,000 tons per 
year. This installation started in 1962 but suffered from several teething 
problems. The Central Laboratory had to solve these problems and also 
worked on further improvements. Product development also continued 
to find new applications and improve product quality for existing applica-
tions.
 The development of a Ziegler process was one of the main research 
projects in the second half of the 1950s. Combined with the research on 
caprolactam and fertilisers, it shows the expansive drive to diversify the 
company and the crucial role the Central Laboratory played in this. Poly-
ethylene, both LDPE and HDPE, caprolactam and urea were researched 
in parallel.
 The Central Laboratory tracked the option Ziegler provided, and its 
capabilities were crucial in the establishment of HDPE production. These 
capabilities included organic chemistry, catalysis and process research. The 
Central Laboratory provided the absorptive capacity necessary to diver-
sify. DSM built a technology base in plastics that not only overlapped 
with caprolactam and fertilisers (process research and catalysis), but also 
included new capabilities (application research and fundamental polymer 
research). These new capabilities were built for LDPE and HDPE at the 
same time.
 To construct a rough indication of R&D performance, table 3.4 lists 
all of Ziegler’s licensees up to 1955. These licensees were the first wave of 
companies that picked up Ziegler’s work and started to develop a process. 
Table 3.4 also lists when the licensing contract was awarded and when the 
first royalties were paid. This gives an indication of the start of research and 
the start of commercial production, and therefore of the time it took com-
panies to develop a Ziegler process and build an industrial plant. Table 3.4 
shows that some licensees were very fast, including Hoechst and Ruhrche-
mie from Germany, but that others were slower. DSM is in the tail of the 
group of licensees with companies like Monsanto and Union Carbide. 
DSM started by investigating the Ziegler process in a fundamental man-
ner and tried to obtain a license first, as well as process know-how from 
another company. Only in 1956 did the Central Laboratory start process 
development and it took almost two years before a pilot plant was built. 
Ruhrchemie, by contrast, quickly ensured access to Ziegler’s work. After a 
decision by the company’s managing board in January 1954, the research 
department started a pilot plant in April of that same year. DSM was a 
somewhat slower pioneer, picking up the work of Ziegler early but taking 
a relatively long time to develop an industrial process.73
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EPDM and Polypropylene
If HDPE in itself was not enough, Ziegler-type catalysts opened a road to 
other products as well. Ziegler had limited his patent claim to polyethylene 
but Giulio Natta, and soon others as well, found that Ziegler-type catalysts 
could be used for the manufacture of polypropylene, another type of plas-
tic, as well as synthetic rubbers. Natta worked for the Milan Polytechnic 
but had close ties with Montecatini. This Italian company fortified its po-
sition with many patents.74
 In June 1955, the Central Laboratory cautiously started to explore the 
production of polypropylene and synthetic rubbers with the Ziegler cata-
lyst. The starting point for polypropylene is propylene, a compound avai-
lable from coke oven gas and from naphtha cracking. The catalyst needs to 
be selective and order the chain of molecules to a high degree (leading to 
so-called isotactic polypropylene). The Central Laboratory needed to find 
such a catalyst, one that did not infringe on the patent position of other 
companies, in particular Montecatini. Montecatini had claimed patents 
for polypropylene early, and negotiated a patent pool contract with Ziegler 
in 1955 that effectively gave the Italian company the right to sell or refuse 
licenses for polypropylene production. Montecatini set tough terms, but 
its patents were also challenged by other companies. For both reasons, the 
Italian firm sold relatively few polypropylene licenses.75
 In September 1959, the HPDE pilot plant switched from polyethylene 
to polypropylene. Systematic research stopped in 1960 as it seemed un-
likely that the Central Laboratory could build an independent position in 
the field. DSM tried to obtain a license from the Italian firm but failed. In 
1963, the polypropylene plant of the Rotterdamse Polyolefinen Maatschappij 
started production. Royal Dutch/Shell and Montecatini had established 
this company for the production of polypropylene, and Montecatini had 
given it an exclusive license. The Central Laboratory investigated poly-
propylene again in 1962 and 1964, but on a very limited scale and without 
solving the problem of patents.76 
 The Central Laboratory’s work on synthetic rubbers would prove more 
successful than its work on polypropylene. In 1954, Ziegler and his co-
workers experimented with the copolymerisation of ethylene and propy-
lene using his recently developed catalyst. Natta did the same in 1955. They 
both got a rubber-like product, later called EPM rubber.77 Many com-
panies picked up these developments and started with experiments. The 
Central Laboratory included copolymers of ethylene and propylene in its 
research on the application of Ziegler-type catalysts outside polyethylene 
in 1955. These products fell under the Ziegler license agreement.78
 In 1959, laboratory research at the Organic Chemistry department on 
EPM rubber intensified. Researchers soon found that these products could 
be manufactured with almost all Ziegler-type catalysts and tried to find an 
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optimal system. In 1960, the HDPE pilot plant switched from polypropy-
lene to ethylene-propylene copolymers. With the product from the pilot 
plant, Plastics Technology started application research in the same year. 
They worked together with the TNO Rubber Institute because the Plastics 
Technology department did not yet have the necessary equipment.79
 The market for synthetic rubbers generally grew after the Second World 
War. In the Netherlands, 1965 was the first year in which synthetic rubber 
usage exceeded natural rubber usage. The rubber market consisted of two 
major segments. On the one hand, so-called general-purpose rubbers had 
a large volume, but car tyres were the dominant application. Both natural 
and synthetic rubber were used. The second market segment consisted 
of special-purpose rubbers. Market volume was smaller than in general-
purpose rubbers but prices were typically higher. Products in this segment 
included technical goods like cable insulation and all sorts of rubber prod-
ucts used in cars. Special-purpose rubbers have one or more defining char-
acteristics that give them an advantage over general-purpose rubbers.80
 In 1960, DSM’s production staff tried to chart a course for synthetic 
rubbers. They aimed for the general-purpose market because of its volume. 
Early results of application research on EPM in car tyres showed promising 
results. However, major rubber companies like Dunlop and B.F. Goodrich 
produced both synthetic rubber and car tyres, and such close connections 
made the general-purpose market hard to enter. 81
 In 1961, Enjay Chemical (Standard Oil of New Jersey, now Exxon 
Chemical) started the first commercial plant for EPM rubbers.82 That year 
the Central Laboratory found, as other companies also had found, that 
EPM rubber could not be vulcanised with sulphur. This was a problem, 
particularly in the general-purpose market. Rubber processors added a 
range of chemicals to both synthetic and natural rubber to improve or steer 
the properties of products, a procedure called compounding. They  also 
added sulphur and heated the product to improve its mechanical proper-
ties, a procedure called vulcanisation. EPM rubber required the use of a 
peroxide, but that increased costs, caused a bad smell during vulcanisation 
and made it impossible to use other common additives. Addition of a third 
monomer alongside ethylene and propylene, leading to products called 
EPDM rubber, could circumvent these problems. However, the patents of 
other companies seemed to be major obstacles. DSM could acquire a li-
cense for the use of dicyclopentadiene (DCPD) from the British company 
Dunlop in 1962. The Polymers Development department found a variant 
of this compound, but nevertheless chose DCPD as it was clear who had 
patented this compound. Dunlop’s patent, moreover, covered a wide range 
of compounds that could be used alongside ethylene and propylene.83
 In October 1962, the pilot plant made the first EPDM rubbers. In the 
following year, research focused completely on these products. Application 
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research showed that EPDM was comparable to general-purpose rubbers 
but had a better weather and ozone resistance. Rubber ages (cracks and 
loses its colour) through the impact of the weather and ozone in particular. 
EPDM ages much less quickly than other rubbers. Application research 
still targeted car tyres, but also belts and cable insulation, for instance. The 
Plastics Technology department cooperated with the major Dutch car tyre 
manufacturer Vredestein to develop EPDM compounding for use in car 
tyres and test these tyres in practice. Several types of rubbers, metal cords 
and fibres were used in car tyre manufacture. EPDM did not adhere very 
well to other types of rubber and other materials; its so-called ‘tack’ was 
insufficient for car tyre production. Plastics Technology worked for several 
years to reach a satisfactory solution to this problem.84 
 Alongside application research, the Central Laboratory also advanced 
with process development. This research moved from the Organic Chem-
istry department to Polymer Development in 1961. The catalyst system 
had to be optimised and a special reactor had to be developed. EPDM, and 
also EPM, manufacture led to thick and sticky solutions which compli-
cated reactor design. Researchers tried reactors from Crawford & Russell, 
an American engineering contractor with much experience in polymers, 
but rejected them and worked out a new design. Extensive pilot plant and 
semi-technical research proved necessary.85
 EPDM with DCPD had a relatively long vulcanisation time. This 
would reduce the production capacity of rubber processors as products 
would remain longer in the vulcanisation machines. Increased vulcanisa-
tion time, in turn, led to the problem of ‘marching modulus’: the stiffness 
of products did not reach an end point, but kept increasing with vulcani-
sation time, reducing the elasticity of the product. To circumvent these 
problems, Plastics Technology started working on EPDM with ethylidene 
norbornene (ENB) as the third monomer. Union Carbide had developed 
a route to ENB and the Polymer Development department tried to find a 
different route.86 
 Du Pont and Montecatini started EPDM production in 1963.87 Two 
years later, DSM decided to build an EPDM plant with a capacity of 
12,000 tons per year. The plant was started up in 1967. It had some teeth-
ing problems, but capacity soon ran at 15,000 tons. In 1968, DSM decided 
to build a second plant with the same capacity as the first. This plant went 
into operation in 1970. These plants initially used DCPD, instead of ENB, 
as the third monomer because DCPD had advantages from a process tech-
nology point of view.88
 As in the case of polypropylene, Montecatini arranged a patent pool 
agreement with Ziegler for EPM, EPDM and other synthetic rubbers in 
1958. Six years later, this agreement was replaced with a second one that 
also included Dunlop technology. Montecatini had bought the patents 
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of the British firm to strengthen its position further. Neither Ziegler nor 
Montecatini directly informed DSM, but the company got wind of these 
developments anyway. Montecatini offered DSM a license to start manu-
facture of EPDM in 1965, but tried to exclude DSM from markets other 
than the Benelux. DSM refused. According to the patent department, the 
company did not need a license from Montecatini at all. They argued 
that Ziegler’s original patent, for which DSM had a license, also included 
ethylene-propylene copolymers. In the second place, DSM used DCPD 
and had obtained a license from Dunlop before Montecatini bought the 
patents of the British firm. Montecatini threatened, however, to file suit 
against DSM in all countries where it sold its rubber. Even if the Italian firm 
lost, it still would hinder DSM severely. DSM and Montecatini reached 
a compromise in 1968. DSM got an exclusive production license for the 
Benelux and remained free to export (with only a few exceptions).89
 The fights over patents and licenses shows the importance the chemi-
cal industry attached to these products. In EPDM, a tough line from the 
patent department helped secure a favourable license from Montecatini. 
DSM’s position, with its Ziegler and Dunlop licenses, was stronger than in 
polypropylene, where the independence of the Central Laboratory’s work 
from Montecatini patents remained doubtful. The EPDM and polypro-
pylene projects, however, built on the same technology base: the capa-
bilities that had been developed for HDPE. Application research was also 
vital. These capabilities were not exclusively related to polyethylene but 
quickly branched out into related fields. 
Melamine
In its drive for expansion and diversification, DSM had entered plastics 
and synthetic fibre intermediates. Resins were to develop into the third leg 
of the company’s second transformation.90 In this field, around 1950 the 
Central Laboratory was working on phenol, formaldehyde and urea. How-
ever, DSM switched its urea activities to the fertiliser market in 1953 and 
the phenol plant had to be shut down in 1955. Phenol, moreover, became 
a feedstock for caprolactam. DSM and the Central Laboratory remained 
interested in resins. Van Krevelen had heard of a patent claiming a process 
for the manufacture of melamine from urea. Melamine in turn could be 
reacted with formaldehyde and urea to manufacture resins. A feedstock 
drive thus led from urea to melamine, like coke oven gas had led to ammo-
nia and fertilisers in the late 1920s. The Inorganic Chemistry department 
started research on melamine in 1956.91
 Thermoset resins were an established field by the time the Central La-
boratory started research on melamine. Bakelite, manufactured from phe-
nol and formaldehyde, was the first product in the field, followed by urea-
formaldehyde resins in the 1920s. Urea, at that time, was produced from 
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calcium cyanamide. Urea-formaldehyde resins had the advantage that end 
products could be manufactured in many colours instead of just black 
or brown as was the case with Bakelite. Around 1935, the Swiss company 
Gesellschaft für Chemische Industrie Basel (CIBA), American Cyanamid and 
other companies found that melamine could be used for the manufacture 
of resins. These products were first used for the manufacture of unbreak-
able tableware, and in 1938 Formica started using melamine formaldehyde 
resins for the top two layers of their laminates for table and counter tops. 
The field of application later expanded to include the manufacture of ply-
wood and chipboard as well as certain types of paints, for instance.92
 In 1936, CIBA started producing melamine, soon followed by Ameri-
can Cyanamid and others. In 1949, Süddeutsche Kalkstickstoff-Werke AG 
(SKW) started a melamine plant and this German company developed 
into a major producer in Europe. SKW, like CIBA and American Cy-
anamid, used a batch process that started from calcium cyanamide, at 
that time a common nitrogen fertiliser, and proceeded via dicyandiamide 
to melamine. American Cyanamid produced large amounts of calcium 
cyanamide for fertiliser purposes. In 1943, the company also patented a 
pro—cess for the production of melamine that started from urea. Research 
continued, and ten years later a patent on a silica gel catalyst for this pro-
cess followed. American Cyanamid did not develop this process to indus-
trial scale. Urea-based melamine production led to ammonia and carbon 
dioxide off-gases that had to be recycled to urea production in order for 
melamine production to be economical. In the 1940s, however, urea syn-
thesis from ammonia and carbon dioxide was still in its infancy.93
 At the Central Laboratory, Jan Steggerda at the Inorganic Chemis-
try department started melamine research on the basis of the patents of 
American Cyanamid. He established that the process could work, and also 
found that it could work at, or near, atmospheric pressure instead of the 
300 to 400 atmospheres mentioned in the patents of American Cyanamid. 
This company had also claimed the use of silica gel catalysts, but Steggerda 
soon found that other materials could be effective as well.94
 In 1959, Steggerda established a two-step process. First, urea was sprayed 
into a fluid bed reactor. In this type of reactor, solids can behave as if they 
are liquids. In this case, ammonia fluidised the catalyst. In a second, fixed 
bed reactor, the reaction product of the first step was further converted 
into melamine, again in the presence of the catalyst. Using two reactors 
was necessary to reach a satisfactory yield. Finally, melamine, which was 
in the gas phase, had to be separated and converted into a solid product 
for further use in resin fabrication. This process departed from American 
Cyanamid’s work on several points, and DSM applied for a patent in 1959, 
which was awarded six years later.95 
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 In 1959, work on equipment for the two-step process started and a 
year later the Semi-Technical department built a small-scale installation. 
Fluidised beds are hard to study on laboratory scale. The main problems 
related to the handling of urea and melamine, which, together with the 
temperature regulation of the catalyst, also necessitated research on a larger 
scale than was possible at the laboratory bench. In March 1961, a pilot 
plant with a capacity of 100 kg of melamine per day was started up.96
 In 1962, work on a semi-technical scale revealed that increasing the op-
erating pressure had a positive effect on the yield of the process. Research-
ers at the Semi-Technical department also experimented with process con-
figurations and tried one fluid bed reactor, and two of these reactors in 
series. This department built a small installation for these experiments in 
1963 and quickly found that using one fluid bed reactor and a pressure 
of 7 atmospheres increased yield substantially over the two-step process. 
The outline of the process was now established (see figure 3.12) but re-
search continued on the design of the equipment, particularly the fluid 
bed reactors, and also on methods to extract melamine from the reaction 
product.97
 The Central Laboratory started from American Cyanamid’s patents, 
but found different catalysts and developed a process that worked at lower 
pressures than the American process. The claims Cyanamid laid down in 
its patents varied per country. Cyanamid’s process worked at high pres-
sure, but its Dutch basic patent claimed low pressure as well. Its catalyst 
patent in the Netherlands was limited to silica gel but broader in other 
countries.98 
 At the end of 1958, DSM contacted American Cyanamid. The com-
Figure 3.12. DSM’s melamine process.
Source: P. Ellwood (1968). Melamine Process Uses Low-Pressure Reactor to Achieve Low 
Costs. Chemical Engineering (20 May 1968), 124-126.
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pany said it had nothing to license; its R&D had failed. The company also 
did not want to license its patents only. A year later, DSM found to its 
surprise that American Cyanamid had granted a license to CIBA. Berkhoff 
and Van Waes, assisted by the head of the patent department, opened ne-
gotiations with the Swiss firm. CIBA was the largest processor of melamine 
in Europe and its main concern was to buy melamine cheaply, well below 
prevailing market prices. CIBA also wanted to keep DSM out of resin 
production.99
 Cyanamid’s patent on the urea-based melamine process would expire 
in 1966; the patent on the silica gel catalyst in 1975. DSM could wait or use 
a different catalyst. The Central Laboratory had other catalysts available, 
but these proved to be less attractive than silica gel. Moreover, DSM want-
ed CIBA as a customer. Production in the United States also counted as a 
serious option as DSM’s process did not infringe on American Cyanamid’s 
patents in that country. Together with Spencer Chemical, DSM investi-
gated joint production of urea, melamine and formaldehyde.100 Spencer 
retreated in 1962, however, because they no longer expected a profitable 
business.
 After further negotiations, CIBA and DSM signed an agreement in 
1963. CIBA granted a license on American Cyanamid’s patents to DSM 
and would buy at least 80% of the melamine it needed from DSM. In 
return, DSM promised not to start manufacture of resins. CIBA could 
retreat from the sales agreement, and did so because it did not want to 
become dependent on one external supplier. As stipulated in the contract, 
DSM would now have to pay a royalty only and was free to enter resins if 
it wanted to.101
 In 1963, with the licensing negotiations and research entering a final 
phase, top management decided to build a melamine plant with a capacity 
of 10,000 tons per year. Cost price calculations showed that melamine pro-
duced with the process developed by Central Laboratory would be at least 
17% cheaper than melamine from calcium cyanamide. In 1964, Chemie-
bouw started with the engineering, assisted by the Central Laboratory. 
Additional research proved necessary to improve melamine extraction and 
purification, but in 1967 the plant went on stream. The off-gases, consist-
ing of carbon dioxide and ammonia, were recycled to the urea stripping 
plant in the form of ammonium carbamate. 
 In the case of melamine, the main challenge for the Central Laboratory 
was to develop an industrial scale process, which entailed process research 
at laboratory, semi-technical and pilot plant scales. Where American Cy-
anamid had failed, the Central Laboratory succeeded. DSM’s plant was 
one of the first plants in the world to produce melamine from urea on 
an industrial scale. Allied Chemical brought a urea-based melamine plant 
on stream in 1962. The Österreichische Stickstoffwerke (OSW, later Chemie 
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Linz) followed two years later, but with a small plant. BASF and Monte-
catini followed in the late 1960s, at about the same time as DSM.102
 Alongside process development, the Central Laboratory also conducted 
some application research. In 1958, the Inorganic Chemistry department 
initiated tests of melamine as a fertiliser because the product contained a 
high percentage of nitrogen. These tests showed that melamine poisoned 
plants. In 1961, the same department started to explore the reaction of 
melamine and formaldehyde, the crucial reaction for the production of 
resins, and investigated whether DSM could start manufacture of so-called 
pre-condensates, an intermediate product that would be sold directly to 
end product manufacturers. The market for these products proved to be 
small, however.103
 In 1965, the Central Laboratory established a new department for 
application research on melamine-based resins. This department, called 
Thermosetting Resins, aimed to stimulate sales of melamine by investigat-
ing applications such as laminates and paints. In the late 1960s, the Ther-
mosetting Resins department also worked on glues for the manufacture 
Figure 3.13 Projects developed by DSM, 1950-1975.
Source: Personal papers Dr L.J. Revallier: Projects developed by DSM. Undated, but from 
approximately 1975. Note: adding the numbers mentioned in the table leads to total ex-
penditure for commercialised projects of NLG 110.6 million and for non-commercialised 
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of chipboard. This department developed recipes for specific applications 
in close contact with customers. Analytical work was also conducted to 
investigate the characteristics of melamine-based resins and to investigate 
how these characteristics influenced the processing of these products.104
 By 1967, DSM had built a melamine plant and established another 
chemical business, alongside fertilisers, caprolactam, polyethylene and 
EPDM. With the latter three products, melamine represents DSM’s sec-
ond transformation from a fertiliser producer to a diversified chemical 
company. The establishment of melamine production shows some typical 
characteristics of this transformation. Feedstock links led the Central La-
boratory to initiate research on melamine. Its work was the key to the de-
velopment of an industrial scale process. Process research and development 
in particular were important. Application research played a less prominent 
role than in the case of polyethylene but was nevertheless important to 
find and maintain a market. 
Towards a Diversified Chemical Business
The 1950s and ’60s were a busy period for the Central Laboratory as it 
worked on several large projects more or less in parallel. It was also a pro-
ductive period. In urea, caprolactam, HPDE, EPDM and melamine, DSM 
built on R&D and gradually broadened the base of its chemical business. 
 Not all research projects succeeded, however. The caprolactone project 
failed, for instance, as did the polypropylene project. In 1975, Revallier 
compared the costs of commercialised projects and projects that had not 
been commercialised. He only included projects that had reached the de-
velopment stage and therefore counted the costs incurred during semi-
technical and pilot plant research. (Figure 3.13.) The costs of commercial-
ised and failed projects were almost even: a success rate of 50% in other 
words!105 Moreover, failures did not shake management’s faith in research: 
R&D results were unpredictable and failures were inevitable. One failure 
was to prove a traumatic experience, however: the failure of the lysine 
project.
 
A Failed Diversification: Lysine
In 1961, Berkhoff and Hans Ottenheym, a researcher from the Central 
Laboratory, told their audience at a symposium on the application of ami-
no acids in food that ‘all foodstuffs can be improved’.106 They particularly 
thought that foodstuffs could be improved by adding amino acids, the 
building blocks of proteins, necessary for growth and health in humans 
and animals. Most amino acids can be synthesised by the body but some, 
the essential amino acids, have to be provided through the diet. Lysine is 
one of these essential amino acids, supplied to humans and animals mostly 
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by animal protein because vegetables, with the exception of soy and beans, 
contain little lysine. In the late 1950s, the Central Laboratory took the 
initiative to start working on the synthesis of lysine.107
Developing a Process
Lysine was a known compound and, like other amino acids, could be man-
ufactured in various ways. Merck and some other companies extracted 
lysine from hydrolysed soybeans, fishmeal or other materials. In Japan, 
Kyowa Fermentation Industries developed a method to make lysine by fer-
mentation in 1958. Merck licensed this process in 1959. Other companies, 
for instance Ajinomoto in Japan and Pfizer in the United States, developed 
fermentation processes as well and used them to manufacture lysine. In 
the 1950s, Du Pont in the United States and Degussa in Germany, among 
others, worked on lysine synthesis processes. Du Pont manufactured lysine 
on a small scale, but Degussa abandoned its effort before production could 
start because it considered prices too low. Synthesis processes were devel-
oped for other amino acids as well. For methionine, another amino acid, 
Alimentation Équilibrée (a French company which was later renamed AEC 
Société Chimique Organique et Biologique and in 1971 was bought by the 
French chemical conglomerate Rhône-Poulenc) developed a synthesis proc-
ess in 1947. The company later also started making lysine in a fermenta-
tion process. Degussa also succeeded in developing a methionine synthesis 
process and built a plant.108
 In the 1950s, lysine found use mainly in pharmaceuticals, but Merck 
also marketed lysine for application in high-protein bread and cereals while 
Kyowa introduced lysine as an addition to animal feeds in 1965. AEC and 
Degussa dominated the methionine market. Methionine was used mainly 
in poultry feeds and some amounts were also added to pig feeds. Produc-
tion was small scale but rising, with AEC producing 80 tons in 1955 but as 
much as 13,000 tons in 1960.109
 In 1957, the Central Laboratory started working on a synthesis process 
for lysine, a project pulled by Ottenheym. The starting point for the pro-
cess was caprolactam, a route that had been explored before by research-
ers from outside DSM. Caprolactam was a natural starting point as the 
company produced this compound industrially. Similarities between capro-
lactam and lysine molecules also prompted research on lysine. The project, 
in other words, was feedstock driven and technology push. Ottenheym at 
first worked under the umbrella of caprolactam research at the Organic 
Chemistry department of the Central Laboratory. This department split in 
two in 1960 with Ottenheym becoming the leader of the group focusing 
on lysine.110
 Ottenheym and his group started by mapping possible routes to lysine 
from caprolactam. In 1958, the most promising option, a multi-step pro-
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cess, was patented and development work started. This work rested cru-
cially on the organic chemistry capabilities of the Central Laboratory, built 
through research on caprolactam. The Inorganic Chemistry department 
and the Catalysis department also did some research on part of the lysine 
process. At the end of 1958, the Organic Pilot Plants department started 
working on a design for a lysine pilot plant, in cooperation with Chemie-
bouw. The pilot plant was intended to develop the process further and to 
determine what the production costs would be, while the output would be 
used for market development work. In 1959, designs were made for a pilot 
plant with a capacity of 200 to 300 kg of lysine per day. The Semi-Techni-
cal department investigated possible equipment.111
 The pilot plant started in 1960. The Semi Technical and Organic Pilot 
Plants departments coordinated the necessary troubleshooting. The Cor-
rosion department advised on some unexpected problems, while the Or-
ganic Analysis group started to develop specific analytical procedures for 
the lysine project. Research by Ottenheym’s group also continued, which 
means that the full spectrum of the Central Laboratory’s capabilities were 
engaged in the lysine project.112
 In the pilot plant many problems were confronted, but initial problems 
concerning corrosion, contamination and low efficiency could be over-
come. However, low efficiency remained a problem in the process step 
where D- and L-lysine were separated from each other. All amino acids oc-
cur in two forms, a natural L-configuration and the D-configuration that 
is a molecular mirror image of the L-configuration. The DSM process led 
to D,L-lysine while only L-lysine was desired. Initially there were also con-
cerns about the safety of D-lysine. It had to be separated and recycled, a 
persistent problem that was investigated on laboratory, semi-technical and 
pilot plant scale. After the pilot plant had started, it was soon clear that the 
separation of D-lysine and its recycling was the most expensive step in the 
process, in terms of both production costs and investments.113 
Market Development in the Late 1950s
When the decision was taken in 1959 to build a pilot plant, it was expected 
that production costs would be low, regardless of the costs incurred in the 
separation and recycling steps, and that with low costs, a market could be 
found. One of the first ideas that emerged was to add lysine to bread and 
so improve the nutritional value of this common food in the Netherlands. 
Ottenheym and Berkhoff used the contacts of the Agricultural Research 
Bureau of the CSV (Landbouwkundig Bureau CSV) to probe the feasibility 
of this idea. In 1958, TNO started investigating the possibilities of lysine 
addition to bread. TNO consisted of several institutes, and for lysine the 
CIVO (Centraal Instituut voor Voedingsonderzoek, central institute for di-
etary research) was of particular importance; this institute investigated the 
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nutritional value of lysine-enriched bread. Berkhoff and Van Waes, head 
of DSM’s chemical sector, signed the order for conducting these tests. The 
Dutch government had to approve the marketing of lysine-enriched bread, 
a decision that the responsible minister delegated to an advisory body of 
civil servants and scientific experts. The type of research DSM ordered 
from TNO had to convince these experts.114
 The preliminary results of the research on lysine-enriched bread seemed 
promising. Nutritional value increased and lysine could be added to bread 
without necessitating modifications to the procedures of baking. In 1959, 
Berkhoff tried to establish contact with Matthieu Dols, who, as a part-
time professor, employee of the Ministry of Agriculture, member of the 
advisory body and member of the FAO and WHO, was a crucial figure 
in the Dutch agricultural and food sectors with many international con-
tacts. The Agricultural Research Bureau of the CSV again facilitated the 
establishment of this contact. Dols showed interest in the lysine project, 
but believed that addition to food for humans in the Netherlands did not 
have priority. Other experts of the advisory body were even more scepti-
cal, fearing a price increase in bread at a time when the government was 
prioritising stable prices and wages. DSM’s attempts to get lysine accepted 
as an addition to bread thus failed.115
 In 1957, when research on lysine started, Ottenheym had the idea that 
lysine could be used to increase the nutritional value of feed for pigs and 
chickens. These were the largest feed markets in the Netherlands in the 
1950s, with production in 1960 at a level of about 1.8 million tons each. 
The Dutch feed industry consisted of several large cooperative manufac-
turers, some large and fairly large private companies, and numerous small 
local mixers. Feed companies used bulk components like cereals, peas, 
and fishmeal for instance, but also added other compounds such as vita-
mins, antibiotics, and amino acids. Specialised companies manufactured 
and packaged these additional compounds in so-called pre-mixes that feed 
companies added to their products. Ottenheym thought that lysine could 
substitute animal protein sources like bonemeal and fishmeal, which he 
considered to be too expensive.116 
 In 1958, the CIVO conducted some preliminary tests on lysine-en-
riched feed that showed promising results. On the basis of these results, 
Dols also concluded that lysine-enriched feeds might offer a good market 
for DSM. Through fertiliser production, DSM had contacts with the co-
operatives, and the Agricultural Research Bureau opened doors for the 
Central Laboratory to probe the possibilities of lysine in feeds. Handel-
maatschappij Trouw, a company that manufactured pre-mixes, also sought 
contact with DSM. Both companies agreed on a division of labour, with 
DSM targeting a number of large feed companies, including the coopera-
tives, and Trouw targeting its own customers.117
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 DSM also built a network of relationships with companies abroad. In 
1961, contact was established with the British branch of Unilever that com-
manded a large share of the feed market in the United Kingdom. Unilever 
showed considerable interest in using lysine in its products and in coope-
rating with DSM. DSM considered Unilever an attractive partner.118 
 As in the case of bread, the effectiveness of addition of lysine to feeds 
had to be demonstrated. In 1960, DSM took the initiative to establish a 
study committee with people from universities and agricultural research 
stations, and chaired by Dols, in order to coordinate several tests on the 
effects of lysine addition to feed for pigs. In 1962, Sixma, spurred by 
Dols, proposed conducting internal application research, hiring research-
ers and an advisor, and building the necessary facilities. Alfred van Loen 
joined DSM. Willem Hirschfeld, director of the Zootechnical Institute 
of Utrecht University, was engaged as an advisor, as was Dols in 1967, 
after his retirement. Van Loen worked on a proposal to build a Biological 
Experimental Station, but research at other institutes continued as well. 
In 1963, Landbouwbelang, one of the large cooperatives, conducted a test 
with lysine-enriched feed for pigs. In May of that year, Koninklijke Ne-
derlandse Gist- & Spiritusfabriek (NGSF, later Gist-brocades, which in 1998 
was taken over by DSM), offered DSM the facilities of their research unit 
ILOB at Wageningen in the Netherlands (Instituut voor Landbouwkundig 
Onderzoek van Biochemische Producten, institute for agricultural research of 
biochemical products). Research at the CIVO also continued.119
 Alongside bread and feed, the Central Laboratory probed other pos-
sible markets for lysine as well. In 1958, contact was established with the 
Dutch food company Nutricia to investigate the possibilities to add lysine 
to baby food. These possibilities were limited, but Nutricia saw an oppor-
tunity for lysine-enriched food in developing countries. Nutricia received 
a sample that it tested in the hospital of one of its advisors but concluded, 
for reasons it did mention in its correspondence with DSM, that the pos-
sibilities of using lysine were slim.120
 In 1960, Revallier and Ottenheym visited Pfizer in the United States. 
Pfizer had much experience with fermentation processes, for instance for 
the production of citric acid and penicillin, and also manufactured lysine 
with a fermentation process for use in pharmaceuticals. DSM’s process 
interested Pfizer, and the American company seemed to be willing to come 
to some sort of cooperation with DSM. Alongside Unilever, DSM consid-
ered Pfizer the best possible partner, opening the door to the pharmaceuti-
cal market.121
 Around 1960, DSM’s efforts to build a network of contacts with poten-
tially interesting partners, customers, government agencies and research 
institutes had resulted in several ideas for possible markets. Lysine addition 
to bread had failed, but feed and pharmaceuticals promised to be attractive 
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markets. The (potential) size of these markets was unclear, and clear ideas 
for products were also lacking. The work on feed concentrated on pigs, 
but that focus had never been debated. DSM’s network provided the com-
pany with numerous ideas for products but not with the tools to select the 
most promising ones. Besides the examples mentioned above, CIVO for 
instance came up with the ideas of adding lysine to the sweet potato that 
formed the main part of the diet in New Guinea, at that time still a Dutch 
colony; adding lysine to ‘school milk’, milk handed out to schoolchildren 
in the Netherlands at low prices to further their growth and health; and 
using lysine in the improvement of pig meat, all in 1959. Two years later, 
Unilever thought that lysine-enriched peanut butter could be interesting 
and again tried to put lysine addition to bread on the agenda.122
The lysine plant in May 1968, just before it was completed and started up. Lysine was a 
major and prestigious research project but failed. Its technological spin-offs, however, laid 
the foundation for DSM’s fine chemical business in the 1970s.
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Building a Plant
Although unfocused and spread out over many segments, market develop-
ment together with work in the pilot plant gave the lysine project momen-
tum. In 1961, Berkhoff and Ottenheym again visited Pfizer in the United 
States after attending a congress in Washington, and this trip convinced 
Berkhoff that a market could be opened for a plant with a capacity of 10 
tons per day. He also thought that lysine presented a springboard to other 
activities in the broad field of food and feed chemicals. Methionine and 
sorbic acid, a preservative, had been topics for research since 1959, for in-
stance.123 
 Others in the company shared Berkhoff ’s optimism. In 1963, Sixma, 
Berkhoff ’s successor, and Jan van Steenis, head of the Commercial Affairs 
department, made a proposal to top management to build a commercial 
lysine plant with a capacity of 3,000 tons per year. It was a joint proposal, 
showing that lysine was not only a research project but was broadly sup-
ported in the company. Sixma and Van Steenis were optimistic and con-
vinced that DSM could compete with other synthetic lysine processes. 
How DSM’s position measured up to fermentation processes was unclear, 
however. Early in 1963, NGSF, which rented out its stables in Wageningen 
to DSM and a company with much experience in fermentation, made a 
cost-price calculation on the basis of patents for Japanese processes that 
were considered state-of-the-art. NGSF concluded that the Japanese pro-
cesses led to a higher cost price than DSM’s synthesis process, but the reli-
ability of these calculations was unclear.124
 In their proposal, Sixma and Van Steenis seized the only market that 
was in reach: animal feeds. Pharmaceuticals could not absorb a capacity of 
3,000 tons per year, while Sixma and Van Steenis considered the addition 
of lysine to food for humans in developing countries an option only for 
the long term. They wrote to top management that lysine in feed could 
replace expensive animal protein such as fishmeal and bonemeal. To intro-
duce lysine to the feed industry, application research and service research, 
the latter after market introduction, was necessary. Sixma and Van Steenis 
proposed internalising this research and establishing a Biological Experi-
mental Station under the umbrella of the Central Laboratory. Van Loen 
argued that the facilities of institutes such as the ILOB were not perfectly 
suited to lysine research, that such institutes often had other priorities, and 
that it was difficult to follow and control the experiments. Commercial 
Affairs thought that the Biological Experimental Station was necessary to 
break the ‘conservatism’ it saw ruling the feed industry. In the fertiliser sec-
tor, supporting sales by scientific research was a well-established and very 
successful practice. Experimental farms and agricultural research were used 
to show how farmers could profit from using fertilisers.125
 Top management agreed with the proposal of Sixma and Van Steenis to 
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build a lysine plant and a Biological Experimental Station. In their letter to 
the Minister of Economic Affairs, who had to approve investments because 
DSM was still fully state-owned at that time, top management emphasised 
that lysine production built on caprolactam, that the process had been de-
veloped in-house, and that large scale and low costs would open a market. 
Lysine, in other words, was a typical DSM project, technology push and 
feedstock driven, but DSM also tried to build on its existing competence 
to enter a new market.
 In 1964, a start was made on the engineering of the lysine plant. In 
November of the same year, the pilot plant closed and DSM bought the 
lysine it needed for market development from Kyowa and other compa-
nies. Research work continued though, and in 1965 the process was modi-
fied on several points, including the separation method. In June of 1965 it 
became clear that more money was needed to build the plant than initially 
foreseen. There were also major delays during construction. In November 
1968, the lysine plant came on stream, but there were many mechanical 
problems and the plant operated at a low overall efficiency.126 
Market Development in the 1960s
The Biological Experimental Station became operational as an organisa-
tional unit in 1963. Facilities were soon built at the Central Laboratory to 
conduct experiments with small animals and the first in-house experiment 
with pigs started in September 1963. Van Loen also drew up a plan to con-
duct tests with pigs, chickens and poultry, calves, and rats, in new accom-
modations that would cover in total more than two hectares of land. He ar-
gued that research should be conducted under circumstances prevailing in 
practice as far as possible to demonstrate the usefulness of lysine-enriched 
feeds. Commercial Affairs organised tests at potential buyers with the same 
goal in mind, and as a consequence the ambitions of the Biological Experi-
mental Station were scaled down in 1966 to understanding the addition of 
lysine under experimental conditions. The cooperation between the Cen-
tral Laboratory and Commercial Affairs was close, so close that Van Loen 
transferred to Commercial Affairs in September 1965. He became part of 
the specialised lysine group that was established there around that time.127
 DSM continued investigating the possibilities of enriching animal 
feeds with lysine, but to reinforce its commercial position Commercial Af-
fairs proposed acquiring a premix company in 1967. This only resulted in 
a cooperation with one feed manufacturer, and in expected sales of only 45 
tons.128 DSM’s contacts with Unilever also failed to take concrete shape. 
 DSM continued talking to other companies as well to find possible 
outlets for lysine, and to gather information on the size of the potential 
market. A wide range of possible products was discussed. In 1965, Revallier 
and a researcher from the Central Laboratory visited the British company 
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Protein Co. and heard representatives of that company talk about a future 
in which food would be supplied by industry through well-balanced pack-
ages of nutrients. They suggested that DSM produce proteins from grass 
and add lysine to those proteins. Expectations about the potential market 
for lysine also varied widely. For instance, in 1966, Standard Oil of Ohio 
(Sohio) seized upon a recent development of corn with two times the usual 
amount of lysine to argue that there would be no market for lysine at all. A 
year later, Allied Chemical told Revallier that it expected a market volume 
of 1.5 million tons in ten years’ time. Both these American companies were 
working on lysine processes as well. Sohio started from acrylonitrile, an 
intermediate for acrylic fibres for which Sohio had developed a process.129 
 DSM also tried to gain a better understanding of Japanese amino acid 
production. Commercial Affairs attempted to gather information through 
the Dutch embassy in Japan and talked directly to Ajinomoto and Kyowa 
in 1965 and 1967, respectively. Commercial Affairs wanted a stable market, 
but Kyowa could not be interested in making deals. Ajinomoto, too, had 
little interest in DSM’s lysine process.130
 The human food market also came into the picture again. Nutricia 
had already pointed to the underdeveloped countries of the world as a 
possible market for lysine, but in 1963 Sixma and Van Steenis had branded 
this an option for the long term. In September of that year, however, Van 
Loen and a representative of Commercial Affairs visited Rome to talk to 
representatives of the FAO and the United Nations World Food Program 
Division, an organisation focused on animal feeds. It became clear that 
these organisations were altogether sceptical of the addition of amino acids 
to food and feed, and that they concluded from research that methionine 
addition to the human diet was more important than lysine addition. The 
developing countries remained a target for DSM, however, with Van Loen 
giving a lecture for the Dutch agricultural attachés in 1964, for instance. In 
a paper from 1966, he clarified the line of reasoning. Van Loen argued that 
the malnutrition problem in the world was due to a shortage of protein. 
Essential proteins could only be supplied by meat, but the growth of meat 
production would never be able to keep up with the growth of the world’s 
population. According to Van Loen, substitution of animal protein by veg-
etable proteins with lysine was inevitable.131 
 In 1967, consultations with Theo Bot, the Dutch minister responsi-
ble for foreign aid, led to the establishment of a committee of civil ser-
vants from several departments and representatives from DSM that was to 
draw up plans for research in developing countries. Talks were also held 
with other Dutch companies interested in improving foods for developing 
countries and with the Productschap Zuivel, an organisation of the dairy 
industry that considered enriching milk powder with lysine interesting.132
 In the mean time, the date of the commissioning of the lysine plant 
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drew nearer. In 1967, researchers of the Biological Experimental Station 
evaluated the results of the experiments with lysine addition to pig feed. 
They concluded that soy and fishmeal could replace animal protein in 
pig feeds at lower costs than lysine: addition of lysine was an ‘illusion’, as 
it was put in the 1967 annual report of the Central Laboratory.133 Experi-
ments with the addition of lysine to feeds for other animals also failed to 
yield clear-cut results. Feeds with lysine were as good as feeds with animal 
protein or with soy or fishmeal. An evaluation of the whole lysine project 
in 1967, moreover, showed that production costs would be higher than 
initially expected while the revenues turned out to be lower. Finding an 
entry in the animal feed market would be difficult. It became clear that 
feed companies used protein norms that did not make it attractive to add 
lysine. Mixing-in of soy was enough, and this was far cheaper than using 
lysine. Prices of fishmeal and other animal products rose, and they lost part 
of the market, but soy was used as a replacement, not synthetic lysine.
 With regard to the potential market in the developing countries, much 
depended on the willingness of the Dutch government to stimulate sales of 
lysine through aid programmes. Developing countries themselves lacked 
the funds or were unwilling to commit them. At the end of 1968, however, 
it became clear that the Dutch government would not commit itself to 
lysine, and around the same time it also became clear that international 
organisations such as the FAO did not support lysine either. Like the ani-
mal feed market, the market for human food in developing countries was 
out of reach.134
 DSM had built a plant that had many teething problems and that pro-
duced a product for which there was no market. Large losses seemed inevi-
table and in 1969, after six months of production, the plant closed. 
 The work on other food and feed additives also failed to produce con-
crete results. Researchers considered sorbic acid an attractive preservative 
because it was non-toxic, but soon doubted if there would be a market 
for it and stopped research in 1963. In the same year, semi-technical work 
on methionine started. A synthesis process starting from acrolein had 
been worked out on laboratory scale. A so-called mini plant was built in 
1964, at a scale in between semi-technical work and a full pilot plant, with 
the expectation that an expensive pilot plant would not have to be built. 
Chemiebouw got involved at this stage, and in 1966 started working on a 
first design for an industrial plant with a capacity in the range of 3,000 to 
6,000 tons per year, comparable to the lysine plant.135 
 Application research on methionine started in 1962 but on a small scale. 
In 1967, DSM entered into a contract with the Japanese company Mitsui, a 
manufacturer of methionine, which enabled DSM to sell methionine from 
Mitsui in a number of countries. By that year, the Central Laboratory had 
started research on the separation of D- and L-methionine, overlapping 
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with research on the separation of D- and L-lysine. It was expected that L-
methionine might be more valuable than D,L-methionine, although both 
AEC and Degussa were marketing D,L-methionine. In 1968, an evalua-
tion of the project showed that investment costs had risen to the extent 
that a methionine plant could only be viable at a capacity of 6,000 tons 
per year, and not less, because cost prices would then become too high. 
At two-thirds of world methionine use in 1965, that capacity would make 
DSM one of the largest methionine producers in the world, but market 
development work cast doubt on the probability that such an amount 
could be sold. Profitability seemed doubtful at best. In 1968, Revallier and 
Van Steenis proposed that research be scaled down, but after the failure of 
the lysine project, the methionine project stopped altogether.136
All Foodstuffs Can Be Improved? The Failure of the Lysine Project
The closure of the lysine plant was a traumatic experience: a big, prestig-
ious and expensive project had failed. Up to 1965, almost 26 million guil-
ders had been spent on research, contrasting with almost 7 million for the 
melamine project and 14.5 million for the EPDM synthetic rubber project. 
Between 1948 and 1955, roughly the period in which production had been 
established, almost 2.6 million guilders had been spent on caprolactam re-
search (including the work on phenol). In the case of urea, DSM spent 7.2 
million guilders on pilot plant work and semi-technical research between 
1950 and 1970, the period covering the tail of the development of the once-
through process and the development of recycle processes and the strip-
ping process.137 The lysine plant, built opposite the Central Laboratory’s 
main building, became a highly visible reminder of a failed project. 
 Lysine was a new technology for DSM. Capabilities built in organic 
chemistry through caprolactam were crucial for the Central Laboratory’s 
research in amino acids. However, the separation of D- from L-lysine and 
its recycling remained a bottleneck in the process. The Central Laboratory 
and Commercial Affairs also had to build expertise on the application of 
food and feed additives to investigate and demonstrate the usefulness of 
lysine. DSM’s focus on large scale to achieve low costs, a strategy that had 
proven successful in caprolactam and urea, had not been appropriate in 
the case of lysine where markets were, at best, small. The intended capacity 
of the methionine plant was inevitable from a cost price point of view but, 
at two-thirds of world use in 1965, extremely large.
 Lysine was also a new market for DSM. The company had no experi-
ence with the markets for food and feed additives. DSM tried to market 
lysine the way it marketed fertilisers: with a focus on scientific research 
to demonstrate the usefulness of the product, and an emphasis on large 
scale and low costs to persuade feed and food companies to use it. A 
crucial problem was finding a market, or a segment of a market, where 
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lysine could compete. David Hounshell argues that in the case of nylon, 
Du Pont’s focus on one market, women’s hosiery, was one of the factors 
explaining the success of this project. Focusing on one market made it 
possible to commercialise nylon fast and to do so without spending large 
amounts of money.138 DSM, on the other hand, struggled to identify a 
market for lysine. Marketing efforts were unfocused and spread out over 
many possible markets or market segments, simply because it was unclear 
where the main effort had to be concentrated. This in turn meant that 
research could not be directed towards market-oriented work.
 The case of lysine clearly shows how difficult it is to find and develop a 
market. Top management, however, decided to build a lysine plant before 
any market development work had yielded results. The lysine project was 
technology push, even though marketing and production were involved in 
the project. Urea and caprolactam had also been technology-push projects, 
but turned out to be successes. In the case of urea, the target market was 
clear, as were the demands set by customers. This was also true for caprol-
actam, where AKU was in fact the market for DSM’s product and played 
a leading role in DSM’s research. A technology push complemented with 
technology-oriented marketing worked very well here. In the case of lysine, 
a market needed to be found. DSM, Commercial Affairs in particular, but 
also the Central Laboratory and the production organisation, had little 
experience with this kind of work and had no partner to help them. 
 Urea, caprolactam and lysine show that DSM was a technology-orient-
ed company, and its research was technology push, but also that this was 
not necessarily a negative characteristic. With existing and growing mar-
kets this orientation worked very well, but the company ran into trouble 
when it had to find a market by itself. In the case of lysine, DSM failed in 
its offensive innovation strategy because it failed to build a strong interface 
between research and marketing.
 Through a mismatch of markets and technologies, and a cost price that 
was too high compared to competitive routes, a big research project came 
to an unsuccessful end. It was to be a major influence on research in the 
1970s, but there were also important technological spin offs from lysine 
research in that decade. Although the project failed, it meant that DSM 
had established some capabilities in fine chemicals. In the long run, this 
was to have far-reaching consequences.
R&D in the 1950s and 1960s
Industrial research played a crucial role in the development of DSM in the 
1950s and 1960s. The case of urea shows that engineering, and the engi-
neering department, also played a role, but that research was increasingly 
at the core of DSM’s development. The successful establishment of capro-
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lactam production rested on research, as did most other diversifications 
in the 1950s and 1960s (see table 3.1). In this way, the Central Laboratory 
contributed in a crucial way to the expansion of DSM’s chemical sector. 
The research organisation grew and expanded in scope, but the different 
types of research work remained closely integrated. The Central Labora-
tory conducted not only fundamental research but also process research, 
development work and service research. Combined with Chemiebouw’s 
engineering capabilities, this provided an effective organisation for innova-
tion.
 The Central Laboratory contributed crucially to the expansion of 
DSM’s chemical businesses, but sometimes other companies and their 
know-how played an important role. In urea, the importance of exter-
nal knowledge and technology declined, while in the case of caprolactam, 
external stimuli related to the market for synthetic fibres. In the case of 
caprolactam, too, process development was internally driven. AKU pro-
vided DSM with a bridge to the market.
 From table 3.1, a number of shifts in technology base can be seen. 
DSM’s markets broadened from fertilisers to fibre intermediates and plas-
tics. The core fertiliser technology base consisted of process research and 
engineering capabilities, complemented with chemistry competences. In 
the case of urea, much work had to be put into finding efficient industrial 
designs. This work was backed by thorough investigation of the reactions 
involved in urea synthesis, but the route to this product was fixed. In the 
case of caprolactam, by contrast, a major part of the projects consisted 
of selecting reactions and finding suitable routes to end products and/or 
intermediates. Finding efficient industrial designs via process research and 
engineering was of course also important, but followed from chemistry 
research.
 Caprolactam, moreover, built on a different branch of chemistry com-
pared with fertilisers: organic versus inorganic chemistry. The alcohol pro-
cess of the 1930s involved some organic chemistry, but on a small scale, and 
built particularly on process research and engineering capabilities, that is, 
the fertiliser technology base. The build-up of organic chemistry capabilities 
through caprolactam research was crucial for the lysine project. The diver-
sifications in the field of plastics also built on this base, but complemented 
it with application research. The Fibre Intermediates department did some 
work on the properties and applications of nylon 6, but this type of work 
was much more important in the marketing of plastics as they were pro-
duced in many varieties that suited many different applications. Research 
was necessary to introduce a specific plastic variety in a specific field.139
 Although the lysine project built on the caprolactam technology base 
in organic chemistry, matching technologies and markets proved difficult. 
Like other diversification projects, lysine was feedstock driven and tech-
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nology push. In the case of urea, the market was well-known, while in the 
case of caprolactam, AKU safeguarded the market. Moreover, the markets 
for both fertilisers and fibre intermediates grew fast. In the case of lysine, 
DSM was on its own; without a partner in a market it could not find, and 
in a field of technology it did not know very well.
 The lysine project was a very visible failure, but the caprolactone project 
had also failed, for instance. From Revallier’s calculation, DSM spent al-
most as much on projects that were not commercialised as on projects 
that were. Revallier pointed to the profits of Stamicarbon, however. Van 
Krevelen showed that research costs were covered by savings in produc-
tion. Not only research management, but also DSM’s top management 
and management in production and marketing, considered failures part 
and parcel of industrial research. They all had great faith in the productiv-
ity and creativity of research but little faith in the possibility of predicting 
this accurately. Research was relatively free to initiate projects, but this free 
initiating role did not mean that research diverged from production and 
marketing. Researchers took their own view of what was in the interest of 
the company and took a long-term view of those interests.
 This freedom enabled the R&D organisation to take initiatives. The 
Central Laboratory often started research that presented the company 
with an option for diversification (see table 3.1). The same freedom also 
enabled researchers to conduct fundamental research: to get to the bottom 
of a reaction, problem or phenomenon without immediately having to 
think of applications. The example of the work on urea shows, however, 
that such ‘fundamental’ research could pay off and was started because of 
its industrial relevance. The same is true of catalysis research, which was 
started in relation to ammonia but was relevant to a range of research 
projects including caprolactam, for instance. Subjects for fundamental re-
search came from industrial practice, not from science. 
 The historical and management literature on industrial research under-
lines the central position of fundamental research, and shows examples of 
companies where this led to an isolated position of research. Fundamental 
research was a striking feature of industrial research in the 1950s and 1960s, 
but that does not mean that other types of research did not take place. 
Typically, histories of industrial research concern large, leading companies 
and emphasise management. These companies usually operated research 
on both a central, corporate level, and a decentralised, divisional, level. 
Graham, in her counterculture argument, focuses on corporate research 
and neglects the divisional level, where research for existing businesses is 
much more likely to be conducted, probably in close cooperation with 
production. This leads to an incomplete picture at best and attaches too 
much importance to corporate, fundamental, and long-range research.140
 At DSM, the Central Laboratory was independent and independent-
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minded, but not isolated. The example of DSM also shows that a heavy 
emphasis on science did not mean a neglect of less glamorous research for 
existing businesses. Even Van Krevelen had been involved in this kind of 
research when he helped to introduce the cyclone in the caprolactam plant. 
Histories of industrial research at DSM have also neglected Berkhoff ’s role, 
which spanned research and business.141 
 The freedom to do research was accompanied by a high level of produc-
tivity. Research was technology push but closely geared to production. As 
Van Heerden, director of the Central Laboratory’s fundamental research, 
put it: “(…) in much of the work the interests of the company come first, 
and in all work they are at least clearly present in the background; the in-
terests of the company are felt, not as an externally imposed force, but as 
the essential motive of the research institute itself.”142
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The Large Leap Forward: Redefining the Role 
of R&D in the 1970s
Although Van Heerden had claimed that in much of the Central Labor-
atory’s work the interests of the company came first, in the 1970s this claim 
came under intense scrutiny from both inside and outside research.1 The 
failure of the lysine project dealt a blow to the self-confidence that had 
been nurtured. At the same time, DSM embarked on a programme of 
expansion and diversification, closed its mines and created divisions. Re-
search reorganised to adapt to these changes, and business management 
gained a strong say in the direction of research. In the 1950s and 1960s, the 
Central Laboratory had played a central role in diversification; but in the 
1970s, top management placed more emphasis on technology acquisitions 
and take-overs as means to diversify, and it stressed that markets, rather 
than technologies and research, should drive diversification. Diversifica-
tion was initiated outside the Central Laboratory. Research played a de-
pendent role, aimed at facilitating the process of buying technology and 
companies.
 DSM’s reorientation fits into a pattern of change in industrial research 
around 1970. After a period of strong faith in research, generous funding, 
and an emphasis on fundamental research and long-term research in gen-
eral, came a period in which companies cut R&D spending, particularly 
spending on fundamental research, and emphasised the role of market 
needs in directing their research.2 Margaret Graham and Bettye Pruitt also 
note, in their R&D history of Alcoa, how stronger involvement of divi-
sional management led to a neglect of long-term research.3 At DSM, the 
involvement of divisional management similarly pushed research to care 
more for short-term than for long-term interests.
 With its reorientation of research, DSM also responded to a chang-
ing business climate. In the 1950s and 1960s, growth on many chemical 
markets had been spectacular, but after 1970 growth slowed down and in 
some markets saturation seemed imminent. Two oil shocks raised energy 
and feedstock prices dramatically and made it attractive for oil-produc-
ing countries to enter the chemical industry, and particularly the plastics 
and fertiliser industries, where feedstock price was a crucial factor in com-
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petition. Increasing labour costs, environmental consciousness and envi-
ronmental regulation meant that companies had to invest considerable 
amounts of money in facilities to reduce pollution and increase safety. 
Chemical companies in Western Europe, Japan and the United States, the 
traditional bastions of the industry, suffered from strained profitability in 
the 1970s, particularly in bulk chemicals.4
 External changes (a worsening business climate) and internal changes 
(expansion and diversification, establishment of divisions and reduced 
self-confidence in research for diversification) occurred in parallel and 
combined to redefine the role and position of research in the 1970s. This 
chapter is about this redefinition, but also analyses DSM’s entry – initiated 
and enabled by the Central Laboratory – into fine chemicals, a field where 
the company profited from lysine research.
The Final Step Towards DSM’s Transformation into a Chemical 
Company
After the Second World War, the importance of DSM’s chemical busi-
nesses increased significantly as a result of diversification and expansion of 
production capacities for existing products. Coal, coke and chemicals were 
closely related from a feedstock point of view, but were organisationally 
separated. The Central Laboratory was part of DSM’s chemical sector and 
conducted research for this part of the company. The Central Experimen-
tal Station, on the other hand, belonged to coal-mining activities and con-
ducted research in that field. Manufacturing and marketing functions were 
organised in the same way. DSM had a functional organisation within the 
two broad areas of chemicals on the one hand and coal and coke on the 
other.5
 In 1965, the Central Laboratory and the Central Experimental Station 
merged, signalling an important change. The production of coal, coke and 
coke oven gas went into decline in the 1960s, and in 1962, losses were in-
curred for the first time. Three years later, on 14 December 1965, the Dutch 
government announced the end of coal-mining in the Netherlands. Not 
only DSM’s pits would be closed but also those of private companies. The 
government made a restructuring plan to create jobs for the miners.6
 The end of the coal and coke activities in the foreseeable future meant 
that DSM had to consider a new course of action. Moreover, from the late 
1950s, the policy of Van Aken and his close colleagues had been aimed at 
expansion to reinforce the company’s position. Merging DSM’s chemical 
businesses with another Dutch company, particularly AKU, DSM’s main 
customer for caprolactam, also counted as a serious possibility. Merger 
attempts failed, however, and AKU merged with KZO to form AKZO in 
1969. 
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 The failed merger with AKU left DSM on its own, with a coal busi-
ness that would soon be shut down and a set of chemical businesses that it 
considered too small. At this crossroads, top management decided to take 
up the challenge. The company should make a ‘Large Leap Forward’ on 
the foundation of the chemical businesses DSM had built in the 1950s and 
1960s. The chemical businesses would be expanded considerably, manu-
facture of new products would be taken up and the organisation of the 
company revised. The Large Leap Forward aimed to secure the company’s 
survival and its revitalisation at the same time. 
 The production of coke and coke oven gas ended in December 1968. 
Five years later, DSM’s last pit closed.7 The Large Leap Forward consisted 
of several routes to replace the company’s coal related activities. In the first 
place, DSM attempted backward integration to secure the necessary feed-
stocks for the production of chemical products. DSM already had a stake 
in the exploitation and distribution of natural gas in the Netherlands. The 
company made plans to build a refinery in Limburg together with Royal 
Dutch/Shell, but when these plans failed in 1971, DSM decided to partici-
pate in the exploitation of oil and natural gas fields in the North Sea. These 
moves were business-driven and were of little consequence for research as 
the Central Laboratory did not work in this field.
 From oil and natural gas, DSM mainly manufactured intermediates 
that other companies used to manufacture end products. DSM wanted 
to get closer to those markets: forward integration was the second part of 
the Large Leap programme. In 1967, DSM bought Curver, a manufacturer 
of plastic products, and four years later it acquired a majority interest in 
the textile firm Macintosh Confectie. In the early 1970s, DSM also bought 
several construction firms. The company mainly targeted plastics, textiles 
and construction in its efforts to integrate forwards but acquired other in-
terests as well. In 1967, for instance, DSM helped the Dutch manufacturer 
of trucks and cars, DAF, to establish a plant in Limburg in an attempt to 
create new jobs in the region. DSM also acquired chemical companies and 
bought Synres, a Dutch manufacturer of resins, in 1970. Acquisitions were 
a sign of the times, although DSM was somewhat slower than other Dutch 
companies to pick up on this trend.8 For DSM, buying companies was a 
new way to enter new markets and to generate growth.
 Besides forward integration, DSM diversified horizontally and took up 
the manufacture of additional plastics and fibre intermediates. The com-
pany started production of acrylonitrile, an intermediate for acrylic fibres, 
as well as the production of the plastics PVC, polypropylene and ABS, for 
all of which it had the necessary feedstocks. These products were well-suit-
ed to reach a large scale as they were established products for which there 
was a large market. DSM in fact had no choice but to build large plants, 
because smaller plants would be a cost disadvantage compared with estab-
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lished manufacturers. This pushed the company towards buying technol-
ogy, because these processes were proven on a large scale. Finally, DSM 
wanted to diversify fast. The Central Laboratory did not have the time or 
the resources to quickly enable all these diversifications. The acrylonitrile, 
PVC, polypropylene and ABS plants were all built with external technol-
ogy.
 DSM also expanded capacity of existing products. In the late 1960s, 
DSM boosted urea and melamine production substantially. The company 
also hired engineering contractors to build a second, very large ammonia 
plant and a third cracker for the production of ethylene with a similarly 
large capacity. DSM strove for large-scale operation in new and established 
products alike.
 The Large Leap Forward meant that DSM expanded in all directions. 
This ‘aggressive’ expansion programme, as it was called by Ton Rottier, 
chairman of DSM’s top management from 1962 to 1973, was comple-
mented with a major revision of the company’s organisation. According to 
Rottier, the transformation from coal and coke to chemicals not only en-
tailed new products and new markets but also a different way of working. 
Top management considered decentralisation necessary, and in three steps 
DSM arrived at a divisional structure in April 1975. Production, market-
ing, accountancy and personnel matters became the responsibility of the 
divisions, but research remained centralised and became a so-called group 
service (Concerndienst), a department directly under the responsibility of 
DSM’s top management. Knight Wegenstein, a Swiss consultancy firm, 
helped DSM complete its divisional design. In 1970, this consultancy firm 
had briefly considered the possibility of decentralising research (which 
would give each division its own research organisation and would make 
the divisions responsible for research management and funding), as well as 
the possibility of including research with the corporate planning depart-
ment and Stamicarbon in a separate division. Both these options were re-
jected quickly because central research was considered to be more flexible 
and more creative.9
 Six divisions were established in 1975: Chemical Products (capro-
lactam among others), Industrial Chemicals (which included Synres), 
Plastics (polyethylene among others), Plastics Processing (Curver and sim-
ilar firms), Construction (which bundled DSM’s participations in several 
construction companies), and Energy (DSM’s activities in the exploration 
and exploitation of oil and natural gas, as well as other energy-related ac-
tivities). In 1972, DSM’s fertiliser activities had been merged with VKF, a 
Dutch fertiliser company, to form UKF (Unie van Kunstmestfabrieken), 
with DSM attaining a majority share. The Chemical Products division 
governed DSM’s interests in UKF, but in January 1979 the fertiliser activi-
ties became an independent division and later that year DSM became the 
sole owner of UKF.10 
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 Wim Bogers succeeded Rottier as chairman of DSM’s top management 
in 1973 and energetically continued DSM’s expansion and diversification. 
The Leap Forward was the final push in DSM’s transformation from coal 
and coke to chemicals. Turnover from chemical activities jumped from 
0.7 billion guilders in 1970 to 7.9 billion ten years later! Growth in several 
chemical markets slowed down after the 1970s, however. Many other com-
panies also expanded, leading to overcapacity and strained profitability 
in the chemical industry. DSM’s profits declined significantly after 1974, 
forcing the company to cut costs and economise.11
Re-Aligning Research and Business
The first half of the 1970s was a turbulent period: DSM changed internal-
ly, expanded on a major scale and faced a changed business climate. These 
changes also affected the Central Laboratory: it had to adapt its organisa-
tion to the company’s emerging divisional structure, to cuts in the research 
budget, and to a different view of the role of research in diversification.
Organising Research in the 1970s
Although the Central Laboratory remained a corporate entity, the Large 
Leap Forward and the emerging divisional structure prompted the Central 
Laboratory to change its organisation. In 1972, the departmental structure 
was changed for the first time in order to align it with changes taking 
place in the company. Alongside the patent department, two main depart-
ments were created in which research was concentrated on chemical prod-
ucts (that is, fibre intermediates and fertilisers) and plastics, respectively. 
These two departments also became responsible for fundamental research, 
but generic research like analysis remained a separate department (Figure 
4.1). Both research management and DSM’s top management preferred 
this product-based organisation of research because they considered that 
it provided a better link between research, manufacturing and marketing 
than the old structure of the Central Laboratory. The new organisation 
also ended the existence of split groups. Catalysis, for instance, had been 
investigated in two Catalysis departments: one focused on applied work 
while the other conducted fundamental research. In practice, such borders 
proved fuzzy and caused confusion.12
 In the reorganisation of 1972, the management and funding mecha-
nisms of research remained unchanged. In 1968, Leo Kretzers took over 
the duties of Van Aken, who retired in that year, and became responsible 
for research. Kretzers had worked in caprolactam and had headed DSM’s 
plastics production before being appointed to DSM’s top management in 
1967. He drew up the research programme together with Leen Revallier, 
DSM’s R&D manager, and the heads of the central commercial and finan-
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cial departments. In principle, service research and process and product 
improvement work were paid by DSM’s production units while all other 
research work was funded centrally. When the first steps in the direction 
of a divisional structure were taken, top managers of the divisions replaced 
the managers of the marketing and financial groups in the periodic meet-
ing on research led by Kretzers. The exact distribution of responsibilities 
for research projects and their funding were repeatedly debated as divi-
sional managers, particularly from the Plastics division, tended to focus 
research on marketing and production issues and hesitated to fund other 
research. In the structure DSM was implementing in the early 1970s, divi-
sions became responsible for marketing and production, but not directly 
for research. The fundamental problem the company faced was how to 
preserve the link between centralised research and decentralised marketing 
and production.13
 In the light of this problem, the organisation of the Central Labora-
tory was discussed again in 1974. Revallier, helped by DSM’s corporate 
organisational efficiency department, organised a series of meetings with 
the heads of the divisions and units within the divisions, as well as with 
his own researchers. The divisions and the Central Laboratory rejected de-
centralisation of research, as they considered the scale of both research and 
manufacturing too small to make such an organisation work. Researchers 
saw little need to adjust the organisation again, but felt that more uni-
form communication with the divisions was necessary. The Central Labo-
ratory worked with several internal coordinating mechanisms: the heads 
of departments or a project coordinator organised research’s communi-
cation, depending on the scale and scope of the project. Within DSM’s 
production organisation, the multiple coordination mechanism caused 
confusion about who acted as focal point and who was in charge, while 
the organisation also argued that these unclear lines of communication 
made research’s input less effective. The Plastics division had decentralised 
much responsibility in units organised around one product and headed by 
a plant manager and a marketing manager. This left a void for input from 
Figure 4.1. The Central Laboratory’s organisation in 1972.
Source: Reorganisatie Sector Research en Octrooien. DSM Nieuws 1972, 21(5), 8.
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research, and the Plastics division suggested appointing research managers 
that would participate in the management of its units. The Construction 
division already worked with a coordinator who also participated in the 
division’s management meetings. This mechanism became the example for 
the creation of so-called directors of research (werkgebiedmanagers), whose 
job was to organise projects and communicate with the divisions. Together 
with divisional management, they determined the research budget and re-
search programme for a division. They controlled these budgets, super-
vised the execution of projects and set priorities if necessary.14
 Top management emphasised the importance of input from the di-
rectors of research in the management of the divisions and DSM’s sub-
sidiaries. They argued that six directors of research should be appointed: 
for fertilisers, organic products, plastics, plastics processing, construction 
and industrial chemicals. This corresponded to DSM’s divisional struc-
ture. Only the Energy division was not represented, simply because no 
research was conducted in this area, while the UKF got its own director of 
research even though it was at that time still part of the Chemical Prod-
ucts division. Top management also argued that, to ensure their leverage 
inside research, the directors of research should be placed directly under 
Revallier and be part of the management of the Central Laboratory. Not 
every division funded the same amount of work, however, and only the 
Plastics division felt an immediate need for the introduction of directors of 
research. Revallier and top management agreed to appoint three directors 
of research directly under Revallier. Each director combined two of the 
six areas (fertilisers, now combined with organic products; construction, 
combined with industrial chemicals; and plastics, combined with plastics 
processing).15
 In addition to the introduction of directors of research, the Central 





R&D Products   Service Research 
and Processes 
Basic Research
 and Support Patents
Fertilisers and Organic Products
Construction and industrial 
Chemicals
Plastics and Plastics Processing
Source: Reorganisatie in fasen van de Concerndienst Research en Octrooien. Geleidelijke 
invoering van matrix-organisatie. Nieuws DSM Limburg 1976, 26(4), 6.
144 the company that changed itself
Laboratory’s departmental structure also changed. The divisions positively 
evaluated research’s effectiveness, but argued that it could be further im-
proved. In their view, the heads of the Central Laboratory’s departments 
focused too much on the performance of their own department. The Cen-
tral Laboratory decided to separate research from control responsibilities. 
This principle, in combination with the newly-introduced directors of re-
search, resulted in a matrix organisation. The directors of research formed 
the vertical axis of this matrix, while the horizontal axis was formed by 
two new departments oriented on the type of research work: a department 
for Product and Process Research and Development, which included re-
search on both plastics and organic products; and a department for Basic 
Research, which included both fundamental and generic research16 (Figure 
4.2).
 DSM’s Corporate Planning department added another ingredient to 
the reorganisation: following the principle of decentralisation that had 
guided the decision to establish divisions, they argued that research man-
agement, broadly conceived to include patenting policies and issues of 
external research and buying technology, should be the primary responsi-
bility of the divisions. With Revallier, they agreed upon a distribution of 
responsibilities. Outside the sphere of interest of each division, the Central 
Laboratory held responsibility for fundamental and generic research, and 
for long-range research aimed at diversification. This work would be fund-
ed at corporate level, but this funding would not exceed a third of the total 
research budget. Within the sphere of interest of each division, research 
would try to get approval for projects. This ‘contract research’ would in-
clude process and product improvement and service research, as well as 
diversification research when the goals of this research had crystallised out 
and the time horizons had shortened. In this way, a clear distribution of 
responsibility for research projects and their funding was agreed.17 
 The matrix organisation and the new funding structure were imple-
mented in 1975 and 1976. The Central Laboratory also changed its name to 
CRO (Concerndienst Research en Octrooien, corporate research and patent 
department).18 Research remained centralised, but CRO was not a corpo-
rate laboratory like Philips and RCA had, for instance. These companies 
had a centrally-funded corporate research laboratory, while divisions also 
operated and funded their own laboratories. In such organisations, the 
corporate laboratories often concentrated on long-range and/or funda-
mental research, while the divisional laboratories concentrated on short-
term research and development work.19 At DSM, CRO was a corporate 
department, but it was for a large part funded by the divisions. Moreover, 
CRO worked on the full range of the R&D spectrum. DSM’s divisions 
had no R&D laboratories of their own.
 The first evaluations of the matrix organisation and the directors of 
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research in late 1977 and early 1978 were positive. According to divisional 
management, research had become less fragmented and budget estimates 
were more accurate. The structure of CRO’s organisation was left un-
changed in the second half of the 1970s. In 1978, however, Dick Tom was 
appointed head of CRO alongside Revallier. Tom had joined the Central 
Laboratory in 1953 and worked in the Organic Chemistry department. 
He started with application research in the Semi-Technical department in 
1957 and became the head of the Plastics Technology department when it 
was formed in 1958. Tom had also led the polymer R&D sector from 1963 
until 1969, when he was appointed head of DSM’s Corporate Planning 
department. After Revallier’s retirement in 1980, Tom became CRO’s sole 
manager.20
Research and Diversification
Alongside the Central Laboratory’s internal reorganisation, top manage-
ment kept up the pressure to keep costs down throughout the 1970s. As 
early as 1971, the first economising programme started, focusing on per-
sonnel reduction as salaries made up most of the research costs. In two 
years’ time the number of researchers declined from approximately 1,200 
to 1,000 (see graph A1 in the appendix). Research expenditure as a percen-
tage of turnover also declined sharply as DSM’s turnover grew much faster 
than research expenditures in the 1970s (see graph A2 in the appendix).21 
 After 1970, the rapid growth of the Central Laboratory ended. The 
number of researchers declined and the research budget no longer kept up 
with the growth of DSM’s turnover. Top management took a more critical 
view towards R&D in the 1970s than in the 1950s and 1960s. Their main 
aim was to make DSM market-driven, which translated into a preference 
for business-driven diversification realised through the acquisition of tech-
nology or companies. Revallier attempted to show in 1975 that research 
was more effective than acquisition by comparing the cost incurred in 
semi-technical and pilot plant work in projects that had, and had not, 
been commercialised in the period between 1950 and 1975 (Figure 3.13). 
He showed that DSM had spent slightly more on projects that had not 
been commercialised, but that the success rate of research was about 50%. 
Moreover, Revallier pointed to the profits of Stamicarbon, which covered 
roughly 72% of the costs of all projects. His figures also showed that DSM’s 
sales from products manufactured with internally-developed processes ran 
up to 25% of the company’s total sales. According to Revallier, this was a 
significant share that showed the importance of research.22
 Revallier’s analysis was to no avail. Top management focused on failed 
projects, not on successful ones, and emphasised that DSM had to expand 
immediately. This created time pressure that pushed the company further 
towards acquisitions of technology and companies.
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 There was yet another reason for the change of direction of DSM’s 
research policy. In June 1970, a draft long-range plan for the Central Labo-
ratory had been presented to Kretzers. Cees Bokhoven, who had worked in 
the field of catalysis and generic research for a long time but was appointed 
head of the support department in 1968, was part of the group who had 
written this draft. The long-term plan focused on research that should lead 
to new businesses. According to Bokhoven, many projects with this aim 
had failed in the preceding ten years. There were marketing problems, and 
the Central Laboratory had perhaps not acted in accord with DSM’s busi-
ness strategy; but Bokhoven also argued that improving externally-bought 
technology was the strong point of DSM’s technological capabilities. He 
pointed out that urea and caprolactam had become successes while lysine 
and methionine had not.23
 The failure of the lysine project had a significant effect on research 
aimed at diversification. Bokhoven was far from alone in his views. The 
presumed lack of marketing capabilities and the detachment of research 
from business strategy were recurring themes in policy discussions: re-
search had been technology push and the lysine case had proven the falla-
cies of that approach. Opinions differed as to whether research had really 
diverged from business strategy before 1970, however. Some, including 
Kretzers, placed emphasis on the absence of a clearly formulated long-
term company plan. The decreased effectiveness of research aimed at di-
versification was a shared view, and consequently buying plants or buying 
companies became an interesting option. The reduced risk and the better 
grip on construction costs were emphasised. Acquiring companies led to 
fast market entry and appropriation of marketing knowledge that could 
then be used to improve products and processes. Kretzers and divisional 
managers became the main voice of this policy.24
 Compared to the research policies of the 1950s and 1960s, a somewhat 
more pessimistic view of the role of research in diversification developed 
in the 1970s. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Central Laboratory had played 
an initiating role as researchers were supposed to come up with ideas for 
innovation and diversification. Research had an independent position. In 
the 1970s, research was supposed to be market-oriented and closely aligned 
to the company’s businesses. Diversification was initiated from outside the 
Central Laboratory. Research played a dependent role.
Research and Technology Acquisitions
Although the view of the role of research in diversification changed after 
1970, research could still facilitate diversifications based on external tech-
nology. The Central Laboratory’s role in the acquisition of technology was 
small, however. Researchers sometimes provided advice, for instance on 
the height of the stack for the acrylonitrile plant, but Chemiebouw and 
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the staff technologists of the production plants were crucial in the process 
of buying plants. Chemiebouw’s name changed to Nieuwbouw at the end 
of 1967, but its tasks remained unchanged.25
 For several of the plants that were based on external technology, process 
research was done. The Central Laboratory worked on boosting capacity 
of the acrylonitrile plants, for instance. DSM had built two plants with a 
design capacity of 90,000 tons in total. The Central Laboratory helped 
boost capacity to 140,000 tons, leading to a significant cost advantage. 
In the early 1970s, researchers developed a new catalyst for acrylonitrile 
manufacture as well. The initial results were promising, but DSM did not 
have a test reactor to investigate the new catalyst on a sufficiently large 
scale. Cooperation was sought with Sohio, the licensor of the process, and 
the Dutch chemical company Ketjen, which had the necessary test facili-
ties, but neither of these firms were interested. The project was therefore 
stopped and in 1973 DSM bought the improved catalyst Sohio had devel-
oped.26
Acrylonitrile plants, 1972. In the 1970s DSM bought technology to diversify and expand. 
The process used in DSM’s acrylonitrile plants had been developed by the American com-
pany Sohio. Acrylonitrile is an intermediate for acrylic fibres but the compound, and the 
by-products released during its production, also stimulated fine chemicals research and 
production. The Central Laboratory also worked on improvements to the Sohio process.
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 The development of a new catalyst for acrylonitrile manufacture was 
stopped, but this example does show that technology acquisitions and re-
search are not mutually exclusive. Buying technology and subsequently 
trying to improve it by in-house industrial research had been established 
practice at DSM as early as the 1930s.27 In acrylonitrile, the Central Labor-
atory was able to pick up research on the catalyst because it had much 
experience in this field. In-house research provided a crucial part of the 
absorptive capacity necessary to track, acquire and integrate external tech-
nologies. 
A Redefinition of the Central Laboratory’s Role
The 1970s were a period in which research and business interests had to be 
re-balanced in light of DSM’s internal changes and in light of a changed 
business climate. DSM’s expansion programme and the establishment of 
the divisions, as well as a slowdown of growth and intensified competition 
in the chemical industry, triggered a redirection of research. In the 1950s 
and 1960s, DSM’s head of chemical production had not had a decisive 
say in the direction of research but in the early 1970s the balance of pow-
er shifted towards divisional management. The coordination of research 
through the triangle consisting of top management – head of production 
– head of the Central Laboratory was replaced by a structure that included 
the heads of the divisions. Given the circumstances they were facing and 
given the wish to expand rapidly, they pushed research towards a more 
dependent role. The changed funding mechanism further strengthened 
the position of the divisions. Finally, the failure of the lysine project led to 
reduced confidence in the powers of research to innovate and particularly 
in the powers of research to enable diversification. 
 In summary, economics, organisational change and diminished self-
confidence resulted in a dependent role for research. These internal and 
external changes occurred roughly between 1969, when the lysine plant 
closed, and 1975, when both the divisions and the matrix organisation in 
research were established. The changes occurred fast, and more or less at 
the same time. Strategic reorientation entailed the expansion of existing 
businesses and the establishment of new businesses. In parallel, the struc-
ture of the company was changed, the role of R&D renegotiated, and the 
Central Laboratory reorganised.
 The debate on the role and importance of industrial research was not 
unique to DSM. Many other companies were struggling with the same 
issue and many also cut their research budgets.28 A combination of unfa-
vourable economic circumstances and the idea that industrial research was 
becoming less effective in diversification are important factors that caused 
this shift. Basil Achilladelis, Albert Schwarzkopf and Martin Cines come 
to the same conclusion in a macro study of innovation in the chemical 
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industry. David Hounshell argues that the failure of many research pro-
grammes to come up with marketable products was an important cause 
of the decline in research budgets in the United States in the 1970s.29 At 
DSM, organisational change further reinforced the change in research 
policies, in line with what Graham and Pruitt have shown for Alcoa.30
DSM’s Entry into Fine Chemicals
While DSM was expanding its chemical businesses, established divisions 
and redefined the role of research, the Central Laboratory initiated a di-
versification that was to have crucial long-term effects on the company’s 
development. In contrast to research’s dependent role, the Central Labo-
ratory pushed DSM’s entry into fine chemicals. DSM also took over a 
company, but research played an important role in establishing a foothold 
in this business. Lysine research, moreover, proved important for several 
fine chemical products.
The Fine Chemicals Industry in the 1970s
DSM was not alone in selecting fine chemicals as an attractive business. 
In contrast to the high volumes and low margins associated with bulk 
chemicals, fine chemicals are high value-added products manufactured in 
low volume. Like bulk chemicals, fine chemicals are specification products 
and customers buy them because they have a certain chemical compo-
sition. Food additives, pharmaceuticals and agrochemicals are important 
outlets for fine chemicals. Specialties, on the other hand, are performance 
products that solve specific problems or address specific needs. Like fine 
chemicals, they are often manufactured in low volume but with high mar-
gins and they are not very sensitive to cyclical highs and lows.31
 Although the differences between the various types of chemical prod-
ucts are gradual, manufacturing and marketing fine chemicals and spe-
cialties and manufacturing bulk and pseudo-bulk chemicals are different 
businesses. Plants for the manufacture of bulk chemicals are large, capital 
intensive and dedicated (they typically produce only one product). Produc-
ers mainly compete on price, leading to a strong focus on cutting produc-
tion costs through process improvements. Specialties, on the other hand, 
are typically manufactured in small, less capital-intensive plants that may 
produce a range of products (so-called multi-product or multi-purpose 
plants). Extensive knowledge of customer needs and practical know-how 
about the application of products is essential. Finally, fine chemicals are 
somewhere between the extremes of bulk chemicals and specialties. Plants 
have a low volume and can be continuous, but are often batch-operated 
and sometimes several products can be manufactured with the same instal-
lation. Process technology is important, but so is knowledge of customer 
needs and of applications.32
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 Despite the differences, the high margins of fine chemicals and special-
ties attracted many bulk-oriented firms to these businesses. Like DSM, 
many companies suffered from strained profitability and many chose fine 
chemicals as part of their response. Unlike DSM, however, other chemi-
cal companies often preferred to enter by acquiring specialised firms, a 
trend that continued well into the 1980s regardless of the problems many 
companies faced in integrating these companies and in maintaining their 
profitability.33 
The Start of Special Products
In the late 1960s, several ideas for fine chemicals had been born at the 
Central Laboratory. Questions from other companies, and compounds 
that were used in the production of bulk chemicals, had provided oppor-
tunities for the production of what was called ‘kleine producten’ (literally: 
small products). For instance, during the research on the separation of 
D- and L-lysine, a method had been worked out that used L-pyrrolidone 
carboxylic acid. Unilever was interested in using this compound as a food 
additive, and they approached DSM. Unilever bought 3.6 tons in 1968, 
indeed a small amount when compared to DSM’s other businesses, but 
Unilever expected substantial growth.34
 A group of researchers were of the opinion that fine chemicals got 
too little priority. In January 1969, they published a report with the aim 
of putting fine chemicals on the map. The report asked the question of 
whether the fine chemical activities were a ‘hobby or a pillar’ of the com-
pany, and called for a systematic commitment and for the establishment 
of a separate group to initiate fine chemicals projects. The report took 
up DSM’s Large Leap Forward strategy of expansion and diversification, 
arguing that fine chemicals could counterbalance the typical downward 
trend of market prices and cost prices in bulk chemicals and that a pas-
sive attitude, focused on fine chemical compounds for captive use and 
on responding to occasional questions from other companies, would not 
provide the means to set up a fine chemicals business to the extent that it 
would contribute substantially to DSM’s results.35
 In April 1969, top management decided to devote 2.5 million guilders 
over two years to a new group for fine chemicals manufacture, taking over 
the name that the Central Laboratory had given to these activities: Small 
Products. The group started in October 1969 and operated from the facili-
ties of the Organic Pilot Plant department of the Central Laboratory to 
obtain the necessary flexibility in production. Ruud Selman, and from 1971 
Hans Bigot, managed the new group.36 Selman, a son of Jan Selman, who 
had been operational director of the Central Laboratory, had joined DSM 
in 1963 to work in the caprolactam plant, and moved to Stamicarbon two 
years later. In 1971 he became general manager of Nypro, DSM’s British 
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caprolactam joint venture, and was succeeded as head of Special Products 
by Bigot, a researcher who had worked for the Central Laboratory since 
1958 on caprolactam and on polymers, and who had research management 
experience.37
 Top management intended to give the head of the sales office for coal 
and coke and the coordinator of chemical sales final responsibility for Small 
Products, but with the instruction to give the group much room to oper-
ate independently. Apparently top management saw fine chemicals as an 
experiment. The allocated budget was also small by DSM’s standards.38 
 Besides the budget of 2.5 million guilders for two years, Small Products 
got permission to use equipment from the shut-down lysine plant and 
facilities from another plant that was not being used. Production staff also 
sold part of these plants as scrap to get some extra money. Utilities were 
tapped from the neighbouring caprolactam plant. Backed-up by recipe de-
velopment at the Central Laboratory, Small Products started production. 
Among the first products were two proprietary catalysts, one for the pro-
duction of cyclohexanone and another for polyethylene, which had been 
developed by the Central Laboratory and had also been manufactured by 
the research organisation on a semi-technical scale. The installation used 
to produce the catalyst for polyethylene manufacture was later adapted for 
the production of a number of oximes, used in agrochemicals amongst 
others, which became a substantial business in the 1970s.39 
 In 1971, Small Products was renamed Special Products and got permis-
sion to initiate dedicated investments. The group shared the personnel and 
some support services with the Organic Products group but remained in-
dependent. In 1975, Special Products became part of the Industrial Chemi-
cals division.40
 The Central Laboratory was very active in fine chemicals in the 1970s, 
as is reflected in the number of patent applications from that decade 
(Graph 4.1). Research played an important role in a number of major early 
fine chemicals diversifications. In the Dow phenol process, the oxidation 
of toluene to phenol proceeded via benzoic acid, but the oxidation prod-
uct also contained benzaldehyde. Dow had pointed to the possibility of 
removing these compounds and built an installation for benzaldehyde ex-
traction near its phenol operation in Kalama (Washington) in 1970.41 Ben-
zoic acid was mainly used in preservatives, with world production at about 
30,000 tons by 1968, while benzaldehyde’s applications included flavours, 
the largest market, and pharmaceutical products.42
 At the Central Laboratory in 1962 and 1963, Bigot and a colleague stud-
ied the possibility of using benzoic acid as a starting point for a plasticiser 
for PVC. Contrary to initial tests at TNO, however, they found that their 
product could not match conventional plasticisers. In 1964, the Central 
Laboratory developed a method to purify benzoic acid from phenol pro-
152 the company that changed itself
duction, starting from a patent by Dow. Marketing purified benzoic acid 
was not easy, however. The main market was in preservatives, and compa-
nies that manufactured these products often made their own benzoic acid. 
In 1965, CIR, DSM’s Rotterdam phenol subsidiary, started to sell crude 
benzoic acid to the Dutch chemical company Chemische Fabriek Naarden, 
which processed it into preservatives and an additive for anti-freeze mix-
tures. CIR initially shipped about 2,000 tons of benzoic acid per year, in-
creasing to almost 4,000 tons in 1981 with a share of the European market 
of almost 60%.43
 With regard to benzaldehyde, CIR’s production staff argued that re-
cycling this compound was necessary to keep the oxidation reaction go-
ing, but research data showed that removal of most of the benzaldehyde 
in the recycle toluene stream did not have a negative effect on benzoic 
acid production. Special Products proposed extracting benzaldehyde and 
purifying it at DSM’s main site in Geleen (Netherlands). Benzaldehyde 
could be produced more cheaply in this way than in conventional routes, 
and the project had a short pay-out time. Top management approved the 
construction of plants at CIR and at Special Products with a capacity of 
1,500 tons of benzaldehyde per year. Production started around 1972 and 
sales volumes quickly rose to 4,656 tons in 1981, with a market share in 
Europe running up to 60%. Benzaldehyde showed the viability of Special 
Products and gave the group more leverage to deploy new activities.44 
Graph 4.1. Patent applications in the field of fine chemicals per year (three year moving 
average).
Data compiled by Wim Hoogstraten. Counted are so-called premier depots: the first pa-
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 Besides research, other methods were also used to build up activities in 
fine chemicals. Selman studied import statistics and made visits to users of 
fine chemicals to see which products could be attractive. He visited Andeno 
for instance, a Dutch company active in the fine chemicals sector. Andeno 
manufactured intermediates for penicillin from phenylglycine among oth-
ers, and this compound could be produced from ammonia, hydrocyanic 
acid and benzaldehyde, which were chemicals DSM had available. Hydro-
cyanic acid was a by-product from acrylonitrile production. The manufac-
ture of phenylglycine was taken up in this way around 1972. Sales volumes 
rose to 728 tons in 1981, with a share of the world market running up to 
40%.45
 Through the initiative of the Central Laboratory, and supported by 
research in crucial ways, DSM entered fine chemicals. This role contrasts 
sharply with the Central Laboratory’s dependent role in the 1970s, but 
production of benzaldehyde, phenylglycine and other fine chemicals was 
relatively small-scale. Special Products’ activities were mostly spin-offs 
from the manufacture of bulk chemicals: either technologically, as in the 
case of benzoic acid and benzaldehyde; or commercially, as in the case of 
phenylglycine, where the availability of chemicals from bulk manufacture 
enabled Special Products to start production.
Lysine, Phenylglycine and Amino Acids
DSM’s first forays into fine chemicals had been the lysine and methionine 
projects and, more generally, research into food and feed additives. These 
initial activities had not been successful, with the closure of the lysine plant 
as the most visible and most costly failure. Production of lysine by chemi-
cal synthesis was reconsidered several times in the first half of the 1970s 
when market prices rose. DSM talked with Allied Chemical in the United 
States and Degussa in Germany about possible cooperation.46
 Research on lysine continued even after the closure of the lysine plant. 
In 1966, the Central Laboratory had started working on a route to lysine 
starting from acrylonitrile, a route on which Sohio, the company that li-
censed its acrylonitrile process to DSM, had done some research. Three 
years later, the Central Laboratory found a route to lysine from acrylo-
nitrile and acetaldehyde via gamma-cyanobutyraldehyde but as the com-
mercial outlook remained bleak, research was cut back in 1972. The cost of 
lysine produced with DSM’s process was too high compared to fermenta-
tion processes. Research reached the conclusion that synthesising lysine 
was viable only when cost prices could be reduced by a breakthrough, 
but that the chances of achieving such a breakthrough were small. The 
separation of D- and L-lysine was identified as the crucial bottleneck in 
the process, and pioneering research aimed at simplifying or possibly omit-
ting this step continued. In 1975, however, research on lysine was finally 
stopped completely.47
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 It seemed that a major research project of the 1960s came to a quiet end 
in this way, but research had taken a turn in the previous years. In the late 
1960s, the Central Laboratory had invested in a Biological Testing Station 
where application research on lysine was done and where capabilities in 
biology were built. At this department, fermentation processes were also 
investigated for lysine and other compounds such as glutamic acid, a food 
additive that dominated the amino acid market in volume. In 1969, after 
the closure of the lysine plant, application research on lysine stopped. The 
Biological Testing Station, renamed Biology department, started to search 
for ways in which their knowledge could be made useful to DSM. Fermen-
tation research continued, but on a small scale. Researchers considered this 
technology to be too far removed from DSM’s core. On the other hand, the 
Biology department saw opportunities in research on the use of enzymes 
in organic chemistry: they reasoned that enzymes are biological catalysts, 
and that catalysts are of prime importance in the chemical industry. A few 
other companies, research institutes and universities were already active in 
this field. Some processes operated commercially. In Japan, for instance, 
Tanabe Seiyaku Co. had operated a process for the production of several 
L-amino acids since 1969. The main markets and applications of enzymes, 
however, were in detergents and dairy products among others. DSM was 
among the first companies to try applications in organic chemistry.48
 In 1972, the Biology department became part of the large Chemical 
Products Research and Development department. The Pioneering Re-
search section of this department, headed by Ottenheym, gave an extra 
input and impetus to the idea of researching enzymes. They proposed in-
cluding phenylglycine. Like lysine, phenylglycine is an amino acid, and 
DSM in fact manufactured D,L-phenylglycine. Special Products’ main 
customer for phenylglycine was Andeno, which had the technology to 
separate the D-configuration from this mixture, which was then sold to 
pharmaceutical companies for the production of penicillin. Separation was 
necessary as only the D-configuration was active against bacteria. Andeno 
worked with specific and complex technology that only worked for D,L-
phenylglycine.49
 Around 1975, researchers found a way to separate D-phenylglycine 
from the L-configuration by using an enzyme. Novo Industri A/S (now 
Novo Group) manufactured the necessary enzyme in a fermentation pro-
cess that Novo and DSM optimised together. Novo was one of the largest 
manufacturers of enzymes in the world. DSM had approached the Dutch 
company Gist-brocades, another large manufacturer, but in their opinion 
the possibilities of using enzymes in organic chemistry were slim and they 
declined the offer.50 
 The new process for phenylglycine was a technological success but the 
production costs were high. Special Products would be competing with its 
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main customer: Andeno. Andeno’s parent company Océ-Van der Grinten, 
whose main line of business was reprography, contacted DSM’s top man-
agement when Andeno got wind of DSM’s work on D-phenylglycine. Océ 
hinted that Special Products’ sales of D,L-phenylglycine to Andeno might 
be endangered. Special Products would then have to sell directly to manu-
facturers of penicillin. This reaction from Andeno and Océ, combined 
with the high production costs, ended the prospect of commercialising the 
enzymatic process.51
 Research on the enzymatic separation of amino acids continued, al-
though it was not commercialised in the manufacture of phenylglycine. 
Research was fundamentally orientated and CRO operated with a vision 
that the selectivity of enzymes would become an advantage in the fields of 
pharmaceuticals and agrochemicals. In amino acids, often only either the 
D- or L-configuration was active in a product, while the other was ‘ballast’ 
or could induce unwanted, and sometimes even harmful, side effects.52
 The process underlying the production of phenylglycine could also 
be used for other amino acids, and the enzymatic separation method ap-
peared to work for a range of these compounds. In this way, DSM had a 
generic process for the production of D- or L-amino acids. The process 
was operated on bench scale only because of the small size of the market. 
Glutamic acid dominated the amino acid market with a production vol-
ume of approximately 220-250,000 tons in 1977, followed by methionine 
with 100,000 tons and lysine with 30,000 tons. Specialty amino acids had 
a volume of about 100 tons but grew fast and commanded high prices. In 
this market, enzymatic methods had to compete with chemical and fer-
mentation processes.53
 Research again continued, and in the early 1980s the separation meth-
od was further refined and another enzyme was found that was applicable 
to a different range of amino acids. In 1987, top management approved 
the construction of a commercial scale plant, which came on stream a year 
later.54
 As a result of the continuation of centrally-funded pioneering research 
on the separation of D- and L-lysine, research on this product eventu-
ally paid off. Lysine research had contributed crucially to the growth of a 
body of knowledge that could be used in the fine chemicals sector. This 
body of knowledge was expanded through the initiative of researchers to 
start research on enzymes; this initiative, too, sprang from the failed lysine 
project.
Lysine, Pyridine and Alpha-picoline
Besides amino acids, lysine research provided a stepping-stone to pyridine 
and alpha picoline. Pharmaceuticals and agrochemicals are important out-
lets for so-called heterocyclics like pyridine, the picolines and the lutidines. 
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In the late 1960s, ICI was by far the largest customer of pyridine. The Eng-
lish company used it to manufacture Paraquat and Diquat, herbicides that 
were more environmentally-friendly than other contemporary products. 
By 1980, world use of pyridine and derivatives had passed 40,000 tons a 
year.55
 Pyridine had traditionally been manufactured from coal tar. The Amer-
ican company Reilly Tar & Chemical Corporation produced the largest 
amounts of pyridine and related products, while in Europe the Swiss 
chemical company Lonza led the field. Other companies, including DSM 
in the 1960s, manufactured small amounts of pyridine out of coal tar from 
their coking operations. Only relatively small amounts could be produced 
from this source, however, and several companies investigated synthetic 
routes to pyridine and related families of compounds. Reilly Tar developed 
a method starting from acetaldehyde and ammonia. Other companies fol-
lowed, and this type of process became the main synthetic route to pyri-
dine and derivatives. By varying the conditions and starting materials of 
the process, several products could be produced, but by-products always 
resulted.56
 The closure of DSM’s coke oven plants would also mean the end of py-
ridine production, but in 1969 the Central Laboratory started to work on 
two alternative approaches to the synthesis of pyridine. The route to lysine 
that started from acrylonitrile proceeded via gamma-cyanobutyraldehyde. 
The alpha picoline plant in 1977. This plant was Special Products’ first major investment. 
CRO had developed the process, using spin-offs from lysine research. DSM had learnt 
from the lysine project, however, and construction of the alpha picoline plant did not start 
until a long-term sales contract had been concluded.
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Jos Thoma, who had worked on lysine from acrylonitrile since 1966 and had 
been head of the Organic Chemistry department since 1969, also inspired 
research on finding other products from gamma-cyanobutyraldehyde, with 
pyridine as the main target. A second route to pyridine was investigated 
as well, starting from acrylonitrile and acetone and proceeding via alpha- 
picoline to pyridine (Figure 4.3). The main advantage of this process was 
the absence of by-products, and if another compound was used instead 
of acetone, other products could be produced by the same route. For in-
stance, by switching from acetone to cyclohexanone, quinoline could be 
manufactured. This compound could be used to manufacture a decon-
taminant for seed for sowing. Research identified 2,3 lutidine as an inter-
esting product; it could be used as an intermediate for nicotinic acid, a 
vitamin B.57
 Research on pyridine was again technology push, a spin-off from re-
search on the acrylonitrile lysine process. As early as 1970, however, mar-
ket development work started. Special Products established contact with 
Lonza to explore the possibilities of selling 2,3 lutidine to the Swiss com-
pany. Lonza produced very large amounts of nicotinic acid and planned to 
expand capacity, but had not yet covered the supply of the necessary inter-
mediates. Commercial Affairs estimated market volume for alpha-picoline 
at about 5,000 tons per year, with half of it used to manufacture a chemical 
that improved the bonding of tyre cords and rubber. Many firms produced 
both compounds and it would be difficult to gain an entry in the mar-
ket for alpha-picoline because of this captive use. Commercial Affairs also 
probed the market for coumarin, used as an aroma in soap and perfumes, 
and quinoline. Special Products worked on a plan to manufacture 500 tons 
of quinoline, 100 to 200 tons of coumarin, and 300 tons of alpha-picoline 
per year in one plant. The process under development was continuous 
and manufacturing several products entailed switching feedstocks between 
production runs.58
 Pyridine had by far the largest market volume, however. Commercial 
Affairs expected demand for pyridine to develop to 10,000 tons per year in 
the next three to five years because of ICI’s growing sales of Paraquat and 
Figure 4.3. Simplified map of the potential paths from acrylonitrile to lysine, pyridine and 
alpha-picoline.
 Acrylonitrile + Acetaldehyde  Acrylonitrile + Acetone
 Gamma-cyanobutyraidehyde
 Lysine Pyridine Alpha-picoline
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Diquat. They established contact with ICI and the British company prom-
ised to evaluate DSM’s pyridine process. DSM kept open the options of 
developing the process together with ICI or developing the process alone 
and then either licensing it to the British company or producing pyridine 
for them.59
 Research found the route to pyridine via gamma-cyanobutyraldehyde 
difficult because of the instability of this intermediate. Pyridine from al-
pha-picoline was unattractive economically when compared to Reilly Tar’s 
process. In 1971, ICI indicated that it did not want to switch suppliers and 
did not want to devote funds to developing the pyridine process together 
with DSM. This focused the Central Laboratory on the alpha-picoline 
process starting from acrylonitrile and acetone, with the possibility of man-
ufacturing different products by replacing acetone by other compounds. 
As Lonza decided to enlarge in-house production of the intermediates it 
required, Special Products’ plan to manufacture quinoline, coumarin and 
alpha-picoline gained momentum. Special Products probed the market 
for these and other compounds and made a new estimate of market vol-
umes.60 
 The project to start manufacture of alpha-picoline and other com-
pounds was Special Products’ first major investment. Top management 
demanded guarantees that the output of the plant could be sold. For 
alpha-picoline, Special Products concluded a long-term contract with 
Dow, which used it in the production of agrochemicals, and top manage-
ment then approved the construction of a plant in June 1973.61 
 Nieuwbouw engineered Special Products’ new plant with a capacity of 
3,000 tons per year. In one stroke, DSM became the third largest producer 
in the field of pyridine and related compounds in Europe, after Lonza and 
the European subsidiary of Reilly Tar.62 By mid-March 1977, the plant was 
ready to be started up. This was done in phases, and the Catalysis section 
of the Central Laboratory assisted during start-up by testing the quality 
of the intermediate product for alpha-picoline. In July 1977, production 
of alpha-picoline started. Special Products made some 2,3 lutidine with 
the same plant and used it for producing pyridine 2,3-dicarboxylic acid, 
a compound for crop protection products. Switching feedstocks entailed 
cumbersome shutdown and start-up procedures, and alpha-picoline soon 
proved to be the most attractive product from a commercial point of view. 
The plant was therefore dedicated to this product. Sales of alpha-picoline 
rose to 2,434 tons in 1981, most of which went to Dow. Special Products 
had also captured 40% of the European market by that year.63 
 The relatively large scale of Special Products’ entry into the produc-
tion of alpha-picoline shows the fluidity between fine and bulk chemicals. 
Low volume at DSM meant a few thousand tons, which was low com-
pared to the hundreds of thousands of tons of plastics and fertilisers DSM 
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produced, but other fine chemical companies operated at lower volumes. 
What emerged as an alpha-picoline plant had in essence been a technol-
ogy-push project like the cases of lysine and methionine. On the other 
hand, the research on pyridine, alpha-picoline and other compounds was 
a small-scale project. Market probes were conducted at an early stage in 
the project, and top management now wanted to see results from market 
development work before it committed DSM to investing in a multi-prod-
uct plant. Special Projects was closely involved, securing a bridging mecha-
nism between research and commercial interests. In this way, technology-
push research could lead to commercial success. 
Acquisitions: Bridging the Gap to Specialties?
Besides research, DSM tried other means to achieve the diversification 
it was aiming at in the 1970s. In fine chemicals, few possibilities existed 
to buy technology from engineering contractors or other companies, but 
several opportunities to acquire existing companies presented themselves. 
Philips Duphar, a Dutch company active in agrochemicals and pharmaceu-
ticals, approached DSM twice with the possibility of a take-over. In 1973, 
top management, divisional management and Special Products agreed that 
Philips Duphar’s profitability was poor and that it would take a major ef-
fort to match its activities with Special Products’ profile. DSM therefore 
declined the offer. Two years later, Philips Duphar wanted to sell part of 
its activities in vitamins and intermediates for flavours to DSM, but was 
again turned down. Top management did not want to free the necessary 
funds, and argued that the activities that would be taken over from Philips 
Duphar would have to be moved to Geleen to make an optimal fit with 
DSM. Moving seemed impossible, however.64
 In 1979, Chemische Fabriek Naarden offered its small Spanish benzoic-
acid subsidiary for sale to DSM but was turned down on Bigot’s advice. 
Instead, both companies reached an agreement by which DSM obtained 
Naarden’s know-how for purifying benzoic acid and pharmaceutical-grade 
sodium benzoate in exchange for exclusive sales rights in a number of 
countries for Naarden’s subsidiary Jan Dekker.65 
 Also in 1979, Chemie Combinatie Amsterdam CCA (now Purac), a 
company that made lactic acid and other sugar-based chemical products, 
went up for sale. CCA’s parents, the Dutch sugar company CSM (Centrale 
Suiker Maatschappij) and the Dutch conglomerate HVA (Verenigde HVA-
Maatschappijen), wanted to sell as CSM had sought other areas to diversify 
into, and as both owners thought that CCA’s financial results were poor. 
CSM and HVA also expected that CCA would develop better as part of a 
chemical concern. CCA’s parents talked to the German company Benckiser 
Knapsack, but CCA also approached DSM. Both top management and di-
visional management saw it as an opportunity to complement the work on 
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enzymes and obtain industrial experience with fermentation technologies. 
CSM asked too much in the eyes of DSM, however, and top management 
expressed concerns about the profitability of CCA and the influence of 
European Community agricultural policies. For CCA, it mattered a great 
deal whether it could process sugar at world market prices or at the higher 
prices set by the European Community. Talks with Benckiser Knapsack also 
failed and CCA remained with CSM and HVA.66
 In the 1970s, one acquisition attempt by DSM was successful. In 1975, 
contact was established with Chem-Y, a specialties company whose main 
line of business was surfactants and which was owned by the Dutch fam-
ily De Jong. Surfactants have a broad range of possible applications, but 
the main markets are in consumer products in the areas of household 
cleaning and personal care. Surfactants (surface active agents) are added 
to these products to improve their characteristics. Added to shampoos, 
for instance, surfactants increase foaming. With 75 employees and sites 
in Bodegraven in the Netherlands and Emmerich in Germany, Chem-Y’s 
turnover was about 16 million guilders in 1976. Its main market was in cos-
metics, as De Jong also owned the cosmetics company Andrélon. In 1977, 
the possibility to buy Chem-Y took concrete shape when De Jong decided 
that they wanted to sell. Chem-Y had developed a plan to restructure pro-
duction, closing the site in Bodegraven and expanding the installations in 
Emmerich.67
 The head of the Industrial Chemicals division, of which Special Prod-
ucts was part, and Tom, at that time head of DSM’s long range planning 
group, drafted a proposal to buy Chem-Y. They argued that the company 
had a good patent position, which illustrated its innovative capacity. They 
also showed that financial performance was very poor. Substantial losses 
were being incurred and would continue to be incurred in the years to 
come as Chem-Y’s plants were outdated and too small, while the compa-
ny’s marketing function was not up to its task. Tom and the head of the 
division argued that Chem-Y was a ‘threshold investment’ DSM would 
have to make to enter the surfactants field. Expected growth for surfactants 
in several markets, increased scale and DSM’s managerial expertise would 
lead to an improvement of Chem-Y’s operations and its results. Top man-
agement agreed and also saw an opportunity to move Chem-Y to the south 
of Limburg. On DSM’s scale, the sum involved in the acquisition and the 
subsequent investment in Emmerich was small, while on Special Products’ 
scale, buying Chem-Y would boost sales volumes substantially. DSM for-
mally acquired Chem-Y in December 1977 and grouped it under Special 
Products.68
 Lack of synergy and lack of profitability had prevented the acquisition 
of Philips Duphar and CCA, but the same arguments did not prevent the 
acquisition of Chem-Y. It is also striking that, whereas companies oriented 
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towards bulk chemicals often bought specialty companies not just to gain 
technical know-how of an unrelated business but also to gain marketing 
know-how, DSM’s management considered Chem-Y’s marketing inad-
equate. The takeover of Chem-Y was clearly a strategic move: a threshold 
investment necessary to enter an attractive field.
 After DSM had bought Chem-Y, Nieuwbouw made a new plan for 
restructuring production, doubling Chem-Y’s capacity. Production moved 
to Emmerich, but the staff department remained in Bodegraven. In 1980, 
the new plants were gradually started up, but they had cost more than 
twice the planned budget and suffered from many teething problems. Pro-
duction of specialties relies on the possibilities of operators to formulate 
products, whereas Nieuwbouw had built a plant with a central control 
room, which is characteristic of bulk chemicals plants, but much less suit-
able for the flexible production of specialities. Moreover, Chem-Y’s per-
sonnel were of poor quality and its research was limited and unrelated 
to DSM’s research. CRO did little work for Chem-Y. The commercial 
synergy between Special Products’ existing lines of business and Chem-Y 
proved to be meagre, as Chem-Y operated in very different markets.69 
 The technological and commercial problems led to poor results. In 
1982, the management of Industrial Chemicals started a drastic reorganisa-
tion, focusing the company’s product portfolio to improve its competi-
tive position. Two years later, after attempts to divest Chem-Y had failed, 
Special Products put Chem-Y at arm’s length so that it would not interfere 
with its own business.70 
 Lack of commercial and technological synergy and familiarity caused 
serious problems after Chem-Y had been taken over, but the same reasons 
had prevented the acquisition of Philips-Duphar and CCA several years 
earlier. Moreover, Nieuwbouw mismatched its own capabilities with the 
requirements of the Chem-Y expansion project. DSM found it difficult to 
adapt to the differences between bulk chemicals and specialties. In a lec-
ture from 1984, Bigot argued that DSM’s activities in fine chemicals could 
provide a bridge between bulk chemicals and specialties, but this turned 
out to be a rather optimistic view.71 
Fine Chemicals in the 1970s: Hobby or Pillar?
The fine chemicals field was en vogue in the 1970s, and many bulk chemi-
cals companies tried to improve their strained profitability by taking up 
activities in this sector of the chemical industry. The path DSM chose, 
however, is striking. In contrast to the dominant trend at DSM in the 
1970s, research played an important role in the company’s entry into fine 
chemicals. The Central Laboratory took the initiative to establish Special 
Products and provided the new group with several of its products. The 
establishment of the production of benzaldehyde and alpha-picoline, and 
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to a lesser extent also phenylglycine, was the result of in-house research 
work. The amount of research work done in the 1970s is also reflected in 
the number of patent applications in that period. (Graph 4.1.)
 Moreover, whereas other companies relied primarily on acquisitions 
to enter fine chemicals, DSM relied primarily on research. The company 
had options for acquisitions, but did not use them, with the exception 
of Chem-Y – in which case, as with many of the acquisitions of specialty 
companies by bulk-chemicals-oriented companies, difficulties were en-
countered in adapting the different businesses to each other.
 A striking feature of Special Products’ development was that it pro-
fited from the lysine project. Not only was some equipment of the plant 
reused, but the knowledge accumulated through lysine research also paid 
off through activities of Special Products. Pisano’s dual output model of 
R&D, where projects not only lead to immediate results but also to a 
build-up of knowledge and experience, is a fruitful way of looking at the 
lysine case. The research project failed, but contributed to the accumula-
tion of capabilities in a particular field. Research on the separation of D- 
and L-lysine was broadened to phenylglycine and led to the development 
of a versatile process for the manufacture of several amino acids. The lysine 
project also provided a stepping-stone to the development of a pyridine 
synthesis and subsequently for the alpha-picoline process. 
 The failure of lysine research from a project point of view had a strong 
effect on the research policies of the 1970s, but the secondary effects of 
this research played no role in the policy debate, and they are also under-
estimated in the historical literature on DSM. By focusing on the project 
and the plant, historians have neglected the contribution of lysine to the 
build-up of DSM’s capabilities in the fine chemicals sector.72
 One reason why the spin-offs from the lysine project have not been 
noticed, and why research could play an important role in fine chemicals 
development at DSM in contrast to its generally dependent role in the 
1970s, is that fine chemicals were of relatively minor importance for DSM 
as a whole. Special Products’ turnover amounted to 1 million guilders in 
1971 and rose to 91 million in 1981; in several products the group had large 
market shares. This growth was in itself spectacular, but in 1981, turnover 
in fine chemicals had grown to just 1% of DSM’s turnover in chemicals. 
Special Products occupied a niche.73
Environmental Concerns: Research into Waste Water Treatment in 
the 1970s
The example of DSM’s fine chemical sectors shows that research remained 
an important driver of the company’s development. In the 1970s, moreo-
ver, it became clear that research could also be important to adapt to the 
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changing circumstances DSM had to operate in. One of the best examples 
of this mechanism is environmental research. To some extent this type of 
research overlapped with the aims of process improvements, but an in-
creased consciousness of environmental problems, both inside DSM and 
in Dutch society, was driving environmental research in the 1970s. Envi-
ronmental research, moreover, overlapped with research in fine chemicals.
 DSM had already been active in the field of environmental research 
before 1970. In 1958, a researcher from the company’s safety department 
was assigned to research aimed at reducing air and water pollution caused 
by chemical plants. One of the activities was to follow water quality in 
the river Maas, one of the major rivers in the Netherlands and DSM’s 
outlet for waste water. At that time, the Central Experimental Station had 
a department for combating pollution from DSM’s mining operations. In 
1964, DSM also took a so-called Pasveersloot into operation for the treat-
ment of waste water from the company’s chemical plants. Developed by 
TNO’s engineer Aale Pasveer in the 1950s, these installations consisted of 
an oval-shaped ditch where bacteria broke down organic compounds. Ro-
tors kept the water moving and supplied the bacteria with the oxygen that 
they needed to decompose the pollutants in the waste water. DSM built a 
relatively large Pasveersloot.74
 In 1966, DSM’s environmental research was concentrated in a new de-
partment of the Central Laboratory. Here the study of water quality con-
tinued, but research also started into the processes which took place in the 
Pasveersloot. Such activities led to a gradual increase in capacity and to a 
new system to supply oxygen to the bacteria.75
 In the late 1960s, government regulations and interventions also be-
came an incentive to do environmental research, particularly in relation 
to waste water from DSM’s chemical plants. In 1968, Rijkswaterstaat, the 
government body responsible for roads and waterways, made it clear that 
the level of pollution in the river Maas was unacceptable. In the early 
1970s, this was translated into clear objectives. The Maas, and particularly 
pollution by nitrogen compounds, was targeted. DSM was responsible for 
25% of this pollution and was forced to reduce this level significantly.76
 The Central Laboratory’s research was an important stepping-stone 
in meeting the more stringent waste water pollution standards. In 1968 
a four-step waste water treatment system was worked out on laboratory 
scale. This system broke down not only organic compounds but also nitro-
gen compounds. Research into the water quality of the Maas had shown 
that nitrogen compounds were important pollutants, but that they were 
not removed from waste water through processing in the Pasveersloot. This 
research finding, coupled to the Dutch government’s actions in the early 
1970s, prompted DSM to build a new, large-scale waste water treatment 
installation. In the late 1960s, the process was developed to semi-techni-
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cal scale, an intermediary step between laboratory scale and the capacity 
of a dedicated pilot plant. During this phase of the research, it became 
clear that a three-step system might suffice. A dedicated pilot plant came 
on stream in September 1972. Several years of research followed, aimed at 
optimising the process design. In addition, tests were conducted with high 
levels of pollution, which might occur when there were major problems 
in one of the production plants. In October 1977 the first part of the new 
waste water treatment plant was put on stream. By July of the following 
year, the installation worked to full capacity and the Pasveersloot was taken 
out of service.77
 The research into waste water treatment and the construction of the 
new plant were only part of the work done in the 1970s to reduce pollution 
from chemical plants. The emissions of nitrogen oxides from the nitric 
acid plants and from the manufacture of ammonium nitrite for the syn-
thesis of caprolactam, which caused brown-coloured fumes from the stacks 
and was a very visible form of pollution, were reduced and other measures 
were also taken to reduce emissions from fertiliser production.78 Near the 
new cracker for the production of ethylene, installations were built to re-
move particular compounds from the plant’s effluent which caused a bad 
smell when the effluent was processed in the new waste water treatment 
plant.79
 The Central Laboratory’s environmental research was also linked with 
fine chemicals. In 1973, the environmental research group merged with 
the Biology department, where research on enzymes was done. DSM’s 
waste water process was essentially a biological process as bacteria decom-
posed the pollutants. The Biology group improved the understanding of 
the decomposition process, research that continued after the new waste 
water processing installation had started. Moreover, the merger of the two 
groups initiated research on using enzymes to decompose urea and mela-
mine in waste water. Processes were worked out but not commercialised. 
In the case of urea, the enzymatic method had advantages over chemical 
routes. In the case of melamine, research found an enzyme to decompose 
this compound, which was something new, but the enzyme proved dif-
ficult to manufacture.80
 The primary objectives of environmental research were complemented 
with subjects that were important for the long-term development of DSM 
through the merger of the Biology group and the environmental research 
unit. The research on waste water treatment touched upon the burgeoning 
field of biotechnology and research on the separation of D- and L-amino 
acids with an enzyme also related to this field. By the early 1980s, the use 
of enzymes as catalysts in chemical processes had emerged as a spearhead 
of biotechnology research.
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Urea: Beyond Major Process Improvements
Research efforts triggered by environmental concerns reflect the role of re-
search in responding to threats. But the Central Laboratory also continued 
to work on existing products and technologies to maintain and improve 
DSM’s position. By 1970 the urea stripping plant had been on stream for 
three years, but corrosion remained a problem and the stripper had to be 
replaced in 1973. The Central Laboratory mounted a major effort to com-
bat the problems and focused in particular on selecting the right materials 
for the construction of strippers.81
 The stripping plant had been built not only to increase production 
of fertiliser grade urea but also to feed DSM’s production of melamine. 
Research on the possible integration of urea and melamine production 
started in 1967, and integration proved to be a viable idea. In 1970, a com-
bined extension of melamine and urea production came on stream.82 
 Such integration was also tried between ammonia and urea. Engineer-
ing contractors such as the Italian company SNAM Progetti, which had 
circumvented DSM’s patents on the stripping process by using ammonia 
instead of carbon dioxide as a stripping agent, pushed the integration of 
ammonia and urea processes. They hoped for reductions in costs through 
increased energy efficiency. The Central Laboratory took up research in 
1967. Kaasenbrood thought that integrated production of ammonia and 
urea would become the next step in the reduction of production costs. 
The SBB, responsible for manufacturing urea, saw few advantages. They 
argued that the reduction in costs was too small and that far-reaching in-
tegration of ammonia and urea production reduced flexibility. Research 
was stopped in 1970 when Stamicarbon came to the conclusion that an 
integrated process would be hard to license to other companies.83 
 Research on urea mostly focused on issues related to operational prob-
lems in DSM’s stripping plants and in the plants licensed by Stamicarbon, 
and as such contrasted with the work of the previous decades. What re-
search saw as the next step in urea manufacturing, integrated production 
with ammonia, did not get off the ground as the manufacturing organisa-
tion and Stamicarbon were not interested.
 Two factors combined to cause this shift in urea research. The efficiency 
of the stripping process was already quite high, limiting the effectiveness of 
further improvements. Technological maturity in this sense played a role 
but other companies continued to improve their processes. The position 
of DSM’s fertiliser activities was also important. An overcapacity crisis in 
the late 1960s pushed DSM to rethink its fertiliser strategy. DSM expected 
the fertiliser industry to develop on a global scale as technology was freely 
available from many sources. New entrants in regions closer to the most 
important markets, and with access to cheaper feedstocks, would capture 
large parts of export markets. DSM focused on the European market, 
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where calcium ammonium nitrate was the main fertiliser rather than urea, 
as well as other outlets for urea, including melamine. VKF made a similar 
analysis of its position on export markets, and initiated the merger with 
DSM’s fertiliser activities that resulted in UKF. The new company indeed 
redirected its efforts to the European market, and consequently gave urea 
and urea research less emphasis. The problems continued for UKF in the 
1970s, however, with rising costs and eroding market positions.84
 In retrospect, the analysis made by DSM and VKF at the end of the 
1960s proved to be correct in outline. The oil shocks of the 1970s prompt-
ed countries in the Middle East to start petrochemical production. They 
produced fertilisers from cheap and abundant supplies of natural gas and, 
because they lacked a home market, exported most of their production. 
The Middle East’s share of world production remained modest in the 
1970s and beyond, but because of its export orientation this region posed 
an increased competitive threat to Western Europe, where the traditional 
export-oriented fertiliser companies were located. Moreover, India, and 
above all China, the two largest fertiliser export markets, embarked on a 
programme of plant construction. China remained a net importer of ferti-
lisers but the amounts declined significantly. For Western European com-
panies like DSM, fertiliser export markets became much more difficult 
and UKF responded by focusing on the European market. Having been 
the growth fertiliser of the 1950s, urea got into a position of stagnation by 
the early 1970s. Urea research reflected this development.85
The Development of the HPO Caprolactam Process
The problems on the fertiliser market also had their effect on the pro-
duction of caprolactam, in which substantial amounts of ammonium sul-
phate by-product were released. Like urea, ammonium sulphate had to 
be exported and this became increasingly difficult during the 1970s. Urea, 
moreover, competed with ammonium sulphate. Its nitrogen content was 
almost twice that of ammonium sulphate, which meant that transpor-
tation costs were significantly lower when calculated on the basis of the 
amount of nitrogen.86
 The Central Laboratory had long recognised the threat to caprolactam 
of ammonium sulphate by-product. The caprolactone process was free 
from by-product and by 1965 was the most important alternative route to 
caprolactam the Central Laboratory was working on. Researchers, howev-
er, considered that the caprolactone process would be difficult to develop 
and therefore would take time. As a second-best option, the Central Labor-
atory worked on a process that later became known as the HPO process 
and that reduced the amount of by-product ammonium sulphate rather 
than eliminating it. After the failure of the caprolactone project, HPO 
moved to centre stage.87
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Ammonium Sulphate and the Central Laboratory: Research on the HPO 
Process
In 1956, the Central Laboratory started working on what was later to be-
come the HPO process. Research basically focused on finding a new way to 
manufacture hydroxylamine. DSM’s caprolactam process was essentially a 
variant of IG Farben’s technology. Hydroxylamine sulphate was produced 
from ammonium nitrite and sulphur dioxide, reacted with cyclohexanone 
to cyclohexanone oxime, which in turn was rearranged to caprolactam 
with oleum (see figure 3.6). The preparation of cyclohexanone oxime and 
its rearrangement led to substantial amounts of ammonium sulphate (per 
ton of caprolactam, about 2.7 tons in the first step and approximately 1.8 
tons in the second).88
 In 1951, BASF started working on a catalytic route to hydroxylamine 
by reacting nitric oxide with hydrogen, the so-called nitric oxide reduction 
process, and in 1956 it was able to start up a plant. The American firm 
Spencer Chemical Company was working on a comparable process that 
catalytically reduced nitric acid with hydrogen to hydroxylamine nitrate. 
Both processes kept the rearrangement section of the conventional route 
DSM’s HPO plant for the manufacture of caprolactam in 1977. The HPO process was an 
important technological breakthrough that reduced the amount of by-product (ammo-
nium sulphate). It also was the first of DSM’s internally developed technologies that was 
not used in the company’s own plant first.
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to caprolactam intact, including the by-product stream from that section. 
BASF’s process substantially reduced the amount of by-product from hy-
droxylamine preparation, however. Spencer’s process led to ammonium 
nitrate as a by-product, used as a fertiliser in the United States and an in-
termediate for calcium ammonium nitrate. BASF’s chemistry was simpler 
but the company had fortified its process with many patents and followed 
a restrictive licensing policy.89 
 DSM and Spencer had been in contact with each other since 1954, and 
struck a deal for the exchange of know-how in 1957. DSM would supply 
Spencer with its caprolactam and nylon salt technologies, while Spencer 
would supply DSM with know-how related to the ICI polyethylene pro-
cess (see also chapter 3). Spencer’s hydroxylamine process remained outside 
this exchange. Nevertheless, the Central Laboratory started research on it 
in 1956. The Organic Products department established that the reduction 
of nitric acid opened the possibility to change the by-product from am-
monium sulphate to ammonium nitrate (see figure 4.4 for an outline of the 
process the Central Laboratory worked on). In this way, Spencer’s process 
opened up the possibility to switch from ammonium sulphate to calcium 
ammonium nitrate, the common nitrogen fertiliser in the Netherlands and 
in Europe. In other words, Spencer’s process opened up the possibility to 
switch to a more valuable by-product than ammonium sulphate. Although 
there were no immediate problems with the sale of ammonium sulphate at 
that time, researchers expected that this would change as caprolactam pro-
duction would increase, and considered the dependence on exports risky.90
 In 1957 the project switched to the Inorganic Products department, 
and a year later Herman de Rooij, who had just graduated from Delft 
Technical College (now Delft University of Technology), was put on the 
project. Research stopped in 1961 when an evaluation by production staff 
showed that the nitric acid reduction process was too expensive compared 
to the conventional route and that it produced large amounts of calcium 
ammonium nitrate: about 1.9 tons of calcium ammonium nitrate would 
be produced per ton of caprolactam alongside the 1.8 tons of ammonium 
Figure 4.4. Outline of the Spencer process as worked on by the Central Laboratory.
Hydrogen Cyclohexanone




and ammonium nitrate 
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Sources: Central Laboratory annual reports 1958, 1961.
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sulphate from the rearrangement section. Technological problems centred 
around the catalyst and around methods to integrate the reduction of ni-
tric acid in the conventional route to caprolactam.91 
 After the negative evaluation by caprolactam production staff, this staff, 
the Central Laboratory and Chemiebouw together reached the decision to 
stop research on the reduction of nitric acid. They also decided, however, 
to formally take a license on the Spencer patents as ‘an insurance’ to keep 
open the possibility of using this process. In 1961, Van Waes initiated li-
censing negotiations with Spencer Chemical, and a year later top manage-
ment eventually decided to formally take out a license.92
 Although research on the Spencer process had officially been cancelled, 
De Rooij continued to work on it because he believed that a solution to 
the problems could be found. He also realised that an explosion might be 
possible if the concentration of nitric acid became too high, so the process 
was unsafe. In the summer of 1963, De Rooij made a breakthrough. He 
proposed making hydroxylamine and cyclohexanone oxime in a buffered 
system that would prevent an explosion and opened a way to solving the 
technological problems (Figure 4.5). Because of the buffer system, neutral-
isation with ammonia as in the conventional caprolactam process was not 
necessary but the preparation of hydroxylamine and cyclohexanone oxime 
would have to be integrated. This led to two recycle streams: of the buffer 
system, and of cyclohexanone oxime and its solvent toluene. De Rooij 
transformed the once-through Spencer process with ammonium nitrate 
by-product in a two-recycle stream process with no by-product.93 
 The main advantage of the new process was that it cut the amount 
of by-product from caprolactam production. In the conventional pro- 
cess, the 2.7 tons of ammonium sulphate formed during the preparation 
of cyclohexanone oxime accounted for 60% of the total amount that was 
Figure 4.5. Simplified scheme of the HPO process of 1963.
Sources: J. Damme, J. T. van Goolen & A. H. de Rooij (1972). Cyclohexanone Oxime 
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produced. De Rooij’s process became known as the Hydroxylamine Phos-
phate Oxime (HPO) process and later as the Low Sulphate Process as 
well. The process also had an environmental advantage: since ammonium 
nitrite, one of the starting materials for the production of hydroxylamine 
in the conventional process, was no longer necessary, the air pollution re-
sulting from the nitric oxides released during the production of this com-
pound was eliminated.94 
 Semi-technical research started in 1964, very soon after De Rooij’s 
breakthrough. The Central Laboratory built a mini plant, a pilot plant at 
the smallest possible capacity to save costs. The recycle loops were omitted 
and only the preparation of hydroxylamine and cyclohexanone oxime were 
developed to semi-technical scale. The mini plant was operated until the 
end of 1969. A method had to be developed to remove the catalyst from 
the reaction product in which it was suspended. Activation of the catalyst 
also posed a problem, but this could be solved by adding germanium (a 
procedure later known as the ‘germanium shot’). The Central Laboratory’s 
Catalysis section played a crucial role here.95 
 The reduction reaction still gave a small amount of ammonium nitrate 
by-product which proved difficult to remove because of its high solubility. 
There were also problems with the necessary purity of the nitric acid. In 
1966, De Rooij came up with the idea of supplying nitrate to the process 
through a conventional combustion of ammonia, commonly used for the 
production of nitric acid, which destroyed the by-product at the same 
time. With this idea, the process had taken on its definitive shape (Figure 
4.6). 96
 The development of the HPO process illustrates the often far from 
straightforward routes research takes. Without De Rooij’s unofficial con-
tinuation of research, the process would not have been developed at all. 
Moreover, the HPO process was at first only a medium term, temporary 
solution as long as the caprolactone process remained under development. 
After the failure of the caprolactone project, however, HPO gained in im-
portance. Andries Sarlemijn and Marc de Vries have called this ‘the piece-
meal rationality of R&D’, arguing that the individual steps in a process 
that eventually leads to an innovation may be managed rationally, but the 
overall innovation process often cannot. From step to step, the circum-
stances change, as do the targets and the problems the innovation is sup-
posed to solve.97
Ammonium Sulphate and Stamicarbon: Selling the HPO Process
Around 1970, the fears that had prompted the Central Laboratory to start 
research on methods to reduce by-product ammonium sulphate formation 
became a reality. Periodically, large stocks of ammonium sulphate accumu-
lated because of marketing problems. In 1969, a committee representing 
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the SBB, Commercial Affairs, production staff and other departments, but 
not the Central Laboratory, started a study into the ammonium sulphate 
problem. The committee reported its conclusions in March 1970. DSM 
was already using ammonium sulphate in the production of nitro phos-
phates, but increasing production of mixed fertilisers was unattractive as 
DSM did not have a strong commercial position in this type of fertilisers.98 
Commercial Affairs argued that additional production would have to be 
exported, to the very markets where problems with ammonium sulphate 
were being encountered, and thereby would only shift the problem from 
one product to another. They also saw few opportunities to sell ammo-
nium sulphate to companies that would blend it into their own mixed fer-
tilisers. The committee started working when the market for ammonium 
sulphate was oversupplied, but they expected that this would change. They 
argued that if the production of ammonium sulphate had to be reduced, 
the HPO process would be attractive, but that the time for such a reduc-
tion had not yet come. The committee calculated the minimum earnings 
for ammonium sulphate below which prices had to fall before measures 
were needed to reduce production of this by-product: this minimum price 
was not yet in sight.99 
 The circumstances on the caprolactam market did not favour a rapid 
introduction of the HPO process either. Although production volume still 
grew after 1970, it grew slower than in the 1950s and 1960s (Graph 4.2). 
Moreover, regional shifts in production and competition between several 
types of fibres reshaped the industry after 1970 (Graphs 4.3 and 4.3). Price 
Figure 4.6. Simplified scheme of the HPO process of 1966.
Sources: J. Damme, J. T. van Goolen & A. H. de Rooij (1972). Cyclohexanone Oxime 
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cuts of cotton and other natural fibres stiffened the competition between 
natural and (semi-)synthetic materials. Polyester, moreover, grew fast and 
increasingly took market share, while nylon grew much more slowly. Car-
pets and other furnishings, as well as textiles, accounted for the major share 
of the market for nylons. The Western textile industry suffered from low-
cost competition from the developing regions of the world, and the same 
type of competition was also affecting fibre production. The traditional fi-
bre-producing countries and regions, the United States, Europe and Japan, 
were faced with declining market shares, while the rest of Asia increasingly 
established itself as the region of man-made fibre production (including 
cellulose-based fibres such as rayon). AKZO, still DSM’s major customer 
for caprolactam, and other European fibre producers suffered in particular 
from the changing structure of the fibre and fibre-consuming industries. 
Their plants operated below design capacity and profitability was poor.100
 DSM felt the changes in the fibre industry indirectly. Production man-
agement, and also DSM’s top management, concluded that introduc-
tion of the HPO process was not necessary. If markets were to grow, de- 
bottlenecking would provide the means to expand production.101 
 Stamicarbon, however, took a different position. In the late 1960s, the 
urea stripping process and other fertiliser technologies accounted for most 
of Stamicarbon’s business (see graph A3 in the appendix) but they were 
looking for other opportunities as well. Besides melamine, caprolactam 
seemed to offer such an opportunity, and Stamicarbon actively tried to 
market the conventional caprolactam process and the HPO process.102
 Stamicarbon came into contact with Montedison, the company that 
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had been formed as a result of the merger between Montecatini and Edi-
son in 1966, who were seriously interested in licensing the HPO process, 
and Stamicarbon also managed to interest the Japanese company Ube. 
DSM’s caprolactam joint ventures in the United Kingdom and the United 
States also showed an interest in the HPO process. These joint ventures 
had been set up in the late 1960s when DSM started to seek internation-
Graph 4.3. World synthetic fibre production per type of fibre.
Graph 4.4. World nylon production per region.
Source: B. von Schlotheim (1987). Märkte entwicklen sich auseinander. Chemische Industrie 
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alisation. In the United Kingdom, Nypro, a joint venture between DSM 
and the British company Fisons Fertilisers, put its first caprolactam plant 
on stream at Flixborough in 1967. In the United States, Pittsburgh Plate 
Glass and DSM had established the Colombia Nitrogen Corporation at 
Augusta (Georgia) in 1962 for the production of nitrogen fertilisers, but 
started manufacturing caprolactam in June 1966 in a joint venture called 
Nipro. In 1970 this company became fully owned by DSM.103
 After intensive contacts, Montedison decided not to buy the HPO 
process. The Italian company was working on its own technology as well 
and thought that this would be better than DSM’s process. In 1969, Nypro 
decided to build an HPO plant. Fisons had a share of 24% in Nypro and 
held responsibility for sales of by-product ammonium sulphate. In 1968, 
DSM decided that it wanted to expand caprolactam capacity as the British 
market was still growing. Fisons refused to guarantee sales of the addition-
al ammonium sulphate, however, making the introduction of the HPO 
process attractive. DSM also approached the National Coal Board (NCB), 
which had interests in fertiliser manufacture through its coke interests and 
could also provide an outlet for by-product ammonium sulphate from 
Nypro. The NCB also had a benzene plant and could supply feedstock for 
Nypro’s cyclohexane oxidation plant. The NCB became a partner in the 
joint venture in 1969.104
 Nypro’s decision to build an HPO plant helped Nipro in the United 
States and Ube to reach the same decision. Ube and Nipro also faced prob-
lems with the disposal of ammonium sulphate. At DSM’s production site 
in Limburg (the Netherlands), production staff decided in 1973 to intro-
duce the HPO process. Although caprolactam sales were still stagnating, 
production management and top management expected demand to in-
crease in the near future. The problems with selling ammonium sulphate 
had also worsened to the point that they could no longer be ignored. A 
plant would be built with a capacity of 70,000 tons of caprolactam per 
year, bringing total capacity to 190,000 tons. Of the capacity of the new 
installation, 40,000 tons represented an expansion and the other 30,000 
tons a rationalisation. The cyclohexane oxidation unit, where cyclohex-
anone was manufactured, was closed in 1975 and all caprolactam became 
phenol-based. In September of the following year, the new HPO plant 
went on stream. Existing facilities were used for rearrangement and purifi-
cation (see table 4.1. for an overview of the first HPO plants).105
 The Central Laboratory had initiated research on Spencer’s nitric acid 
reduction process without any commitment and participation from the 
production organisation. DSM had no integrated strategy in caprolactam: 
the Central Laboratory, Stamicarbon, production staff as well as Nypro 
and Nipro all developed their own views on the attractiveness of the 
HPO process. While research continued to push the development of new 
arjan van rooij  175
processes, Production saw itself confronted with stagnating market growth. 
Rationalisation and defending existing market positions gained priority 
over expansion and thereby reduced the chances for the introduction of 
a new process; in fact the HPO extension and rationalisation programme 
was the only major increase in capacity in Geleen in the 1970s. In the 1950s 
and 1960s, markets had grown so fast that major expansions of capacity 
were periodically needed, which provided a chance for new technology.
The First Plants
As Stamicarbon generated interest in the new process and as the mini 
plant stopped, research continued. The first HPO plants had capacities of 
50,000 tons a year, but in the research stage a smaller capacity had initially 
been foreseen. Building plants at smaller capacities was not viable, how-
ever, because the HPO process had to be integrated with existing facilities 
for rearrangement and purification. The new plants also had to compete 
with established large plants, making the prospect of a small HPO plant 
economically unattractive.106
 Moreover, the reactor where hydroxylamine was formed in the mini 
plant was equipped with a mechanical stirrer, but for technical and eco-
nomic reasons this was considered to be unattractive for the large scale 
of industrial plants. The Central Laboratory opted for a bubble column 
design, a type of reactor where the reactants are not mixed by mechanical 
means but by blowing bubbles in the column. Generic research was being 
conducted on this type of reactor at that time. Experiments were done on a 
model, but the scale-up factor was large. Research on an intermediary scale 
was too expensive, however, and confidence was high.107 
Table 4.1. The first HPO plants.
Sources: J.T.J. van Goolen, 18 January 2005. New Construction. Chemical & Engineering 
News (8 June 1970), 21. DSM’s caprolactamkennis vindt wereldwijd toepassing. DSM Ma-
gazine (9, September 1975), 9-10. HPO-fabriek van Groep Organische Producten in bedrijf 
genomen. DSM Limburg Nieuws 1976, 26(17), 1, 2. Stamicarbon Reference List 1 February 
1985, 12. H. Strijkers (1992). Veertig jaar caprolactam bij DSM. DSM. 11, 12, 14, 15, 16.
Company Decision On stream Capacity
(tons/ year)
Nypro (UK) 1969 1973 50,000
Ube Industries 1970 May 1972 50,000
Nipro (US) 1970 June 1972 50,000
DSM 1973 1976 70,000
Nipro (US), 2nd unit. 1974 1977 70,000
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 Similarly, the oximation section was changed. Initially it took place in 
a number of vessels in series but the Central Laboratory’s Technology de-
partment, part of the generic research effort where researchers worked on 
equipment, unit operations and other generic process technology related 
issues, designed a custom column (the so-called pulsed-packed column), 
which simplified oximation. Both the bubble column and the pulsed-
packed column show how generic research, a field in which the Central 
Laboratory invested heavily after the Second World War, played an impor-
tant role in a concrete project.108
 Finally, De Rooij had developed the idea of breaking down ammonia 
with nitric oxides in 1966, but the decision to use this idea in the plants 
was taken after the mini plant had been stopped. Although this change 
crucially affected the recycle streams in the process, it could not be studied 
on mini plant scale. Laboratory tests were done, however, as well as tests in 
an industrial nitric acid column at the SBB.109 
 Stamicarbon made the process design on the basis of mini plant work 
and additional research. Ube started the first HPO plant and soon ran 
into trouble. Contaminations accumulated and poisoned the catalyst. The 
extent and type of the contaminations had not been seen in the mini plant, 
The so-called Little Hyam, an installation built in 1970 for catalysis research in relation to 
the HPO process. An improved catalyst was developed here. 
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mainly due to the later change in the handling of by-product ammonia in 
the process. Frequent sampling in the mini plant had also prevented large 
accumulations of contaminations. The HPO process required excellent 
operators and operating procedures. Regular processing improved per-
formance, but Ube’s plant, followed by Nypro’s and Nipro’s plants, did not 
reach their design capacity. In 1970, the Central Laboratory had started a 
new, smaller, semi-technical installation to continue research on the HPO 
process. The Catalysis section had developed an improved catalyst to boost 
performance of the process. This improved catalyst was used to reach the 
designed capacity of the first HPO plants.110 
 In 1973, a year after initial start-up, Ube’s plant made the test run, a 
common contractual obligation meant to show that the plant lived up 
to the specifications detailed in the contract. The plant completed the 
test run successfully. This demonstrated the viability of the HPO process 
and showed that the problems with the plants of Nypro and Nipro could 
be solved in principle. The successful test run also boosted confidence of 
DSM’s divisional and top management and was the final push that made 
DSM decide to build an HPO plant in Geleen.111
 The final step of the HPO process to industrial scale plants did not go 
smoothly. The changed handling of the by-product after the mini plant 
had been stopped, which meant that this change could not be investigated 
as part of the recycle loops, and this later led to problems. Also, the size 
of the first plants was rather large. The plants could perhaps have been 
built smaller, but the HPO process had to be integrated with the other 
steps in caprolactam production and had to compete with products from 
conventional plants. The minimum economic size of plants had increased, 
and with it the costs of building a first plant and the risks involved in 
scale-up, even though researchers thought it could be done. Moreover, it 
was not possible to build a protected niche for a new technology, given the 
circumstances on the market. In the 1950s, DSM could enter markets with 
relatively small plants, learn and research, and expand production as mar-
kets grew. This was a far more favourable climate for process innovation. 
 In this way innovation became more complex in the 1970s than in the 
previous decades. Market growth and development could no longer be 
taken for granted, and this significantly narrowed the window of opportu-
nity for the introduction of new, or substantially improved, processes, and 
also called for a strong interface and interchange between research, mar-
keting and production. DSM lacked this interface in the early 1970s: the 
Central Laboratory, production staff and Stamicarbon all had their own 
considerations for supporting or not supporting the HPO process. Divi-
sional management, responsible for marketing and production, responded 
to the stagnation of caprolactam markets by pushing towards rationalisa-
tion and consequently towards the short term: in 1970 they considered 
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that no measures were needed to reduce the production of ammonium 
sulphate, and concluded that research on this subject was not necessary 
either. Only a few years later, while the market of caprolactam was still 
difficult, did the division decide to build an HPO plant in Geleen when 
the problems with marketing ammonium sulphate had worsened further. 
In the meantime, Stamicarbon and DSM’s Nypro and Nipro operations 
abroad had kept research going, while Ube’s plant had provided an oppor-
tunity to learn and had shown the viability of the process.
Troubleshooting and Finding Markets: Melamine and EPDM in the 
1970s
The Central Laboratory continued to do research not only on urea and 
caprolactam but also on melamine and EPDM synthetic rubbers. The 
problems in melamine and EPDM were similar: the first plants had initial 
problems that required research. In EPDM, moreover, new markets had 
to be found.
Melamine
The first melamine plant, which started in 1967, had several teething 
problems but in that same year top management decided to expand pro-
duction.112 After further market studies, the capacity of the expansion was 
set at 30,000 tons per year, three times as large as the first plant. Urea 
production had to be expanded as well to feed the new melamine plant. 
The Inorganic Chemistry department of the Central Laboratory had also 
worked on the integration of melamine and urea production since 1967. 
Instead of recycling a carbamate solution, the ammonia and carbon diox-
ide off-gases from melamine synthesis would now be fed directly into urea 
synthesis. The second melamine plant and the expansion of the urea plants 
went on stream in 1970 and had this tight integration.113
 An important argument for top management to triple melamine 
production was the technological lead DSM had. Urea-based melami- 
ne production was simply cheaper than calcium cyanamide-based produc-
tion. Top management expected DSM to be able to capture a large part 
of the melamine market from established producers. Speed was essential, 
because other companies, particularly Montecatini and BASF, were also 
working on urea-based melamine processes. Because DSM manufactured 
urea and ammonia, the key feedstock for melamine, on a large scale and 
at low costs, top management had confidence that melamine production 
would be profitable.114
 Demand for melamine proved to be strong in the first half of the 1970s, 
and financial results were satisfactory.115 Through information provided by 
Stamicarbon, however, the Central Laboratory established in 1969 that 
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competing urea-based melamine processes were cheaper than DSM’s. This 
prompted research to optimise the process. The second melamine plant, 
moreover, reached only a third of its design capacity due to problems with the 
reactor. The Central Laboratory helped to correct some of the problems, and 
by 1971 the plant reached regular production. On a yearly basis, 15 to 20% 
of production was still being lost due to reactor-related failures. Research to 
find a new design followed. In 1973, Industrial Chemicals and Stamicarbon 
agreed to finance the construction of a large, 5,000 tons per year, melamine 
test reactor tied in with the second melamine plant. In the same year, Indus-
trial Chemicals started planning for a third melamine plant.116
 In March 1974, maintenance crews discovered cracks in the melamine 
reactor of the second plant during a regular maintenance shutdown. The 
plant remained shut down for the remainder of the year. The problems 
were so severe that Industrial Chemicals raised the question of whether 
melamine production should continue at all. One of Stamicarbon’s licen-
sees took legal action and had to be paid a large sum in damages, com-
pounding the problems even further. 
 The Central Laboratory, however, had advanced with its research on a 
new reactor design to the point where it was able to convince Industrial 
Chemicals to push on. By 1976 the new design was ready. It not only 
combated the production problems, but could also achieve much larger 
capacities in a single stream, cutting costs substantially. Industrial Chemi-
cals scrapped the plans for a third plant and decided to equip the second 
plant with the new reactor. The second melamine plant restarted in 1978, 
debottlenecked to a capacity of 55,000 tons. The first and oldest plant was 
taken out of production in the same year. The new reactor design meant 
the final technological breakthrough of melamine at DSM.117 
 In summary, it took time before DSM learnt to operate its melamine 
plants. CRO played a supportive, but crucial, role in this process. A new 
reactor design eventually overcame the problems and put melamine pro-
duction on a firm footing.
EPDM
In the 1960s, EPDM was generally believed to be the next big synthetic 
rubber. Ethylene and propylene were cheap feedstocks and would lead to 
a cheap product. The product also seemed suited for car tyre manufacture, 
the biggest rubber market.118 
 In 1970, DSM had two EPDM plants in production. Operating these 
two plants proved more difficult than anticipated, however, mainly be-
cause of the thick and sticky product that had to be processed. All pro-
ducers had problems with their plants but it drove up prices. Moreover, it 
became clear that several disadvantages were hampering the application of 
EPDM in car tyres. Among other things, the tack, the adhesion of EPDM 
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to other rubbers and to materials, remained a problem. In addition, the 
elasticity of EPDM was too low, and tyres containing EPDM had a poor 
resistance to the heat that built up during driving.119
 The Central Laboratory continued application research and tried to 
open up other markets. Thanks to this research together with rubber pro-
cessors and manufacturers of home appliances, EPDM found its way into 
hoses and seals for washing machines, for instance, because it could with-
stand the impact of washing powders better than other materials. EPDM 
also found use in roofing materials that were more flexible than the com-
mon bitumen materials. EPDM roofing materials resisted the impact of 
ozone and aged slowly; in other words, they did not crack and remained 
black. The ozone resistance of EPDM also attracted the automobile indus-
try. Window seals and other rubber parts would remain black and without 
cracks if they were made from EPDM. The Swedish car manufacturer Saab 
developed a fender with EPDM that kept its shape after a low speed colli-
sion.120 
 The automotive market became one of the major outlets of EPDM, 
but it took time to develop applications. These markets were also smaller 
Manufacture of Erres washing machines containing EPDM parts, March 1970. DSM 
found a market for its EPDM rubber in washing machines by working closely together 
with manufacturers. Such cooperation was important for product development for other 
synthetic materials as well. 
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than the market for synthetic rubber used in car tyres. In the meantime, 
the Central Laboratory had already started attempts to improve the manu-
facturing process in 1969. From these efforts, combined with increasing 
manufacturing experience, it became clear that the EPDM plants could be 
debottlenecked. In 1974, DSM closed the oldest plant but conserved it. At 
the same time, the company renovated the second plant, which boosted 
its capacity to 40,000 tons per year, more than twice its design capacity. 
This improved the economics of EPDM manufacture. Moreover, the first 
oil shock pushed up rubber prices, helping DSM get through the difficult 
period of the early 1970s.121
 From 1979, DSM gradually restarted its oldest EPDM plant and built 
facilities to increase the number of EPDM types that could be manufac-
tured. In the early 1980s, the two plants worked to full capacity. CRO 
investigated new catalyst systems to increase product diversity, improve 
product quality and cut costs. Application research also continued. Close 
relations between CRO, rubber processors and users of end products re-
mained of vital importance.122
 As in the case of melamine, it took some time for DSM to learn how to 
produce EPDM. The Central Laboratory had not anticipated these prob-
lems but helped solve them in the 1970s. Application research and prod-
uct development were crucial for finding new markets. In the long run, 
EPDM developed into an important product for DSM. The company 
developed into one of the largest producers in the world.
Plastics in the 1970s 
Plastics was one of the most expansive fields at DSM in the 1970s. Follow-
ing the Large Leap Program, the Plastics division set out on an expansive 
course, which involved both boosting the capacities for existing products 
and taking up diversification. The expansion in scale was reflected in 
DSM’s cracking operations, for instance. The Plastics division built two 
large crackers in the 1970s, leading to a capacity of 800,000 tons of ethyl-
ene per year by 1979 (Table 3.3). These plants were built to reinforce the 
company’s position in bulk plastics like polyethylene. Large scale would 
bring down costs and enable the production of a wide range of plastics. 
Both top management and divisional management were of the opinion 
that DSM needed to increase the scale of its operations in plastics in order 
to survive the harsh economic climate and the fierce competition of the 
1970s.123
 In 1970, polyethylene was the only plastic manufactured by DSM, and 
EPDM the only synthetic rubber, but the company quickly diversified to 
broaden its markets (Table 4.2). By this time, processes from other compa-
nies had also become available. The Plastics division, in cooperation with 
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CRO, Commercial Affairs and other departments, developed a policy that 
favoured external technology. These processes were proven and promised 
excellent product quality. In 1970, CRO restarted research on polypro-
pylene for the third time, but the question of whether this process could 
manufacture what the market wanted remained open. This was decisive in 
favour of external processes. For similar reasons, DSM also bought tech-
nology for the establishment of PVC and ABS technology. Afterwards, 
CRO optimised production processes and built on its own application 
research to develop additional product types and improve product qual-
ity.124
 In 1972, DSM once again acquired technology for LDPE produc-
tion. The company manufactured this product in autoclaves but acquired 
know-how for the more modern tubular reactors from the Japanese com-
pany Sumitomo Chemical. With this equipment an additional range of 
product types came within reach. CRO, however, played an important 
role in scaling-up the tubular reactors. The first LDPE unit with tubular 
reactors started in 1975. The next unit was put on stream four years later 
and had almost twice the capacity of the first one.125
 CRO also continued to work on HDPE, for which it had developed its 
own technology in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1968, Cees van den Berg of the 
Central Laboratory’s Polymer Development department found a catalyst 
for the production of HDPE that was more active than the one in use. In 
conventional HDPE production, the catalyst had to be removed from the 
product. Because the new catalyst was more active, less was needed and it 
could remain in the product. An HDPE plant therefore no longer needed 
a catalyst removal section, which simplified the plant design and brought 
down costs. DSM named the new process ‘the Compact process’ because 
it was literally compact.126 
 As the Compact process shows, catalyst improvements typically pushed 
innovation in polyethylene and related products. Developing a substan-
Table 4.2. Plastics diversifications in the 1970s.
Sources: RAL, 17.26/46 inv. no. 60: letter from top management to supervisory board, 19 
August 1969. New construction. Chemical & Engineering News (12 January 1970), 27. Nieu-
we fabriek voor lagedichtheid polyetheen. DSM Nieuws 1972, 22(20), 1. DSM kan krakergas 
‘propeen’ volledig gaan benutten voor hoogwaardig eindproduct. DSM Nieuws 1973, 23(24), 
1, 2.
Product Start-up Technology from
PVC 1972 Sumitomo Chemical
ABS 1974 Japan Synthetic Resins
Polypropylene 1977 Mitsubishi Petrochemical
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tially more active catalyst simplified production processes and cut costs. In 
a comparable way, more selective catalysts reduced by-product formation, 
made it possible to omit the by-product removal step from production 
processes, simplified processes and cut costs. After 1970, cutting costs in-
creasingly became imperative for DSM to remain competitive.127 
 Early in 1969, top management decided to build a new HPDE plant 
using the Compact process. The plant came on stream three years later 
and doubled HDPE capacity. In 1970, Stamicarbon had licensed the Com-
pact process to Sinclair-Koppers (a company Sinclair Oil and Koppers had 
formed in 1965 for the production of plastics). Stamicarbon’s contacts 
showed demand for bigger capacities and for a process that could produce 
a wider range of HPDE types. Although the new catalyst was more active, 
it led to products that could not be processed into bottles and films, which 
were major markets. CRO attempted to expand the application area but 
the Plastics division stopped this research and focused the Compact pro-
cess on the product range that could be manufactured with it. Such limita-
tions were not unique. Polyethylene is a versatile product. Specific catalyst, 
process and product combinations existed alongside each other and have 
continued to do so until the present day.128
 Research’s role in plastics shifted after 1970. Following the Large Leap 
programme, the Plastics division expanded in scale and diversified, and 
to be able to do so it acquired technology. Consequently research’s role in 
establishing diversifications declined somewhat compared to the 1950s and 
1960s. Through scale-up and optimisation, however, CRO helped to cut 
production costs and to improve competitiveness. Such supportive work 
was crucial in the economic climate of the 1970s. 
 CRO’s support of the Plastics division’s market position included 
product development and application research. In 1970, DSM and AKZO 
closed down the VPV, their joint sales office for plastics. The Plastics di-
vision continued the technical service function, while CRO continued 
product development and improvement. This work broadened to include 
PVC, ABS and polypropylene, following the division’s expanded product 
line.129 
A Large Leap but in Which Direction? DSM and the Central Labor-
atory in the 1970s
In the 1970s, DSM made a large leap under difficult circumstances. The 
company shed its coal-related activities, expanded the capacities of existing 
products in big steps and took up the manufacture of several new products 
in a period when chemical-industry growth slowed down and competition 
intensified. Finally, the company replaced its functional organisation by a 
divisional structure. These changes occurred more or less in parallel and 
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over a short period of time. By 1975, the company had completely renewed 
itself.
 The Large Leap Forward had important consequences for the Central 
Laboratory. It realigned its organisation in response to the emerging di-
visional structure of the company. Directors of research provided a new 
bridge between research and the divisions, but the balance of power shifted 
towards divisional management, pushing research to the short term and 
initiating diversification outside the Central Laboratory. In the 1970s, re-
search played a dependent role, which was derived from DSM’s business 
strategy. Organisational change combined with a changed business climate 
and the failure of the lysine project to shift research polices in this direc-
tion.
 The contrast between research policy before and after 1970 is striking. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, research played, and was expected to play, a crucial 
role in the establishment of new businesses. The Central Laboratory initi-
ated diversification and self-confidence was high. Research, production, 
Stamicarbon, and later even the foreign subsidiaries to some extent, devel-
oped their own view of the company as a whole and the role of research 
and technology. The HPO process shows how independent the Central 
Laboratory was at that time: it was able to continue research on a subject 
it considered vital for the company without any clear commitment from 
Production or Stamicarbon. After 1970, DSM embarked on a journey to 
align these views and interests by giving primacy to the divisions. The 
slowdown of chemical-industry growth and the discussion as to how to 
give the divisions a say in the direction of centralised research pushed re-
search towards the short term and towards a dependent role.
 The example of the HPO process shows that Stamicarbon was impor-
tant for the Central Laboratory and for DSM as a whole. Stamicarbon was 
interested in the HPO process and enabled research to be commercialised 
when DSM’s production organisation at first did not seem interested. Sim-
ilarly, research on integrated ammonia and urea processes stopped when 
Stamicarbon passed a negative judgement (as the division had done ear-
lier). In the case of melamine, Stamicarbon and the Industrial Chemicals 
division co-financed a test reactor. Stamicarbon could provide the Central 
Laboratory with extra support and an extra outlet for its R&D. This outlet 
was highly profitable as Revallier showed in his comparison of research 
costs and licensing profits. DSM could learn from Stamicarbon projects, 
moreover, as the first HPO plants were built for other companies, for ex-
ample.
 An important exception to the short-term focus that dominated re-
search work in the 1970s was the field of fine chemicals. Although Special 
Products was a small group, research played an important role in the entry 
of fine chemicals. Bulk chemicals oriented companies like DSM often pre-
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ferred entry by acquisition. The failure of the lysine project had a negative 
impact on research policy in the 1970s, but the research done during this 
project led to an accumulation of knowledge and experience that proved 
important for other products and led to some important spin-offs. Fine 
chemicals, together with the work done on waste water treatment, also 
initiated a step into the field of biotechnology.
 DSM’s activities in fine chemicals built not only on knowledge accu-
mulated during lysine research, but also on generic capabilities in process 
research and catalysis. These capabilities were also vital for the develop-
ment of the HPO process. The scale-up of this process was no easy task 
but proved to be a success, while catalysis research provided the means to 
reach design capacity with the first plants. Application research on poly-
ethylene and caprolactam in the 1950s and 1960s similarly built a base 
that enabled the Central Laboratory to guide the introduction of ABS and 
other plastics, as well as acrylonitrile. In this way, DSM could profit from 
the expansion of the Central Laboratory that had started after the Second 
World War.
 The case of fine chemicals also shows that DSM had learnt a lesson 
from the lysine failure. Although research remained technology push, the 
crucial difference was that in the 1970s market development kept up with 
research and was taken into account before a decision to build a plant was 
taken. In the case of alpha-picoline, the creativity of the Central Labora-
tory caused some unexpected turns in research – research switched from 
lysine to pyridine and then to alpha-picoline – but an outlet for alpha- 
picoline had to be found before top management would approve the con-
struction of a plant. In contrast, the lysine plant had been built before 
market development work had led to clear results.
 In summary, DSM made a Large Leap in the 1970s, but had to re-
align research and the divisions in a changed business climate. R&D’s role 
was redefined and moved away from the strong, independent role it had 
played in the 1950s and 1960s. The consequences of this redefinition and 
the Large Leap were to make themselves felt towards the end of the 1970s 
and in the following decade. This will be the subject of the next chapter.
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The 1980s: Moving Away from Cyclicality and 
into High Value-Added Products
The second oil crisis of 1979, and the economic downturn that followed it, 
deeply affected the chemical industry and marked the end of DSM’s Large 
Leap Forward. DSM’s turnover grew, but profitability declined and the 
strategy of expansion had to be adjusted. The company consolidated its 
activities in bulk chemicals and sought expansion in knowledge-intensive 
products with high value-added. 
 The new twofold strategy implied an innovation drive, but its imple-
mentation was initially hampered by the company’s weak results of the ear-
ly 1980s. Nevertheless, DSM’s strategic shift enlarged the playing field for 
research, as knowledge-intensive products mainly meant research-inten-
sive products. CRO had played a smaller role in diversification in the 1970s 
than in previous periods but in the 1980s the number of research-based 
diversifications increased again (see table 5.1). CRO translated DSM’s busi-
ness strategy into a set of so-called corporate development programmes 
that aimed to help the company reach its goal of finding products with 
higher value-added and improving its results.
 Under a new strategy, and helped by improving results, DSM found 
a new balance between research and business interests around 1985. After 
the Second World War, the tremendous growth of the chemical indus-
try and the strong faith in research had enabled research to play a key 
role in DSM’s expansion and diversification in the chemical industry but 
research, marketing, production and other functions had been independ-
ent of each other. After 1970, due to internal and external changes, busi-
ness and research had to be realigned but DSM’s solution pushed research 
towards short-term work. After 1980, research gradually got more room 
again. A strategic shift added emphasis to research and improving business 
results made a more generous research budget possible. The corporate de-
velopment programmes, moreover, provided the means to coordinate the 
needs of medium-term to long-term oriented research with the needs of 
business.
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Product Start of Production Area of application









Phenylglycine Early 1970s Fine chemicals (pharma)
Surfactants 1977 Specialties
Alpha-picoline 1977 Fine chemicals (agro, pharma, 
other)
MTBE 1981 Petrol improvement
RIM Nylon 1986










UHMW-PE 1990 Engineering plastics
Stanyl 1990 Fibres/engineering plastics
Sources: see text, and P. Tans (1977). Van Staatsmijnen tot DSM: Hoofdlijnen van de ont-
wikkeling. Land van Herle 27(3), 87-103, in particular 99. Schone fabriek gaat milieuvrien-
delijk product maken: Contract voor MTBE-installatie getekend. DSM Limburg Nieuws 
1979, 29(12), 1. Florerende tak van DSM Agro: DSM Agro Specialties. DSM Magazine 1990 
(98), 12-14, in particular 12. F. J. G. Kwanten (1993). Onderzoek bij Staatsmijnen in Limburg/
DSM Centraal Laboratorium/ DSM Research 1940-1990. DSM Research report R 89 8061. (1 
September 1993). 25. H. Strijkers (2002). DSM, een koninklijke eeuwling: kroniek van de 
laatste 25 jaar. Het Land van Herle 52(3). 23, 52, 54.
Note: end of production is included when it falls in the period until 1990.
Table 5.1. The role of research in DSM’s major diversifications, 1970-1990.
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Organic chemistry: enzymes - ++ +
Fertilisers research  
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External technology Importance of research Initiated by research
- No important role for 
external technology.
No role for research work. No or small role 
for research.
+ Technology acquired in 
the form of a process or re-
search work starting from 
process of competitor.
Small-scale research proj-




++ Plant acquired. Research work crucial for 
establishment of production.
Crucial role for 
research.
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Shifting Strategies and Research Policies in the 1980s 
Towards a New Business Strategy
In the economic downturn after the second oil shock of 1979, many firms 
found that their diversification strategy had not made them less sensitive 
to cyclical fluctuations. They responded by directing their attention to 
what they thought were their core activities. In the chemical industry, 
many companies had expanded their plants after 1974 and 1979, some-
times with good results in the short term, but problems became apparent 
in the early 1980s when slow demand brought overcapacity (particularly 
in bulk chemicals) accompanied by low prices and intense competition. 
The recession of the early 1980s cut deep into the flesh of the industry. The 
response was twofold. On the one hand, chemical companies concentrated 
on core activities and tried to rationalise their hard-hit bulk chemicals 
businesses through cost-cutting programmes, portfolio swaps and capacity 
reductions. On the other hand, companies continued to seek expansion, 
but this time in areas offering higher margins than bulk chemicals. Fine 
chemicals and specialities ranked first on the priority list of many compa-
nies. High performance polymers, ceramics and composites attracted a lot 
of attention as well.1
 The expansion response was more innovation-driven and research-
driven than the rationalisation response. Companies with major research 
departments typically chose this route. For instance, Monsanto, an Ameri-
can chemical company with extensive interests in bulk chemicals, targeted 
food, agriculture and healthcare as fields to grow in. The French chemical 
conglomerate Rhône-Poulenc followed a similar course and focused its ex-
pansion efforts on healthcare and agriculture, like Monsanto, but also on 
fine chemicals. Rhône-Poulenc belonged to the category of chemical com-
panies that tried to diversify even more radically by taking up fields such 
as electronics. The American chemical company Hercules tried aerospace 
components, for instance. Companies chose all these fields to balance their 
bulk chemicals oriented portfolios and improve profitability.2
 At DSM in the 1970s, Leen Revallier had tried to keep diversification-
oriented research going within the framework of the Large Leap Forward 
plan but had met with only a lukewarm response from divisional and top 
management. In a report on research policy to DSM’s supervisory board of 
November 1975, however, top management made a carefully-worded state-
ment on the possibility that, in the long term, the growth of bulk chemi-
cals could be limited by developments in the markets for these products 
and increasingly stringent environmental regulations. Top management 
suggested that DSM should perhaps change its course and initiate more 
research on products, instead of improvements of existing processes, and 
specifically products with high value-added as opposed to low-margin bulk 
chemicals.3
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 In the supervisory board, Evert Verwey, who had been research director 
at Philips from 1946 until his retirement in 1966 and who was active in 
science and technology policy-making in the Netherlands, took up these 
ideas and emphasised that DSM should break with its course of the past 
and start searching for high value-added products. Verwey also argued that 
DSM should start spending more on research. He visited DSM in August 
1976 to talk to Leo Kretzers, Revallier, the head of CRO’s Products and 
Processes department and the head of DSM’s corporate planning depart-
ment and again underlined his ideas. It took a further three years, how-
ever, before the search for high value-added products formally became part 
of CRO’s long-range plan. The company’s weak results caused the delay; 
DSM simply did not have a lot of money available to spend on research.4
 DSM’s weak results also eventually prompted top management to 
change course. Towards the end of the 1970s, it had become clear that 
expansion alone did not bring the expected improvement in results. Top 
management chose the twofold strategy common in the chemical industry 
at that time. Consolidation and rationalisation became the key objectives 
in bulk chemicals, while growth would have to come from new knowledge-
intensive products with a high potential profitability. Ruud Selman, who, 
having been appointed to top management in 1979, took over responsibil-
ity for research from Kretzers and also involved himself with the Chemical 
Products division, emphasised that research should play an important role 
in the shift DSM was to make.5
 In 1982, however, DSM made a substantial loss for the first time in 
its history. The loss had a tremendous impact and started another round 
of economising. DSM decided to retreat from the construction industry 
in 1983 and sold the interests it had in construction firms. The research 
budget was also cut and the number of researchers declined. The innova-
tion-driven search for new businesses did not get off the ground, but in 
1983, and once again in 1984 for the supervisory board, top management 
reaffirmed the strategic shift. Bulk chemicals would remain the core of the 
company, but DSM would have to push rationalisation vigorously to excel 
as this was the only way to maintain its position. The ceiling of growth in 
bulk chemicals was in sight and made it necessary to search for new busi-
nesses. When DSM recovered from the low point of 1982, this innovation-
driven search could get off the ground.6 
 It took time to adjust the expansion and diversification policies of the 
Large Leap programmes but DSM’s strategic reorientation of the first half 
of the 1980s was a major one. The company refocused and no longer aimed 
at vigorous expansion of its bulk chemicals, traditionally the core of the 
company. Instead, DSM tried to ‘reach out’ to new business activities from 
its base in bulk chemicals.7
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The Corporate Development Programmes
After the course top management wanted to steer had become clear and 
economic circumstances had improved, CRO started to think about the 
implications of DSM’s business strategy for itself. In the eyes of CRO, it 
was clear that DSM should spend more on research. The company had 
fallen behind its competitors and the existing work aimed at diversification 
would not be enough to develop knowledge-intensive products with high 
value-added. A first compilation of ideas within CRO resulted in a long 
list of possible projects. Together with DSM’s corporate planning depart-
ment, CRO selected the most promising ideas and classified them into two 
types of projects: projects that would have to be fit for commercialisation 
within a period of five years and projects that would have to lead to results 
in ten years’ time (see table 5.2). The selected projects were called cor-
porate development programmes. A committee comprising people from 
research, DSM’s corporate planning department, and the divisions (as well 
as Selman) was set up to direct these programmes. This committee be-
came an important platform for directing research and diversification. In 
December 1984, top management officially decided to start the corporate 
development programmes.8 
 Following the decision to start the programmes, DSM’s research ex-
penditure sharply increased from 1.6% of chemical turnover in 1985 to 
4.2% five years later (see graph A2 in the appendix). The corporate devel-
opment programmes would initially be funded at corporate level; when a 
project was clearly formulated and ready for commercialisation it would be 
transferred to the divisions. An essential element in the decision-making 
process was that the Ministry of Economic Affairs granted DSM a subsidy. 
In the 1980s, the Dutch government developed a series of measures to 
stimulate Dutch industry, in a response to the economic crisis and several 
reports by advisory committees. In this case, following the broad incentive 
to stimulate research in Dutch industry, the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
granted DSM bilateral subsidies. The total amount was quite large com-
pared to the budget of the corporate development programmes.9 
 DSM targeted fine chemicals, with the underlying field of biotech-
nology, and materials as the two main growth areas (see table 5.2. items 
a1-3 and b1-2 for materials and a4-5 and b3 for biotechnology). The list 
of corporate development programmes later expanded, but the focus on 
materials and biotechnology remained.10 Biotechnology and materials re-
search generated a lot of interest in the chemical industry. Monsanto, for 
instance, selected food, agriculture and healthcare as businesses to grow in 
because biotechnology underlay all of them.11 DSM followed the trend, 
but its choice also matched the profile of its technological capabilities. 
Through the company’s business activities and research on products such 
as polyethylene and other plastics, capabilities had been built in the field of 
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materials research. Through the work on phenylglycine, amino acids and 
waste water treatment, DSM had gained a foothold in the field of biotech-
nology. Both in biotechnology and in materials, research work of the 1970s 
had contributed to the corporate development programmes. 
 CRO translated DSM’s strategic reorientation of the first half of the 
1980s into corporate development programmes. In the 1970s, DSM had 
had difficulty in aligning research plans and business strategy but the cor-
porate development programmes ensured a tight fit between R&D plans 
and strategy and ensured mutual commitment between the research organ-
isation and the divisions. Research was again linked with diversification; 
innovation was an important part of DSM’s readjusted business strategy. 
This, combined with improved profitability, resulted in more room for 
research in the 1980s. Towards 1990 this was to pay off in a number of re-
search-based diversifications (see table 5.1). DSM’s strategy to combat the 
problems in the chemical industry was not unique, nor was its emphasis 
on research. DSM belonged to those chemical companies that had a major 
research department and that deployed this department to diversify and 
balance their bulk chemicals oriented portfolio.
Organising Research in the 1980s
The strategic shift and the corporate development programmes also had 
consequences for the organisation of research. New laboratories were built 
and existing ones renovated. In 1985, a new name was also chosen for CRO: 
DSM Research. The matrix remained in place as both the divisions and re-
Table 5.2. Corporate development programmes.
Based on: H. Lintsen & F. Veraart (2000). De nieuwe bloei van research, 1985-1990. H. 
Lintsen, Ed. Research tussen vetkool en zoetstof: zestig jaar DSM Research 1940-2000. Eindho-
ven/Zutphen: Stichting Historie der Techniek/Walburg Pers, 104-115, in particular 109-110.
a. Short-term programmes: commercialisation in five years
1. Strong polyethylene fibres
2. Special composites and resins using strong polyethylene fibres
3. High-performance plastics
4. Amino acids
5. Biological nitrogen fixation
b. Long-term programmes: commercialisation in ten years
1. Conductive polymers
2. Silica and ceramic materials for use at high temperatures
3. New high pressure, electrochemical and bio-catalytic synthesis methods for 
chemical intermediates
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search were of the opinion that this organisation worked, but the divisions 
wanted to reinforce their control of research further. Top management 
responded by suggesting that the directors of research be placed under the 
responsibility of the divisions. DSM Research implemented this change 
in 1985. In the same year it changed its departmental structure to create 
smaller departments and more effective communication within them.12
 Although the divisions again considered decentralisation of research unat-
tractive, some R&D started to be done under their responsibility in the 1980s. 
Chem-Y’s laboratory had not been integrated into CRO because of a lack of 
synergy, and in thermoset resins Synres operated an independent research 
laboratory. In 1982, DSM bought Urachem, the resins activities of Unilever. 
This included a research laboratory in Zwolle (the Netherlands), which re-
mained intact. When DSM established a Resins division in 1983, this division 
also became responsible for its two research laboratories. The Resins division 
used DSM Research’s central facilities in Geleen (Netherlands) alongside its 
own laboratories, however. The Plastics division similarly developed a pattern 
of both central and decentralised research. In 1986, the Applied Research and 
Technical Service (ARTS) laboratories were split off from DSM Research 
and placed under the responsibility of the Plastics division. To create close 
contacts with customers, the ARTS laboratories organised service research for 
marketing in several units centred around one product.13 
 The trend towards decentralisation of research through expansion of 
laboratories in divisions and business units was less pronounced at DSM 
than at other companies. Some divisions set up limited research laborato-
ries but the main effort was still concentrated in DSM’s centralised, corpo-
rate research laboratory. The divisions and the research department were 
not so large that centralised research became unmanageable.14 
Dyneema: The Development of Strong Polyethylene Fibres 
Around 1963, Albert Pennings and Ron Koningsveld of the fundamental 
polymer research unit needed a polyethylene solution of uniform tempera-
ture; they decided to stir the solution mechanically. It led to a surprising 
discovery: polyethylene crystals formed on the stirring rods. Crystallisa-
tion of polyethylene had been observed before, but only through cooling. 
This chance discovery triggered further research, which in turn was ulti-
mately to lead to Dyneema, a strong and stiff fibre (a high strength-high 
modulus fibre).15
Beyond a Discovery
In 1956, the Central Laboratory had started fundamental polymer research, 
as had many other companies around that time. Companies primarily en-
gaged in polymer research and universities only followed later.16 
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 The Central Laboratory’s new research unit at first focused on poly- 
ethylene, the polymer for which DSM was building a plant at that time. 
One of the subjects was fractionation: methods to make polyethylene with 
uniform and sharply-defined molecular weight and distribution. Commer-
cial polyethylene was not homogeneous in this respect. Molecular weight 
and distribution were key parameters that influenced the characteristics 
of the product, and uniform polyethylene was therefore important for re-
search aiming to understand this relationship. In the long run, it promised 
an improvement in product quality. In 1959, research had advanced to the 
stage that substantial amounts of polyethylene could be fractionated on 
semi-technical scale.17 
 In 1963, Pennings and Koningsveld converted their crystallisation dis-
covery into a method to fractionate polyethylene, resulting in very homo-
geneous substances. Pennings and Koningsveld published their discovery 
and the results of their research in 1964. With a colleague, they discovered 
in the same year that polyethylene crystallised into a fibrous form. Further 
research showed a branched, so-called ‘shish kebab’, molecular structure. 
The fibres were very strong and stiff, and their appearance could vary from 
Production of Dyneema strong polyethylene fibres. The idea for this product originated in 
fundamental polymer research but it took a long time before a market and a production 
process could be developed.
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paper-like to down-like. In 1966, Pennings developed a method to crystal-
lise polyethylene into a sheet which could be written upon and a patent 
was applied for. Revallier came up with the idea of using the new material 
to reinforce other plastics. The Central Laboratory’s application research 
group investigated this idea but came to the conclusion that new equip-
ment would have to be developed. Plastics processing companies would 
have to invest in this new equipment, which made introduction of the 
fibre to reinforce plastics unattractive.18
 Around the middle of the 1960s, the Central Laboratory’s work on pol-
yethylene fibres still had not identified any field of application and there 
was no process with which polyethylene fibres could possibly be manufac-
tured on an industrial scale.19 Research was fundamentally oriented and 
was aimed at understanding the structure and properties of the crystals 
and how they formed. It generated little interest in DSM’s manufacturing 
organisation.
 The work of the fundamental polymer research unit on polyethylene fi-
bres reflects the importance attached to fundamental research and research 
work in general in the 1950s and 1960s. There was much room to explore 
subjects without concern for immediate applications and research work 
could continue even when there was no clear interest from manufacturing. 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, this changed in the 1970s. The 
Central Laboratory’s budget was cut and the divisions funded research for 
a large part. In particular, less importance was attached to fundamental 
research, and the fundamental polymer research section was consequently 
reduced from twenty-five to fifteen people during an economising pro-
gramme in 1970. Pennings left for Groningen University (Netherlands). 
By contract, DSM partly funded his research.
Developing a Process
Although fewer people worked on fundamental polymer research after 
1970, work on polyethylene fibres continued but on a small scale. Pen-
nings also continued research on the subject in Groningen. In 1969, be-
fore Pennings left for Groningen, he had started research on continuous 
processes for the manufacture of polyethylene fibres. He had made little 
progress that year but in Groningen Pennings and his group developed the 
so-called surface growth method. Ultra high molecular weight polyethy-
lene (UHMW-PE) was used here. A seed fibre was immersed in a vessel 
containing UHMW-PE, and from a rotating inner cylinder a tape-like 
fibre could be drawn (Figure 5.1). This fibre had the shish kebab molecular 
structure. The surface growth method demonstrated for the first time that 
high-strength, high-modulus polyethylene fibres could be made. DSM 
patented the process because of the funding contract.20
 Although Pennings had shown that a fibre could be made, CRO was 
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sceptical about the surface growth method. It was a very slow way of mak-
ing a fibre, and this fibre did not have a homogeneous thickness. The pro- 
cess was also difficult to scale up.21 On the other hand, other companies 
were investigating high-strength, high-modulus fibres as well. ICI showed 
an interest in the surface growth method, but nothing came of this as the 
company’s fibre activities were in stormy weather. DSM approached AKZO, 
but they were not interested because they were aiming at other fibres and 
considered themselves specialists in the field. Although the contacts of 
CRO with other companies did not result in concrete partnerships, these 
contacts, and the activities of other companies in the field, did encourage 
research to continue. Revallier in particular stimulated the project: the fibre 
seemed unique, had been patented by DSM and was based on polyethy-
lene, in which the company had accumulated much experience. 
 At the end of 1978, CRO hired Paul Smith, one of Pennings’ PhD 
students, to work on the development of a process to make polyethylene 
fibres amongst other items. Together with Piet Lemstra, he came up with 
the idea of gel spinning, a process that dissolved polyethylene, pushed the 
solution through a spinneret, quenched the fibres and drew them to ob-
tain the desired strength. (Figure 5.2).22 All polyethylene molecules were 
aligned when this method was used, leading to the best possible strength 
and stiffness. In 1979, DSM applied for a patent on the gel spinning pro-
cess. A conflict arose with Pennings as to who should get the scientific 
credits because Pennings argued that the gel spinning process built on his 
own work in crucial ways. The conflict ended the cooperation between 
DSM and Pennings.
Funding Research
With the gel spinning process, research took a crucial step forward: now 
a fibre could be manufactured in principle. Additional research needed 
to be funded, however, to develop the process further and commercialise 
products. The Plastics division, which was linked to the project through 
polyethylene, showed no interest. The Chemical Products division manu-
factured intermediates for synthetic fibres, caprolactam and acrylonitrile, 
but no fibres. Although CRO had know-how in the field of fibres through 
its Fibre Technology department (formerly Fibre Intermediates), this mar-
ket remained uncharted territory for DSM. Chemical Products and Plas-
tics did not plan to start manufacturing fibres nor did they change course 
because of the development of the gel spinning process.
 If the polyethylene fibres project was to continue, corporate funds 
would have to be made available. At that time, in the early 1980s, top 
management was reorienting DSM’s strategy towards knowledge-inten-
sive products and from this perspective polyethylene fibres were interesting 
products. CRO used the possible applications of strong polyethylene fibres 
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to convince Selman and top management, but economic circumstances 
made it difficult to fund a major research programme. Top management 
left the question as to whether DSM would eventually manufacture poly-
ethylene fibres unanswered until the company’s patent position was clear. 
In 1981, top management agreed to fund further research, in a plan to 
do part of the scale-up work to decide whether DSM should start fibre 
manufacture or should license out the technology. Because of the lim-
ited resources, CRO conducted some experiments in cooperation with the 
Figure 5.2. The gel spinning process.
Source: M. J. N. Jacobs (1999). Creep of Gel-Spun Polyethylene Fibres: Improvements by Im-
pregnation and Crosslinking. Eindhoven: Dissertation Eindhoven University of Technology. 
Figure 1.2, 6.
Figure 5.1. Surface growth method.
Source: M. J. N. Jacobs (1999). Creep of Gel-Spun Polyethylene Fibres: Improvements by Im-
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Eindhoven University of Technology (Netherlands) and Aachen Polytech-
nic (Germany). CRO also built a small installation at Fibre Technology to 
research the gel spinning process for polyethylene fibres and to investigate 
whether the process could be applied to other fibres, for instance nylon. 
The Chemical Products division therefore partly paid for the installation. 
Fibre Technology created a post for development of the gel spinning pro-
cess, but combined this research with technical service work. Only through 
this combination could enough funding be secured.23
 In 1982, another general round of cost cutting started because DSM 
had made a loss that year but the polyethylene fibre project survived, par-
ticularly because the spinning installation had just been started. Although 
Lemstra and Smith’s gel spinning process overcame the slow production 
speed of the surface growth method, it proved difficult to make a ho-
mogeneous and viscous polyethylene solution. To tackle this problem, re-
searchers developed a special twin-screw extruder.24 Gel spinning proved 
to work only for polyethylene and it also became clear that the quality 
of the raw materials needed to make polyethylene fibres was crucial. The 
small spinning unit made fibres that were not as strong as expected because 
UHMW-PE, the raw material, was impure. The supplier could not solve 
the problems and CRO proposed developing a process for making the ne-
cessary UHMW-PE and securing supply of the raw material for Dyneema, 
as the product was now called. In doing so CRO built on its knowledge 
of polyethylene catalysts. UHMW-PE could also be sold as an engineering 
plastic.
 In September 1983, after DSM had been granted a crucial patent, top 
management decided that licensing out the accumulated know-how con-
cerning strong polyethylene fibres was less attractive than in-house pro-
duction. On the other hand, both top management and CRO agreed that 
DSM lacked a lot of know-how of spinning, application development and 
marketing in the field of synthetic fibres, and lacked the time to develop 
such know-how in-house. Finding a partner became crucial. AKZO once 
again came into view, but once again refused. Polyethylene fibres were 
of interest to Allied Signal Inc. from the United States, however, and the 
company had been working on a gel spinning process itself. Allied tried to 
challenge the validity of DSM’s patents, but failed, and then had to negoti-
ate a license. Allied accepted a very high licensing fee and this convinced 
many people at the top of DSM that the company was onto something 
valuable.25
 At the end of 1984, CRO included the strong polyethylene fibre project 
in the list of proposed corporate development programmes. Its acceptance 
by top management meant that more corporate funds became available 
for the project. In the same year DSM selected the Japanese company 
Toyobo as its partner. In 1986, the two companies established a joint ven-
208 the company that changed itself
ture to develop the polyethylene fibre further. DSM owned 51% of the 
shares. Toyobo was an attractive partner because it had extensive know-
how of spinning synthetic fibres while its marketing knowledge and tech-
niques were also valuable for DSM. Moreover, the market could be easily 
divided. Toyobo became responsible for the Far East, New Zealand and 
Australia, Allied owned the exclusive rights for the United States, and 
DSM could operate in the rest of the world’s markets. Toyobo and DSM 
used Dyneema as a trade name while Allied marketed its polyethylene 
fibres as Spectra.26
 Allied worked fast to introduce its new fibre on the market and tried to 
patent certain applications while other companies were developing com-
parable products as well. At the end of 1986, DSM and Toyobo agreed on 
a ‘Hurry-Up Programme’ that aimed to build pilot plants for UHMW-PE 
and Dyneema. In 1987 these plants came on stream. The Dyneema pilot 
plant was built in Japan. 
 In 1988, just a year after the pilot plants had been started, the decision 
to build industrial scale installations came into sight but Toyobo hesitated 
and did not want to take the risk involved. They raised doubts about the 
success of Dyneema in Europe and suspected that DSM could profit far 
more from the joint venture because it provided an entry into the Japa-
nese market. DSM tried to solve the problems by involving the Japanese 
more in the engineering and construction of its Dyneema plant, but the 
joint venture had to be restructured. The pilot plant in Japan would be 
expanded under the joint venture, but the plant in the Netherlands would 
become the sole responsibility and property of DSM. Toyobo provided full 
technical assistance, however. In 1990, industrial production of Dyneema 
started at an industrial area in Heerlen (Netherlands) while production of 
UHMW-PE started in the same year.27
Finding a Market
In the early 1980s, it gradually became clear that a process for a polyethy-
lene fibre could be developed. Although it was by that time clear that fibres 
would also be the area of application, much work needed to be done to 
determine which applications would be promising for the new material. 
Dyneema is a strong, stiff, lightweight fibre, resistant to UV radiation and 
many chemicals, but it has a relatively low melting point compared with 
aramid high-strength, high-modulus fibres like Du Pont’s Kevlar. DSM 
aimed not so much at finding new applications for its fibre but at substi-
tuting other materials in existing applications. Dyneema competed not 
only with aramid fibres but also with other types of fibres and materials.28 
Du Pont tried to market Kevlar as a tyre cord but with limited success. It 
also developed other applications, however, such as bullet-proof vests and 
other protective clothing, cables and composites. In the last category of 
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applications, carbon fibres also competed. Strong but lightweight, carbon-
fibre-based composite materials were well-suited for use in the aerospace 
industry and in sports equipment. Several companies were manufacturing 
these fibres by the early 1980s.29
 At DSM, application research started in 1981 when the small spinning 
unit was installed. There were contacts with TNO (the Dutch organisa-
tion for applied research) and personal contacts with employees of AKZO. 
Under the corporate development programme, additional funds became 
available and a dedicated application research laboratory was built for 
Dyneema and opened in 1985. A new composites laboratory opened a year 
later and also engaged in application research on the new material.30
 By 1990, application research and marketing efforts had opened three 
The UHMW-PE plant in 1990. Ultra high molecular weight polyethylene (UHMW-PE) is 
used to manufacture Dyneema. DSM also marketed UHMW-PE as an engineering plastic.
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main markets. The first was ropes and cables, particularly for offshore and 
nautical applications. Dyneema was promoted as a material for anchoring 
ships and offshore drilling rigs, for instance. It floated on water, which 
was an advantage when a line broke. Dyneema’s strength, stiffness and 
low weight also made it better than steel. Dyneema cables were also more 
durable than steel cables as they could better withstand the varying stress 
caused by heavy or moderate seas. The second important area of applica-
tion was as a material for protection against bullets, shrapnel and other 
kinds of ammunition. In this field, specific applications called for spe-
cific Dyneema variants, depending on the degree of protection desired and 
on the type of ammunition. Dyneema competed with Kevlar and other 
aramid fibres in this market. Because of its relatively low melting point, 
Dyneema could not be used as a tyre cord. Finally, Dyneema found ample 
use in composites, with applications ranging from helmets to sails, tennis 
rackets and skis. Dyneema was well-suited for sails because of its strength 
and its resistance to UV radiation. Competition came from a range of 
materials and depended on the specific requirements in use.31
Introducing a New Product
From 1990 onwards, Dyneema gradually developed into a success story for 
DSM. The number of applications increased, as did production capacity 
and sales. Against the background of this commercial success, the story 
of the development of the polyethylene fibre may seem odd. Why was 
Dyneema’s potential not realised sooner?
 Karel Mulder argues in his dissertation that the fundamental poly-
mer research unit was isolated, and that this position made it difficult to 
get DSM’s manufacturing organisation interested in the discovery made 
by Pennings and Koningsveld; which is why it took a long time before 
Dyneema was commercialised.32 In comparison to the fundamental ca-
talysis section of the Central Laboratory, the polymer research unit does 
seem to have been more isolated. For catalysis, a contact group was estab-
lished with members of the manufacturing organisation, researchers and 
also people from the SBB’s works laboratory, while catalysis expertise was 
also frequently needed in a broad range of projects. This was not the case 
for fundamental polymer research, which was isolated in this sense.
 The discovery made by Pennings and Koningsveld, moreover, was a 
long way away from any commercial product. There were several ideas, 
but none of them were very clear and targeted. Research aimed at finding 
a process started only in 1969, six years after the initial discovery had been 
made. In the 1960s, the project was not in a phase that it seemed likely 
DSM’s manufacturing organisation would become interested. Only in the 
late 1970s did a feasible industrial process come into view, and with it, 
fibres as a possible field of application.
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 When fibres emerged as the most promising field of application, an-
other problem emerged. Although DSM had some technological knowl-
edge of the spinning and processing of synthetic fibres through the work 
of CRO’s Fibre Technology department, the gel spinning process differed 
from the typical processes for synthetic fibres.33 More importantly, DSM 
had no knowledge of the fibre market and had no expertise in marketing 
fibres. This explains the divisions’ reluctance to support Dyneema in the 
1980s. For Chemical Products, the step toward actual fibre manufacture 
was large because of this lack of market knowledge. For the Plastics divi-
sion the project was both a different business and a different technology. In 
this way, Dyneema almost naturally became a corporate project. Dyneema 
was a long-term project and not related to the markets and technologies 
the divisions were active in. The question of whether or not DSM should 
start manufacturing fibres was a very fundamental one and was directly 
related to strategy issues.
 The harsh economic climate and the company’s poor results in the ear-
ly 1980s made it difficult to allocate a large amount of corporate funds to 
Dyneema. Around the middle of the 1980s this changed and, at the same 
time, the strategy to move away from bulk chemicals intensified. Dyneema 
was an interesting project from this perspective and more funds could, 
and were, made available. The new material was then commercialised in a 
relatively short period of time, with Toyobo providing the necessary know-
how on manufacturing and marketing synthetic fibres.
 The critical steps in the story of Dyneema were the translation of a 
discovery into a product and finding a market for that product. In cases 
like caprolactam and urea it was clear what the product was and who the 
potential buyers were. In the case of Dyneema, DSM had to develop an of-
fensive strategy. As fibre manufacture was a commercial and technological 
mismatch, this was not easy and took time. Indeed, it was a tremendous 
achievement that the Dyneema project was brought to a successful conclu-
sion. Innovations along the axis of both technology and markets often fail, 
as the lysine case shows for example.34
 The case of Dyneema also shows the evolution of research policies 
over the years. Confidence in research was high in the 1950s and 1960s, 
and research played an initiating and enabling role. There was also much 
room for fundamental research, as the work of the Central Laboratory’s 
fundamental polymer research section shows. Researchers could work on 
projects that manufacturing was not immediately interested in and, at least 
at first, they did not need to concern themselves with targeted product and 
process research. 
 In the 1970s, DSM shifted its research policies. Costs and effectiveness 
were reviewed critically and the divisions funded a large part of the research 
budget. Fundamental research was scaled down and, with it, research on 
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strong polyethylene fibres. Towards the end of the 1970s, DSM decided to 
try to reduce its emphasis on bulk chemicals and expand in other, faster-
growing and more profitable areas while research was regarded more posi-
tively as well. Top management shifted its strategy in a severe economic 
climate, but by the middle of the 1980s the company’s results improved 
and research aimed at entering new markets was again on the map. The 
corporate development programmes ensured there was room for research 
and expenditures grew. The Dyneema case shows that the importance at-
tached to industrial research varied in a wave-like pattern over time.
 Dyneema was the most expensive corporate development programme. 
An evaluation of all the programmes in 1990 concluded that the results 
had been positive. The list of projects had shifted somewhat compared to 
the original ideas, but by 1990 only 20% of the projects had been discon-
tinued with limited spin-offs (Table 5.3).
 
DSM’s Expansion in Fine Chemicals
Dyneema shows the importance of materials in the search for new markets, 
but DSM made fine chemicals another spearhead in its expansion and di-
versification plans. After more than a decade, Special Products’ turnover 
reached about 90 million guilders in 1982. The group produced twenty 
products but seven products, including benzoic acid, benzaldehyde, al-
pha-picoline and phenylglycine, generated 80% of its turnover and 60% 
of sales were in the intermediates for agrochemicals and pharmaceuticals 
markets.35
 Special Products’ turnover growth fell behind expectations, particularly 
after 1978 when growth started to stagnate. The managements of Special 
Products and the Industrial Chemicals division had different opinions on 
the course to be taken. From the division’s perspective, activities in fine 
chemicals were scattered over too many areas – a view that was reinforced 
by the poor results of the acquisition of Chem-Y, both in financial terms 
and in terms of synergy with Special Products’ technologies and markets. 
Industrial Chemicals’ response also forms part of a broader backlash in 
Dutch industry against the emphasis put on diversification and acquisi-
tions. Diversification had not cushioned the effects of an unfavourable 
economic climate, while integrating companies with unfamiliar businesses 
proved difficult, draining the expected results.36 
 In 1982, a new long-term strategy plan was agreed upon. Special 
Products would focus on its existing businesses, and on improving them 
through better marketing and through better management of production. 
Although activities had to be focused, both Special Products and Indus-
trial Chemicals agreed on the need for further growth in fine chemicals to 
achieve the critical mass necessary for survival. In the revised strategy, this 
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Table 5.3. Evaluation of the corporate development programmes in 1990.
Source: H. Lintsen & F. Veraart (2000). De nieuwe bloei van research, 1985-1990. H. Lintsen, 
Ed. Research tussen vetkool en zoetstof: zestig jaar DSM Research 1940-2000. Eindhoven/Zut-
phen: Stichting Historie der Techniek/Walburg Pers, 104-115, in particular table 8.1, 112.
Projects Expenditure Share of total cost
(million guilders) (%)
Commercialised projects
1. Dyneema  70 22
B. Projects passed to the divisions with good 
prospects for commercialisation
2.  Engineered composites  27
3.  Carmat  15
4.  Plastic waste processing  3
5.  Amino acids (spin-off )  28
Total:  73 23
C.  Ongoing projects with good to acceptable 
chances of success
6.  S-RIM  5
7.  Strong film/ Geltrusion  19
8.  Epoxy moulding compounds/
 E&E materials
 3.5
9.  Biomedical applications  6
Total:  33.5 11
D.  Ongoing projects with low to minimal 
chances of success in the short term
10.  PVA and new high-performance fibres (in-
cluding first phase of Dyneema)  31
11.  High-performance plastics/LCPs  39
12.  Biochemistry  4
13.  Conform  2
Total:  76 24
E.  Discontinued projects with limited spin-off
14.  Silica  29
15.  Ceramics  20
16.  Agro-biotechnology  2
17. Chemical intermediates  4
18. Enzymatic hydroxylation  5
Total:  60 20
Total for all programmes:  313
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would be achieved through autonomous growth and by a targeted acqui-
sition. Special Products should in ten years’ time reach the level of com-
panies like SSF Dottikon (now EMS Dottikon) and Lonza, both Swiss 
companies. Dottikon had been established in 1913 and had branched out 
into fine chemicals and custom synthesis, where it produced a specific 
intermediate for a customer or the customer’s proprietary compound.37 
Lonza was established in 1897 as an electricity and carbide works. Lonza 
branched out into calcium cyanamide fertiliser in 1915, followed by ammo-
nia synthesis in 1925 and later other bulk chemicals as well. Carbide also 
provided a route to acetylene, which in turn secured Lonza’s entry into fine 
chemicals. The company developed into a conglomerate of energy, bulk 
chemicals and fine chemicals activities, but chose the latter as its core after 
1980. Lonza pushed down the share of bulk chemicals in its turnover from 
76% in 1970 to 65% in 1980 and 44% in 1985.38 
 DSM’s top management confirmed the new strategy for fine chemicals 
in October 1982 and integrated it into DSM’s overall diversification strat-
egy in 1984.39 Organisationally, Special Products moved to the Chemical 
Products division in 1983. After the acquisition of the resins division of 
Unilever, DSM established a new Resins division by merging the acquired 
activities with the existing activities of Industrial Chemicals in this field. 
The remaining groups of the Industrial Chemicals division became part of 
the Chemical Products division.40
A Joint Venture: Aspartame
DSM aimed to achieve growth in fine chemicals both organically and via 
acquisitions. Nevertheless, an opportunity presented itself to start produc-
tion of aspartame, a sweetener about 200 times sweeter than sugar but low 
in calories. 
 In 1965, a chemist working at the American pharmaceutical company 
G.D. Searle & Co. discovered that a dipeptide from aspartic acid and L-
phenylalanine tasted intensely sweet. However, it took a long time before 
aspartame was approved for applications in food as doubts were raised on 
the safety of the compound. In 1979, France was the first country to grant 
approval. The United States followed two years later, and in 1983 also ap-
proved the use of aspartame in soft drinks, which became a particularly 
important application. Because it was low on calories, aspartame could 
be used in diet soft drinks. Searle’s aspartame business, under the trade 
name NutraSweet, grew fast. In 1985, Monsanto acquired Searle as part of 
its strategy to move into businesses that were more profitable than bulk 
chemicals. Searle had patented the use of aspartame in many fields, and 
only Ajinomoto in Japan had been granted a license. Although competing 
sweeteners were on the market, this patenting strategy greatly enhanced 
the profitability of aspartame for Searle and later Monsanto.41
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 In 1966, the lysine group at the Central Laboratory had started working 
on aspartame of their own accord. DSM patented an aspartame process 
in 1972. The reaction of aspartic acid and D,L-phenylalanine yielded a 
racemic mixture. Only the L-configuration tasted sweet, while the D-con-
figuration tasted bitter and had to be removed. This removal proved dif-
ficult to achieve.42
 In Japan, the Toyo Soda Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (which changed its 
name to Tosoh in 1987) had also worked on a method to synthesise aspar-
tame, initially together with the Sagami Chemical Research Centre. In 
1976 they found a way to produce only the sweet-tasting component of 
aspartame by using an enzyme. In the following years, they developed a 
process and built a pilot plant.43 
 DSM worked on a route to D,L-phenylalanine, the most expensive 
intermediate for aspartame. In the early 1980s, DSM’s corporate plan-
ning department re-evaluated the route to aspartame the company had pa-
tented in 1972 and found it too expensive compared to Searle’s route. CRO 
pointed to the Japanese route, however. As an evaluation showed that this 
process was promising, CRO and DSM’s corporate planning department 
approached Tosoh. In 1984, the Japanese company proposed marketing 
aspartame in Europe together. DSM’s research appealed to Tosoh and they 
were already working with D,L-phenylalanine manufactured by Special 
Products. Tosoh thought that the Japanese market was too small while the 
American market would be hard to enter because of Searle’s application 
patents. Tosoh considered production in Europe necessary to prevent high 
transportation costs and also feared import taxes. In 1985, Tosoh and DSM 
reached an agreement and established Holland Sweetener Company, with 
both companies holding an equal part of the shares of their joint venture. 
In December of that year, DSM’s top management approved the construc-
tion of an aspartame plant. The required investment amounted to 181 mil-
lion guilders, but DSM needed to provide only half that amount and, 
moreover, secured government subsidies under various industrial policy 
programmes, reducing the necessary funds to 50 million guilders. This 
was still no small amount when compared to previous investments in fine 
chemicals, with the exception of the overrun expansion project for Chem-
Y, and also when compared to projects in bulk chemicals.44 
 The Japanese engineering contractor Chiyoda engineered and con-
structed an aspartame plant with a capacity of 500 tons per year. Mar-
ket studies initiated by Chemical Products indicated a market volume in 
Europe of 1,000 tons and projected that Holland Sweetener Company 
would be able to capture 35% of this market. Exports of 100 to 200 tons 
added up to a volume of about 500 tons. NutraSweet provided by far the 
toughest competition, but other companies were also considering enter-
ing aspartame. Searle’s application patents would in most countries expire 
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between 1986 and 1988, and in the United States in 1992. By being the first 
to profit from the expiration of these patents, Chemical Products expected 
to capture market share and deter other companies from entry. In 1988, 
production of aspartame started when the European market was free of 
Searle’s patent claims. NutraSweet defended its position by lowering prices 
in Europe, but Holland Sweetener Company, helped by an import tariff 
imposed by the European Community, could establish and maintain a 
position in the aspartame market.45 
 Some of DSM’s technological input in the joint venture with Tosoh 
was generic and related to the knowledge base it had built in fine chemi-
cals and in particular to the knowledge about the use of enzymes that it 
had accumulated. Another part specifically related to the production of 
D,L-phenylalanine. In 1985, the company decided to build a plant for the 
production of this compound. It was a multi-purpose plant that could 
manufacture other products as well. DSM Research developed the routes 
used in the multi-purpose plant and scaled them up in the so-called small 
scale installation (Kleinschalige Installatie, KSI), started in 1980, and later 
in mini plant 2, started in 1989. Matthew Hall Keynes, a British engineer-
ing contractor with offices in the Netherlands, engineered and constructed 
the multi-purpose plant. It went on stream in 1987.46 
 The start of aspartame production built on Tosoh’s enzymatic pro-
cess, but the Japanese company’s knowledge was complemented by DSM’s 
work in the field of fine chemicals. DSM’s know-how for the production 
of D,L-phenylalanine was important in this respect, as was the research 
that had been done on enzymes. DSM also built on its own research to 
overcome the initial start-up problems of the aspartame plant and also to 
improve the process. This pattern of complementarity is in line with the 
general DSM pattern of technology acquisitions. With a defensive innova-
tion strategy, DSM acquired technology through a joint venture to enter 
the existing aspartame market. The company’s internal research attracted 
Tosoh and backed up the acquisition.47
Acquisitions: Andeno
Tosoh presented DSM with the opportunity to start aspartame produc-
tion, but Special Products also actively went looking for companies to take 
over after its new strategy had been drafted. Special Products, with the 
help of consultants, scanned the fine chemicals industry in search of at-
tractive take-over candidates. The group targeted American companies in 
particular. It generated about a quarter of its turnover in the United States, 
but further growth was difficult to achieve from the Netherlands. Nepera, 
a company producing pyridine and derivatives which in terms of scale was 
second only to Reilly Tar, came into view for instance, as did Kalama (now 
Noveon Kalama), a producer of phenol and related fine chemicals, which 
presented an opportunity to expand and reinforce Special Products’ benz-
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aldehyde business. Both examples show that Special Products followed the 
strategy of 1982 to expand in related businesses. Nepera was not up for 
sale, but Special Products started talks with Kalama in 1984. The company 
had been a Dow phenol production site but Dow had sold it to three 
employees in 1971. However, the owners asked a high price when DSM ap-
proached them, while the profitability of the operations was poor. DSM’s 
Chemical Products division, moreover, wanted to exclude Kalama’s phenol 
production from the deal.48 
 The joint venture with Tosoh presented an opportunity to gain access 
to a promising technology. The attempt to buy Kalama, by contrast, was 
driven by an attempt to expand market access. This remained important 
for Special Products after the takeover of Kalama failed. The group hired 
Charles Kline’s consultancy firm to make a new scan of possible takeover 
candidates in the United States. Nepera again came into view. Schering 
decided in 1986 to sell its fine chemicals division, of which Nepera was a 
Aerial view of part Andeno’s plants in Venlo (the Netherlands), 1987. Andeno manufac-
tured pharmaceutical intermediates and was Special Products’ major customer for phenyl-
glycine. DSM bought Andeno in 1986, at a time when the company was increasingly using 
acquisitions as a strategic tool for achieving growth in fine chemicals. 
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part. Special Products, backed by divisional management, wanted to bid. 
Nepera’s activities and technologies complemented those of Special Prod-
ucts and, with a turnover of about 45 million dollars, its acquisition would 
boost Special Products’ growth substantially. However, top management 
refused to make a bid because it considered that Nepera had a low poten-
tial for growth and that its acquisition would contribute little to DSM’s 
corporate business strategy.49
 Although Schering decided to divest its fine chemicals division in 1986, 
the company had branded it as an attractive field only four years earlier. 
Schering’s move reflects the trend to focus on core business. Other phar-
maceutical companies similarly de-emphasised in-house fine chemicals 
production. In turn, this gave dedicated fine chemicals companies or fine 
chemicals units of larger companies a chance to become suppliers to the 
pharmaceutical industry, and provided opportunities for custom synthesis. 
In its search for companies to take over, Special Products established valu-
able contacts that boosted its pharmaceutical business.50
 On the one hand, Special Products was searching for takeover can-
didates, but on the other hand companies were offered to DSM. Special 
Products considered most of these companies unattractive, but in Decem-
ber of 1986, Andeno, Special Products’ main customer of phenylglycine, 
came up for sale. Océ-Van der Grinten, a Dutch company, had established 
Andeno in 1957 to produce the chemicals it needed in reprography, its 
main business. Andeno started manufacturing pharmaceutical interme-
diates in 1968. By 1986, its turnover amounted to 125 million guilders, 
which meant that its acquisition would more or less double Special Prod-
ucts’ turnover. Moreover, Andeno’s commercial and technological profile 
matched that of Special Products. The two companies operated in related 
and complementary fields. For example, they were both working on amino 
acids. Moreover, Andeno had worked together with Special Products in 
research on D,L-phenylglycine and in the development of other interme-
diates for antibiotics around the middle of the 1980s.51
 DSM had already tried to acquire Andeno in the early 1980s, but at that 
time Océ had refused to sell. Contacts remained, however, and in Decem-
ber 1986 Océ communicated to DSM’s top management that it wanted 
to divest Andeno. Océ was restructuring its businesses while Andeno was 
suffering from poor results. Andeno’s strategic importance to DSM was 
clear, and discussions between top management and the division focused 
on the price to pay for the company. DSM and Océ quickly reached an 
agreement and DSM bought Andeno in April 1987.52
 Andeno became part of Special Products. Like Chem-Y, Andeno had its 
own, relatively small, research department. Unlike the case of Chem-Y, for 
which little research was done in DSM’s R&D base in Geleen, Andeno’s 
research and businesses were closely related to those of Special Products. 
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DSM left Andeno’s research department intact. Coordination was neces-
sary but was not formally organised until 1990, when a research coordina-
tor was appointed to improve coherence in research and to try to exploit 
synergies better.53
 Like aspartame, the acquisition of Andeno complemented Special 
Products’ existing businesses and technologies. These acquisitions were also 
more research-driven than the failed acquisitions, particularly in the case 
of Andeno as it presented a springboard for the extension of fine chemicals 
research. 
 Together with the aspartame project, the acquisition of Andeno boosted 
DSM’s activities in fine chemicals to a substantially higher level. Andeno’s 
and Special Products’ turnover were comparable while the (expected) turn-
over from aspartame added another large lump. Aspartame and Andeno 
were two crucial steps in DSM’s expansion in fine chemicals.
In-house Research: Amino Acids
The body of knowledge that was complemented by the aspartame and 
Andeno projects related to the use of enzymes in the production of fine 
chemicals. Research on enzymes had started in the 1970s, at first in relation 
to phenylglycine but later to amino acids generally, and continued in the 
1980s. In 1985, amino acids became a corporate development programme. 
The project was well-advanced and in 1986 became the responsibility of 
the Chemical Products division. In July of the next year, top management 
decided to build a plant for amino acids.54 
 Special Products’ management characterised the project as technol-
ogy push: demand for specialty amino acids would arise as these products 
would become available. The stage for the project had been set in 1985 
when, under the corporate development programme structure, the Ameri-
can consultancy firm Arthur D. Little studied the technology’s potential 
and the market’s opportunities. They considered phenylglycine, phenyl-
alanine and valine to be the most important products to be produced in 
the new plant. The idea was to market D-phenylglycine without hurting 
the existing manufacturers of this compound, and particularly Andeno of 
course, but the attractiveness of using the new plant for D-phenyglycine 
declined when DSM bought Andeno. Tosoh bought phenylalanine, which 
the Japanese company used in the pilot production of aspartame. There 
was no need to separate D- and L-phenylalanine in the Japanese aspartame 
process. All this meant that of the three initial amino acids which were 
branded as the most attractive products, only D- and L-valine remained. 
In 1984, Zoëcon had approached DSM for the production of D-valine, 
a compound it needed for the production of its insecticide, Arsenal. A 
specific enzyme was selected so that D-valine could be produced and this 
enzyme opened up a new range of products.55 
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 Of the three crucial products the new amino acid plant was to make, 
only one remained when the installation was started in 1988. There were 
also some initial problems with the plant, and process improvements were 
needed to bring down costs. It also took some time before marketers found 
customers for amino acids that could be made by DSM with the enzyme 
discovered in the 1970s and the enzyme used for the production of valine. 
Andeno’s marketing expertise and experience with the pharmaceutical in-
dustry proved of great value here.56
Networks in Biotechnology
One of the enzymes DSM needed to manufacture amino acids was sup-
plied by the Danish firm Novo Industri, which had developed a fermenta-
tion process for the production of this enzyme. DSM and Novo did some 
research together in this field as well. In 1986, when the outlook for amino 
acid production was still bright, both firms considered the possibility of 
establishing a joint venture together to build on this research. DSM had 
gained some experience with screening and selecting enzymes, but did not 
have the knowledge necessary to produce on a larger scale and secure sup-
ply. For Novo, a joint venture would reduce the risks of research because 
it would be assured of a customer for its product. The Danish company 
also sought new markets to supplement its traditional outlets such as de-
tergents, which showed some signs of saturation.57
 Together with the Dutch company Gist-brocades, Novo was a leading 
company in the field of enzymes. DSM had considered Gist-brocades and 
other companies for cooperation as well, but Gist-brocades refused. DSM 
chose Novo because of its good relations with the Danish company and 
the quality of their research. In 1987 the joint venture plans were cancelled, 
but a year later a research agreement was signed, which focused on the de-
velopment of improved enzymes. A market was not found, however, and 
the research cooperation with Novo was stopped in 1990.58
 The agreement with Novo is just one example of a long list of projects 
in which DSM conducted research together with other companies, re-
search institutes and universities. In the 1980s, companies generally made 
more use of outside sources of research than they had done before. Histo-
rians have tried to explain this trend by pointing to the decline in compa-
nies’ research expenditure. Above all, less money was spent on fundamen-
tal and/or basic research and this was compensated for by using outside 
research. Historians also point to increased internationalisation.59 
 Economic explanations for the increase in the use of outside research 
in the 1980s centre around the increased cost, complexity and risk of doing 
R&D. Such explanations are based on a rather linear view of technological 
change, but there are also economic studies that underline the importance 
of government policies and argue that scouting for long-term opportuni-
ties is sometimes done through collaborative research.60
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 At DSM, many collaborative projects related to biotechnology. Jos 
Schakenraad and John Hagendoorn counted twenty-one instances where 
DSM collaborated with other organisations in biotechnology research un-
til 1988. Most of these were focused on fine chemicals and agro chemicals 
while other segments were neglected, a pattern that reflects DSM’s tech-
nological and business positions. Other companies (in the Netherlands 
mainly large companies) also networked extensively in biotechnology. 
AKZO’s collaborative research showed a pattern comparable to DSM’s, 
but Royal/Dutch Shell and Gist-brocades spread their activities over more 
fields.61
 In biotechnology, DSM focused on enzymes in particular and they 
were also a topic for collaborative research. In 1986, DSM started research 
on the fungus Aspergillus niger together with TNO and Wageningen Ag-
ricultural University. These institutes had been researching fungi for a pe-
riod of ten years. The aim of the project with DSM was to try to find ways 
in which Aspergillus niger could produce enzymes, which in turn could be 
used for the production of a specific class of compounds. The project was 
fundamentally oriented and only loosely aimed at possible applications, as 
was the case with many collaborative research projects.62
 Besides enzymes, DSM also ran other biotechnology projects. One 
was biological nitrogen fixation, which was part of the corporate develop-
ment programme. Some microorganisms can make nitrogen from the air 
available to plants and can in principle replace nitrogen fertilisers. DSM 
thought that biological nitrogen fixation could lead to a new line of busi-
ness for UKF, its fertiliser division, and had the opportunity to participate 
in a project of the American company Biotechnology General Inc. The 
potential rewards would be great but the effects of the microorganism un-
der study were as yet unproven. DSM would participate in the project of 
Biotechnology General by funding research at Wageningen Agricultural 
University through the IOP-b programme, thereby minimising the com-
pany’s exposure. The IOP-b was the first fully-fledged Innovation Orient-
ed Research Programme (Innovatiegerichte Onderzoeksprogramma’s, IOP), 
developed by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and aimed at stimulat-
ing research and innovation in areas that were considered to offer attrac-
tive growth possibilities for Dutch business (so-called aandachtsgebieden). 
DSM and Wageningen could not reach agreement, however, as the univer-
sity claimed royalties and rights to publication that DSM regarded as ex-
cessive. Cooperation with other Dutch research institutes was considered, 
but agreement could not be reached and research on biological nitrogen 
fixation did not get off the ground.63
 The Ministry of Economic Affairs had developed the IOP-b programme 
with the explicit aim of reinforcing cooperation between universities. To 
this end, advisory councils with members from science and industry were 
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put in place for universities and research institutes to give advice on the 
projects they should undertake. DSM Research also participated in several 
of these councils.64 
 Besides the IOP-b, the Dutch government also established other 
frameworks for stimulating Dutch industry, and the European Economic 
Community also offered subsidies. DSM tried to use these programmes 
as much as possible, and to this end set up a special unit at the corporate 
planning department in the 1980s. In general, the national programmes 
were used more than the European ones. DSM found applications for Eu-
ropean subsidies difficult to organise and funds for the chemical industry 
proved to be limited in practice.65
 Although the number of collaborative research projects increased in 
the 1980s and although many of these projects were subsidised, using out-
side research was nothing new in the sense that DSM had had many rela-
tions with other companies and academic research before 1980. DSM had 
worked with advisors from universities, some researchers were professors 
by special appointment and DSM funded graduate work, for instance. The 
company also participated in several industry research institutes, which 
mostly focused on generic subjects like distillation and were funded by 
companies from several countries. Research collaboration with other firms 
was rare, but ASED and DSM had worked on the development of a once-
through urea process shortly after the Second World War, for instance. 
 A major change in relation to outside research was that collaboration 
and building relationships with universities and other research institutes 
became an explicit goal of research policies in the 1980s. CRO felt that 
the company was becoming more and more diversified and built on an in-
creasingly wide range of knowledge fields. Funds for research were strained 
in the early 1980s, however, making it difficult to be active in all these 
fields. CRO argued that external research, in many forms, could comple-
ment DSM’s own research very well.66
 An increase in the use of outside research in general, and outside research 
in relation to biotechnology in particular, is considered to be a feature of 
industrial research in the 1980s. The DSM pattern is not that different, al-
though perhaps the trend towards internationalisation of research was less 
pronounced than in other companies, but the shift in research policies in rela-
tion to outside research is striking. DSM also used external research to scout 
for long-term opportunities. Moreover, as much of the company’s collabora-
tive research work was subsidised, the risks for the company were minimal. If 
something came out of the collaborative projects, DSM was in a position to 
utilise it, but if not, the losses were minimal. The short-term effect of collabo-
rative research was, on the other hand, rather minimal as no new businesses 
developed from the many cooperative research projects in biotechnology.
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Fine Chemicals in the 1980s
The 1980s were a crucial decade for DSM’s fine chemicals activities. In the 
early 1980s growth had still fallen short of expectations, but around 1985 ex-
pansion gained momentum through the aspartame project and the acquisi-
tion of Andeno. Both acquisitions boosted turnover and were related to Spe-
cial Products’ existing commercial and technological profile. The lesson from 
Chem-Y had been learnt and formally implemented into Special Products’ 
business strategy in 1982: in-house research complemented acquisitions.
 The long-term view taken at CRO in the 1970s on the utility of en-
zymes proved its worth in the 1980s, and enabled research to continue to 
play an important role in fine chemicals. The work on enzymes and amino 
acids provided the base that enabled DSM to take up aspartame produc-
tion together with Tosoh, to acquire Andeno, and to establish the amino 
acid business. The partnership with Novo provided the crucial know-how 
of how to manufacture enzymes, while networking with external research 
institutes provided the means to reinforce DSM’s base in biotechnology 
and scout for long-term opportunities. Again the pattern is complemen-
tary, this time between in-house and external research.
Research and Bulk Chemicals in the 1980s
Dyneema, amino acids and aspartame are examples of products in areas 
DSM considered attractive, but the company was still manufacturing bulk 
chemicals and did not intend to discard these businesses. Graph 5.1 shows 
that research on existing products, combined with customer support and 
plant service, accounted for roughly 80 to 90% of the research budget 
between 1980 and 1990.
Caprolactam
In 1979, DSM manufactured its two millionth ton of caprolactam. The 
company had grown into one of the largest manufacturers of caprolactam 
in the world, and remained in that position throughout the 1980s (Table 
5.4). Annual growth of caprolactam demand was only about 2% per year, 
however. The European market grew little, while the manufacture of syn-
thetic fibres increasingly moved to the Far East and developing countries 
(Graph 5.2). DSM gained a foothold in these markets through exports and 
built a position in Latin America by minority participations in licensed 
caprolactam plants. New customers and markets had to be found, the 
more so since AKZO, DSM’s long-time major customer, no longer bought 
caprolactam exclusively from DSM and closed its British subsidiary British 
Enkalon. Courtaulds decided around the same time to end nylon produc-
tion in the United Kingdom. Nypro, DSM’s British caprolactam opera-
tion at Flixborough, lost its customers. The plant had been rebuilt after the 
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explosion of 1974, but closed permanently in 1980. Production of capro-
lactam at Nipro, DSM’s American subsidiary, also fell in the early 1980s.67
 DSM continued to invest in caprolactam production in Geleen, 
though. In 1982, the rearrangement section was renovated. Control rooms 
were centralised and digitised, while the pneumatic control devices in the 
plant were replaced by electronic ones. Production and maintenance costs 
could be cut and product quality could be improved as well. In 1983 and 
the following year, the purification section was revamped. Between 1984 
and 1986, the capacity of the HPO plant could be increased from approxi-
mately 70,000 tons to about 100,000 tons through small modifications. 
The increased scale meant reduced costs per ton, and this was attractive 
regardless of the development of the market for caprolactam. The capacity 
boost meant the definitive breakthrough of HPO technology.68
 Increasing energy efficiency was a very important theme in caprolactam 
at the beginning of the 1980s. DSM embarked on a company-wide pro-
gramme of reducing the use of energy and feedstocks by good housekeep-
ing. Without making major investments, DSM aimed to keep consump-
tion of raw materials and utilities to a minimum by stimulating awareness 
among plant personnel and by keeping track of consumption figures. Such 
measures saved millions of guilders.69
 CRO played a relatively limited role in these measures, but it did carry 
out research on increasing energy efficiency and reducing consumption of 
raw materials. Specifically in relation to caprolactam, research tried to im-
prove the phenol process, for instance. In 1978, a second phenol plant was 
Graph 5.1. Research expenditure by category.
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started up at CIR, DSM’s subsidiary located in the harbour region of Rot-
terdam (Netherlands). CRO started research on possible improvements 
to the phenol process, but in 1979 reached the conclusion that DSM’s 
toluene-based phenol process was in principle more expensive than a com-
petitive route that started from cumene, a compound made from benzene. 
In an attempt to make the DSM phenol process more attractive, research 
tried to improve the first two steps of the process (the oxidation of toluene 
and the subsequent oxidation of benzoic acid) and also tried to increase 
production of the by-products of phenol manufacture (benzoic acid and 
benzaldehyde). The by-products in DSM’s phenol process contributed sig-
nificantly to the viability of phenol manufacture at CIR. The position of 
DSM’s phenol process remained difficult, however. Buying phenol on the 
market instead of manufacturing it at CIR would substantially cut the 
costs of caprolactam production in Geleen. CIR closed the oldest plant in 
Rotterdam in the early 1980s. Additional phenol, needed to manufacture 
caprolactam, was bought from other firms.70
 The improvement of the process for the oxidation of cyclohexane was 
also a project that aimed at reducing the amounts of energy and raw ma-
terials used in the production of caprolactam. Oxidation of cyclohexane 
was part of the route to cyclohexanone that started from benzene. DSM’s 
process oxidised cyclohexane in a cascade of five reactors. Efficiency was 
relatively low, but could be increased substantially by leaving out the cata-
Graph 5.2. World caprolactam production by region, 1980-1990.
Source: Kirk-Othmer Encyclopedia of Chemical Technology. London: Wiley-Interscience. 
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lyst in the first three reactors. Although the cyclohexane oxidation unit in 
Geleen had closed in 1975, CRO continued research on the improvement 
of the process as Nipro, DSM’s American caprolactam subsidiary, would 
profit from this research. Stamicarbon could also profit from an improved 
cyclohexane oxidation process since licensed caprolactam plants, with a 
few exceptions, all started from benzene instead of toluene. In 1979, Nipro 
converted two of its three cyclohexane oxidation units to the improved 
process, followed by its third unit in 1981. There were several initial prob-
lems but the consumption of cyclohexane per ton of cyclohexanone could 
be reduced. Research continued on this subject throughout the 1980s and 
the efficiency of cyclohexane oxidation was further improved.71 
 Research that aimed to remove or reduce the by-product stream of 
ammonium sulphate also continued. Ammonium sulphate had a great in-
fluence on the economics of caprolactam production and often the price 
of the ammonia contained in the sulphate could not be recouped. Re-
searchers tried several options to reduce or even get rid of this by-product, 
but the most viable one proved to be the optimisation of the rearrange-
ment section. This did not remove by-product manufacture completely, 
Table 5.4. The ten largest caprolactam producers in the world, 1980-1990.
Source: Kirk-Othmer Encyclopedia of Chemical Technology. London: Wiley-Interscience. 
Fourth edition, 16 volumes, 1991-1996. Vol. 4, 1992, table 3, 834.
i Sic. This was the Soviet agency responsible for technological imports, but it did not run 
the actual plants.
Company Country 1980 1985 1990
Capacity Rank Capacity Rank Capacity Rank
1000 t/ y 1000 t/ y 1000 t/ y
Techmashimporti Russia  550 1  550 1  550 1
BASF Germany  440 2  440 2  460 2
DSM Netherlands  435 3  380 3  390 3
Allied Signal USA  220 4  250 4  300 4
SNIA/





Ube Industries Japan  160 6  160 5  180 6
Bayer Germany  150 7  150 7  110 8
Toray Industries Japan  130 8  130 8  145 7
Polimex Poland  110 9  110 9  110 9
Chung Tai Taiwan  90 10  100 10  110 10
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but at least minimised the amounts. Research also developed a two-step 
rearrangement to reduce the amount of by-product ammonium sulphate 
further. Research on by-product reduction was an ongoing process and the 
results were continuously being applied in the plants.72 
 Management of the Chemical Products division pursued a two-track 
strategy in relation to ammonium sulphate. On the one hand, the volume 
of the by-product stream should be minimised as much as possible, but 
on the other hand Chemical Products initiated research with the aim of 
improving the production of ammonium sulphate as such. The energy ef-
ficiency of the sulphate plants was improved, leading to lower production 
costs. In 1982, CRO started to research the possibilities of making larger 
granules, which would make by-product ammonium sulphate suitable for 
use in mixed fertilisers, fertilisers which contained two or all three plant 
nutrients. DSM manufactured mixed fertilisers by chemical processes, but 
these products could also be made by dry-mixing several individual fer-
tilisers. CRO succeeded in doubling the size of the ammonium sulphate 
granules, making them suitable for use in dry-mixed fertilisers. Improved 
product quality also made it possible to sell ammonium sulphate outside 
the fertiliser market, for instance for use in fire extinguishers.73 
 By minimising the amount of ammonium sulphate and by improv-
ing its quality at the same time, the influence of the by-product stream 
on the economics of caprolactam production was combated. Such ratio-
nalisation measures were important in the 1980s to maintain competitive-
ness. DSM’s production capacity at Geleen increased only modestly in the 
1980s.74 Technological modifications were relatively small and innovations 
were incremental, but this work was nevertheless crucial.
 Research beyond incremental improvements was also performed, how-
ever. Stamicarbon licensed caprolactam technology, and in 1980 they com-
peted for a project in Mexico. BASF’s offer caused some concern to CRO 
as the projected use of feedstocks and energy were low. Even though Stami-
carbon had built in more reserves in its tender than BASF, the Mexican 
project triggered a study into possible improvements of the HPO process. 
CRO worked on this study and soon concluded that BASF’s nitric ox-
ide reduction process was in principle more attractive than DSM’s HPO 
process. The use of nitric oxide meant that only half of the hydrogen was 
needed and this cut costs substantially. CRO investigated the use of nitric 
oxide in the HPO process and called it the HPNO process. Using nitric 
oxide would cut costs, but was a disadvantage at the same time. Nitric 
oxide had to be produced by oxidising ammonia with pure oxygen in-
stead of with air, which was the route to nitrous gases in the HPO process 
and a method widely used for the production of nitric acid. The use of 
oxygen made the process expensive and the necessary investments would 
not pay. Moreover, at about the same time that research was being done 
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on the HPNO process, the capacity of the HPO plant was being boosted 
substantially through debottlenecking. This reduced the costs of existing 
caprolactam production plants and in turn reduced the attractiveness of 
converting the existing plant to the HPNO process. Therefore, the project 
was stopped in 1984.75 
 DSM continued probing possible alternatives for its technologies. In 
1988, divisional management and CRO initiated the ALTAM project (‘al-
ternative caprolactam’). Demand for caprolactam grew only slowly. Poly-
ester, and synthetic fibres made from cheaper feedstocks in general, threat-
ened caprolactam, while major reductions in costs were considered to be 
unachievable with the existing caprolactam technology. In the ALTAM 
project, CRO investigated the possibilities of a route to caprolactam start-
ing from butadiene, a compound available from steam crackers. Butadiene 
was cheaper than phenol, but the ALTAM process also reduced energy 
consumption and would be cheaper to build, adding up to a major cost 
advantage over existing technologies. The ALTAM process was complex, 
however, consisting of four steps. In 1992, cooperation was sought with Du 
Pont, and DSM and the American company built a pilot plant together. 
The ALTAM process has as yet not been commercialised, however. No 
major capacity expansions have been necessary because the slow growth of 
caprolactam demand could be met through debottlenecking and through 
small modifications. The necessity to build a new plant has not arisen, 
making it unattractive to commercialise the ALTAM process.76 
 The HPNO and ALTAM projects were both major projects and re-
flected an increased confidence in the necessity of research for maintaining 
and improving market positions. Neither of them was commercialised, 
however. An important reason for this was that the market for synthetic 
fibres, and particularly nylon, was growing much more slowly in the 1970s 
and 1980s than in the 1960s. Major expansions of capacity were less fre-
quently needed, if at all. Moreover, plants had become large scale. A new 
plant with a new process would have to be built large or otherwise it would 
not be economically viable. This not only increased the risks of process 
research, but also the investments that were needed to commercialise new 
technologies. In addition, the plants built in the 1960s and 1970s were not 
at the end of their life yet. In bulk chemicals, replacing existing plants with 
a new plant incorporating new technology pays off only in exceptional 
cases. Even the ALTAM process was not such an exceptional case. Moreo-
ver, existing plants could also be improved by incremental innovations 
and debottlenecking. The HPNO process lost its attractiveness when it 
became clear that the capacity of the existing HPO plant could be boosted 
without any major changes.77 
 The HPNO and ALTAM projects, as well as the projects that were 
closely related to existing technologies, were all focused on the consolida-
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tion of caprolactam, but diversification on the basis of caprolactam also 
remained a subject. A big project concerned the development of nylon 4.6, 
Stanyl, related to caprolactam through knowledge and experience that had 
been accumulated in application research. 
 In the 1970s, CRO worked on nylon 4 as a replacement for cotton, 
together with the American company Chevron. Textile products made 
of nylon 4, however, were very flammable and CRO stopped the project. 
With the knowledge that had been developed, nylon 4.6 also seemed in 
reach. Reinoud Gaymans from Twente Technical College (now University 
of Twente) had also approached DSM. Gaymans and his colleagues were 
working on nylon 4.6 and had established the principle of a two-step proc-
ess for the manufacture of this compound. This type of nylon could with-
stand high temperatures and later proved to be impact-resistant as well. 
After a market study showed considerable potential for nylon 4.6, in 1982 
the Chemical Products division gave a high priority to this research and tar-
geted tyre cord in particular. The high melting point would be an advantage 
to tyre producers as they would be able to produce more tyres with the same 
equipment. The engineering plastics market was also targeted, which meant 
that the Plastics division co-sponsored the project. Stanyl did not become 
a corporate development programme because of the more advanced stage 
of the project. In 1986 a pilot plant was started up, followed by commercial 
production four years later. Applications as engineering plastic, particularly 
in computer equipment, proved to be the most important for Stanyl.78
 Stanyl reflects DSM’s strategy to seek opportunities in businesses that 
seemed more profitable than its activities in bulk chemicals, and the em-
phasis on materials in this search. In this way, Stanyl contributed to the 
company’s search for products with high value-added. Nevertheless, the 
most important aim of research directly relating to caprolactam was con-
solidation. In the first place, this entailed making small modifications to 
the plant and incremental innovation to maintain competitiveness. In-
creasing energy and feedstock efficiencies, as well as the work done on am-
monium sulphate, are examples of this type of research work. In the sec-
ond place, consolidation research meant that the possibilities of alternative 
processes were probed, but these projects were difficult to commercialise. 
In summary, work on caprolactam reflects DSM’s business strategy of the 
1980s. The development of the market was recognised and a strategy was 
developed that aimed at maintaining the company’s position.
Urea
Another bulk chemical DSM manufactured was urea. When a new long-
range plan was drafted for CRO in 1979, DSM’s know-how in urea, and 
fertilisers generally, was considered to be outdated. Competitors had ad-
vanced in the 1970s, mainly in relation to product finishing techniques 
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and in reducing energy consumption of manufacturing processes. With 
regard to urea, Stamicarbon and CRO feared competition from other li-
censors on the market for technology and above all from Snam Progetti, 
whose marketing techniques CRO and Stamicarbon characterised as ‘ag-
gressive’. Moreover, the patents on the carbon dioxide stripping process 
would expire in the 1980s. Snam, which had already developed an am-
monia stripping process, Ammonia Casale, Montedison and Toyo Engi-
neering all developed variants of DSM’s carbon dioxide stripping process. 
Stamicarbon could no longer rely on technological leadership. The high 
numbers of urea licenses sold in the 1960s and early 1970s declined, and 
Stamicarbon’s market share and profitability became strained (see graph A3 
in the appendix for the number of licenses).79
 DSM intensified research on urea. The integrated production of am-
monia and urea was again considered, as competitors had developed such 
processes in the 1970s, but once again nothing came of this. In addition, 
the first attempts were made to develop a next generation of stripping 
technology. It would have to be a low-energy process with low investment 
costs. CRO meanwhile made attempts to regain a strong patent position. 
The processes of competitors were evaluated and researchers also came 
up with several alternatives. Montedison’s method of stripping with both 
ammonia and carbon dioxide in two subsequent strippers was considered. 
DSM acquired a patent from an engineering contractor that described 
such a process. High pressure stripping was also investigated, as were sev-
eral variants of the construction of the stripper. A pilot plant was built 
in 1981 and came on stream in November of the following year. One of 
the aims of research in this plant was to improve the understanding of 
stripping efficiencies under circumstances that differed from those in the 
traditional DSM process.80 
 In 1984, pilot plant research was stopped and the results obtained 
were evaluated. Stamicarbon reached the conclusion that no significant 
improvement of the carbon dioxide stripping process seemed viable, and 
therefore research ended. Stamicarbon changed its marketing strategy and 
placed emphasis on factors such as experience instead of technological su-
periority, and attempted to include services such as renovations and de-
bottlenecking of existing plants (revamps). The work done on the new 
stripping process could also be used in these areas and Stamicarbon posi-
tively evaluated the research effort for this reason.81
 It was Stamicarbon that pushed research on the urea stripping process, 
not UKF, DSM’s fertiliser division. Fertilisers still occupied an important 
place in DSM’s portfolio at that time. In 1979, DSM became the sole 
owner of UKF. Urea, however, was not the most attractive product because 
it was sold primarily on export markets. Feedstock prices, ultimately the 
prices of natural gas, were vital for the cost price of fertilisers, particularly 
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in export markets where competition was fierce. The policy of the Dutch 
government had been to stimulate industry by keeping natural gas prices 
low, but in the 1970s these prices gradually became linked to the (rising) 
prices of petroleum, leading to a structural disadvantage for UKF.82
 DSM’s competitors not only worked on improving urea production 
but also improved the quality of their fertilisers. The ability to produce 
coarse-grain fertilisers gained in importance as products were increasingly 
shipped in bulk and were no longer bagged. Coarse-grain fertilisers caked 
less and this was an advantage with bulk transportation. In addition, farm-
ing increased in scale and in the rate of mechanisation, further increasing 
demand for coarse-grain fertilisers. In Geleen, UKF prilled urea. Granu-
lation, making fertiliser grains in revolving pans or drums, made it pos-
sible to manufacture larger particles than in prilling towers. NSM, UKF’s 
Dutch competitor, actively developed urea granulation and succeeded in 
putting a plant on stream in July 1979.83
 Not surprisingly, CRO also targeted granulation in the long-range re-
search plan of 1979. The SBB switched production of calcium ammonium 
nitrate from prilling to granulation in 1979 and substantial research was 
done in this field in the 1980s to improve granulation processes and to 
develop coatings. Most of this work was of a practical nature and focused 
on the problems of production, but some fundamental research was also 
done.84
 CRO started research on the granulation of urea at the end of the 
1970s. Researchers attempted a fluidised-bed technique and developed 
special equipment. In 1983, a process was developed that did not infringe 
on NSM’s patents, but UKF was not interested. In 1983, CRO started 
research to decrease the height of prilling towers, but again UKF did not 
commercialise it. In the late 1970s, production staff had made small modi-
fications to the prilling process so that larger prills could be made with 
the existing installations. Moreover, the works laboratory of the SBB had 
found a coating that also improved product quality. All this research was 
not in vain: Stamicarbon later offered granulation processes to its custom-
ers.85 
 In the second half of the 1980s, the growth of European fertiliser mar-
kets stagnated and competition intensified. Some companies retreated 
from the industry while others intensified their efforts and increased their 
scale.86 DSM tried to maintain its strategy of consolidation and expansion 
for DSM Agro, the new name chosen for UKF in 1986. CRO worked 
on several projects, including specialty fertilisers and biological nitrogen 
fixation, which were aimed at renewing the division’s businesses. In 1990, 
DSM Agro introduced these specialty fertilisers but it sold these businesses 
only one year later.87 
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 The strategy of consolidation and expansion became increasingly dif-
ficult to maintain as Agro’s results were poor. In 1989, the division spent 
0.6% of its turnover on research. In relation to the R&D spend of com-
petitors, which was in the range of 1 to 2%, CRO considered this budget 
adequate, but in absolute terms the difference was substantial because of 
the high turnover of the fertilisers division. Of the total research budget, 
CRO allocated 75% to existing businesses and the remaining 25% to new 
activities. CRO aimed to minimise research in relation to existing prod-
ucts and processes to keep working on new activities as much as possible. 
It dissolved the specialised group of researchers who worked on urea in 
1988 as any improvements that might still be realised would not outweigh 
the costs of continued research. At CRO, cuts in the budget for research 
aimed at new activities caused more concern than cuts in research aimed 
at improving existing processes.88 
 In 1989, the management of Chemical Products prevented Stamicar-
bon from selling DSM’s entire urea know-how to a consortium of three 
engineering contractors, mainly because of the close relationship between 
urea and melamine. The division bought the know-how and also stimu-
lated Stamicarbon to develop the stripping process further. In two steps, 
Stamicarbon simplified the necessary equipment, resulting in lower in-
vestments for a new plant. A fertiliser company in Bangladesh built the 
first plant incorporating the first phase of the improvements and started 
production in 1994. DSM’s new urea plant, which started in March 1998, 
was the first to utilise the second phase of the improvements.89
 The changes Stamicabon made to the urea process involved only en-
gineering and no research. Although they were often relatively minor, 
they showed that ‘mature’ technologies could still be improved. In the late 
1980s, research on urea, and fertilisers in general, followed from a specific 
choice: work on existing products and processes was scaled down to a level 
that was considered the bare minimum, but research that could renew the 
fertiliser division’s businesses was kept up. Cuts in this type of research 
caused concern at DSM Research, which felt that it would no longer be 
able to help the division establish new activities.90
Consolidation and Selective Expansion: Caprolactam and Urea Research in 
the 1980s
The cases of urea and caprolactam show that there was more room for 
research in the 1980s than in the 1970s. Consolidation did not mean less 
research, but meant work on improving energy and feedstock efficiencies. 
Expansion was also sought, but selectively in segments that looked attrac-
tive. The focus of the corporate development programmes also played a 
role here. Stanyl reflects the emphasis on materials, while the biological 
nitrogen fixation project was related to biotechnology. Through consoli-
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dation and selective expansion, caprolactam and urea research followed 
DSM’s business strategy of the 1980s.
 In research on urea, and to a lesser extent on fertilisers in general, Sta-
micarbon played an important role in the 1980s. Stamicarbon stimulated 
research out of a concern for its own position on the market for technol-
ogy. Although it had to be prevented from selling DSM’s urea know-how 
altogether, Stamicarbon showed in the 1990s that the stripping process 
could be further improved.
 In the 1980s, there was also room for researchers to explore possible al-
ternative processes but both in urea and in caprolactam this line of research 
did not lead to results. In the case of urea, the conclusion was reached that 
the carbon dioxide stripping process could not be significantly improved. 
The examples of the HPNO and ALTAM process, on the other hand, 
show that it had become very difficult to introduce new processes. Slow 
market growth, the large scale at which plants became economical, and 
incremental innovation in existing technologies and plants were important 
factors. There were still options available to take big steps in improving 
processes, but these opportunities were hard to seize. 
 The case of urea also shows that business strategy and research policy 
were important. It may have been that the urea stripping process was ma-
ture and highly optimised, but a project like ALTAM was never set up for 
urea. Fertilisers drifted away from DSM’s core during the 1980s and par-
ticularly after 1985. Stamicarbon was able to adapt the stripping process to 
the changing requirements of its market. Research policy was not shifted 
similarly in the late 1980s when the fertiliser division was scaled down 
and when the research budget consequently declined. As a renewal of the 
fertiliser division seemed unlikely, focusing research on existing processes 
would have been more probable than minimising this type of research. In 
the case of urea, slow growth in the marketplace worked hand-in-hand 
with business strategy and research policies.
Plastics in the 1980s
Consolidation and selective expansion also characterised plastics R&D in 
the 1980s. Consolidation had the upper hand in the early years of that 
decade. DSM’s Plastics division expanded and diversified in the 1970s, but 
with disappointing financial results. The division incurred losses in several 
years in the 1970s and early 1980s. The Western European plastics industry 
faced overcapacity as companies had continued to expand while demand 
growth slowed down. The minimum economical scale of ethylene plants 
and plastics units had increased in the 1950s and 1960s, which meant that 
companies expanded in very big jumps. Markets continued to grow but 
it took time before they could take up the extra capacity. Moreover, there 
were many companies producing plastics, making the industry highly 
competitive.91
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 Over the years, DSM had built a highly integrated complex of crackers 
and production plants in the belief that this would lead to high efficiency 
and low production costs. The interconnectedness of the complex, how-
ever, narrowed the room to manoeuvre in the early 1980s. Closing down a 
relatively weak product line would worsen the performance of the crack-
ers. The Plastics division calculated that closing down a cracker in combi-
nation with product plants would not improve its performance either. The 
Plastics division believed a shake-out to be inevitable and argued it could 
survive this phase because its plants were modern and large, and because 
it manufactured products of high quality. After the shake-out, profitability 
would return. In the meantime, cutting costs and improving product qual-
ity became vital.92
 For CRO, DSM’s strategy in bulk plastics meant optimising processes 
to drive down costs and improve product quality. Optimisation became a 
defining characteristic of DSM’s research in plastics. For instance, CRO 
DSM’s fourth naphtha cracker in 1982. The fourth cracker started production in 1979 with 
a nameplate capacity of 450,000 tons, underlining the expansion in scale the company’s 
plastics business had gone through in the 1970s. Expansion alone, however, failed to bring 
the expected results and the Plastics division changed its course in the early 1980s.
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went to such lengths to optimise PVC that Sumitomo, which had licensed 
its technology to DSM, got interested in buying back know-how from 
DSM. CRO also worked on improving the HDPE, LDPE, polypropylene 
and ABS processes. To aid process improvement, CRO opened a new mini 
plant complex for research on HDPE and polypropylene in 1980.93
 Application research and associated process research continued as well 
and was aimed at developing new product types for new applications. To-
gether with a Finnish shipyard, CRO developed an ABS type specifically 
suited for pleasure boats, for instance. CRO also developed a type of poly-
ethylene suited for making fuel tanks for cars. This type of work proceeded 
in close contact with (potential) customers and consumed a large part of 
the plastics R&D budget.94
 Application research and product development provided springboards 
for the development of products with higher value-added than bulk 
plastics. Following the strategic change initiated by top management, the 
Plastics division and CRO increasingly aimed at such products in the 1980s. 
The anticipated shake-out did not occur, although companies rationalised 
their plastics production and shut down some capacity. However, demand 
for plastics improved and the results of the Plastics division improved with 
it. The division got more room to sponsor the development of products 
with high value-added.95
 These products were mainly to be found in areas that imposed specific 
demands (resistance to high temperatures, chemicals, etcetera). Such high-
performance materials got a prominent place in the corporate develop-
ment programme of 1985. Besides Dyneema, blends of different polymers, 
composites and ceramics were included. CRO’s work on blends led to 
Stapron, a combination of styrene – maleic anhydride and other polymers. 
DSM built a plant in 1993, but closed it down only six years later.96 Stanyl 
and Dyneema were more successful, however, as was UHMW-PE for the 
engineering plastics market.
 As in the case of fertilisers and synthetic fibre intermediates, DSM 
developed a strategy of consolidation and selective expansion in plastics. 
Research not only optimised production processes but also worked on 
broadening the product portfolio. Diversification and product develop-
ment built on the same technology base that had fuelled the bulk plastics 
business.
Searching for Products with High Value-Added
In the 1980s, DSM chose a common twofold strategy to combat the prob-
lems in the chemical industry and improve its results. This strategy left 
more room for research than in the 1970s, both in bulk chemicals and 
in diversification projects and strategic spearheads such as fine chemicals. 
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The balancing of research and business interests was more successful than 
in the 1970s, particularly through the corporate development programmes. 
Towards 1990, the increased room for research paid off in a number of re-
search-based diversifications (see also table 5.1). 
 Although confidence in research did not reach the levels of the 1950s 
and 1960s, it did increase in the 1980s. Confidence in research varied in 
a wave-like pattern, as the case of Dyneema shows in a nutshell. The in-
creased productivity of research in diversification towards 1990 shows that 
at least some independence is necessary. In order to be productive in re-
newing the company’s lines of business, research needs room to develop its 
own view of what is in the interest of the company and room to act on this 
view.97
 DSM increased its research spending in the 1980s, but did not reach 
the levels of the 1950s and 1960s. The level of spending was adequate, 
however, to allow research to reclaim its importance in diversification. 
The major difference between the 1980s and the period before 1970 was 
the much stronger integration of research and business strategy, and the 
stronger organisational integration of research, production, marketing and 
other company functions. In the 1950s and 1960s, research took initiatives 
and management responded, leading to a rather loose interplay between 
research and DSM’s production organisation. In the 1980s, by contrast, 
research took initiatives within a clearly-defined strategic framework that 
enabled a closer coordination between research and business needs. Com-
pared to the 1970s, during the 1980s DSM found a better way to involve 
the divisions in research. The corporate development programmes were 
funded centrally and subsidised by the Dutch government, but the divi-
sions monitored progress and took over well-defined projects. This pro-
vided the means to involve the divisions, but without testing their patience 
and confidence with the many turns and unexpected results that are char-
acteristic of research. 
 Research’s role in the 1980s built on its accumulated technological ca-
pabilities. The work on urea and caprolactam shows research’s ability to 
help DSM maintain its market positions and to evaluate the attractiveness 
of variants of technology used in plants. The corporate development pro-
grammes also built on previous research work and accumulated techno-
logical capabilities. Dyneema’s long development finally gained momen-
tum with the development of an industrial process. Existing knowledge of 
fibre processing, although not very extensive, enabled the absorption of 
Toyobo’s input. 
 Similarly, the expansion in fine chemicals and the research work in this 
field had started in the 1970s, but gained momentum in the 1980s. The 
work on enzymes provided a stepping-stone to the establishment of amino 
acid production and to engaging in the joint venture with Tosoh for aspar-
tame production. The acquisition of Andeno complemented Special Prod-
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ucts’ business as well as the technological capabilities and research built in 
fine chemicals. Through research and complementary acquisitions, fine 
chemicals made its breakthrough and developed from a niche in 1970 to a 
strategic spearhead by 1985.
 After DSM’s shift from coal to fertilisers, and from fertilisers to bulk 
chemicals, DSM embarked on a third shift after 1980. Fine chemicals had 
started as a niche in the 1970s, but DSM started to emphasise this field 
after 1980. At that time, the company was developing new materials as 
well. This trend continued after 1990 and was to transform DSM into a 
fine chemicals and materials company. Research laid a crucial foundation 
for this transformation in the 1980s.
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6
Conclusion. Research and Business at DSM 
Carl Bosch once predicted that the chemical industry would have to 
transform its foundations every fifteen years. Charles Kline, an American 
marketing consultant who frequently worked with chemical companies, 
remarked in the early 1980s that the chemical industry was a ‘chameleon 
industry’ continuously adapting itself to new circumstances.1 Change is in-
deed an important feature of the chemical industry and of chemical com-
panies. DSM is no exception, having transformed itself from a coal-min-
ing company and coke manufacturer into a fertiliser company and then 
into a large and diversified chemical company focused on bulk chemicals, 
and then again into a firm focused on fine chemicals and high perform-
ance materials. What role did research play in these processes of change? 
And how was research managed? 
 This chapter provides an overview of these issues. Table 6.1 summar-
ises the roles of industrial research in the cases analysed in this book and 
provides structure to this chapter. It shows that enabling diversification 
and meeting threats were important roles of research at DSM. The role of 
research in diversification is linked with management views on research. 
In several cases analysed in this book, moreover, research’s role changed 
over time from enabling diversification to meeting threats, as improving 
and maintaining market and technological positions becomes important 
after a business has been entered. Research’s absorptive capacity enabled a 
number of diversifications as well. Research played no role in controlling 
technological change. DSM followed an imitative innovation strategy in 
ammonia, for instance, the crucial intermediate for fertilisers. Low costs 
were central here. Chemiebouw and the plant’s staff played crucial roles in 
cutting production costs and in expanding production capacity. When en-
gineering contractors developed a new generation of ammonia processes, 
DSM bought a new plant incorporating this technology.2
Enabling Diversification: Research and New Businesses
Shifting Technology Bases
DSM developed from coal and coke to fertilisers in the 1920s, and from 
fertilisers to plastics and fibre intermediates in the 1950s and 1960s. DSM 
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became a diversified chemical company, and this enabled the company to 
survive the shutdown of the Dutch coal-mining industry. DSM continued 
to renew itself, however, and from its base in plastics and fibre intermedi-
ates sought high value-added products in fine chemicals and high perform-
ance materials after 1970 and particularly after 1980.
 Technology bases shifted along with this pattern of diversification and 
transformation. DSM entered the chemical industry by hiring engineering 
contractors but soon started to build its own technological capabilities, 
and this process gained momentum after the Second World War. The im-
provement of the process for the manufacture of ammonium sulphate, as 
well as the development of the mixed fertiliser and alcohol processes, built 
a foundation of capabilities in process research, development and engi-
Table 6.1. Roles of research and innovation strategy: products.
Note: years between brackets refer to the year of start-up (of a plant), or the year of 
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neering, as well as a specific body of knowledge relating to fertilisers (prod-
uct finishing techniques and later phase rule expertise in relation to mixed 
fertilisers). After the Second World War, the engineering capabilities were 
institutionalised in Chemiebouw while the Central Laboratory started to 
grow in scale and scope. In the case of urea, the engineering capabilities of 
Chemiebouw and the process research capabilities of the Central Labora-
tory combined to form an effective organisation for innovation. Specific 
fertiliser know-how was utilised in urea (phase rules) and also expanded 
(prilling). DSM in this way expanded the technology base it had started to 
build in the 1930s.3 
 After the Second World War, the Central Laboratory started to do fun-
damental research on a major scale. Catalysis research started in relation 
to ammonia, but later shifted to other products and provided a valuable 
input in a diverse range of projects. In the case of ammonia, catalysis re-
search was conducted together with the works laboratory of the fertiliser 
business and closely coordinated with the ammonia plant’s staff. Catalysis 
research was valuable to both research and production.4 
 In the case of urea, fundamental research even started out of direct 
industrial relevance: an effort to improve full recycle processes. As such, 
fundamental research played an important role in the development of the 
stripping process: DSM’s breakthrough that propelled it into a position of 
technological leadership.
 DSM also started fundamental research on polymers. It related to what 
was at the time a core activity and it also led to Dyneema (after some 
unexpected turns and detours). Both fundamental polymer research and 
catalysis were subjects that universities had difficulty handling within their 
discipline-oriented organisation. This prompted DSM and other compa-
nies to start research in these areas, alongside their industrial relevance.5
 The fundamental research carried out at DSM after the Second World 
War points to the deepening and widening of the company’s research ef-
fort. This can also be seen in the case of caprolactam, where the Central 
Laboratory greatly expanded on the small-scale research in organic chemis-
try of the 1930s. In urea, the route to the product was known and research 
focused on finding possible process configurations and on finding the 
most efficient, low-cost configuration. This was partly engineering work, 
as in the case of the once-through process, but also entailed development 
and process research, particularly when DSM’s innovation strategy in urea 
developed from defensive to offensive. 
 Research in organic chemistry, by contrast, often entailed a substantial 
amount of work to find a route to a targeted product, and then the work 
on finding a suitable process configuration still had to be done. The capro-
lactam process proceeded in more steps from feedstock to end-product 
than urea. This was typical of organic products and could lead to unex-
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pected turns in research. For instance, the research that led to the establish-
ment of alpha-picoline production had targeted pyridine at first, but when 
this compound proved to be out of reach, it targeted alpha-picoline.
 The capabilities that were built in relation to caprolactam built a new 
technology base alongside the technology base in fertilisers. Some ele-
ments overlapped, particularly the capabilities in relation to process re-
search, development, engineering and catalysis, and these overlapping ca-
pabilities were pivotal in the development of a new technology base from 
the existing one. Through caprolactam, however, DSM acquired extensive 
capabilities in organic chemistry and also, although on a smaller scale, 
capabilities in relation to the processing of synthetic fibres. In particular, 
an application research capability was built in relation to polyethylene and 
other plastics in DSM’s portfolio, where product variety and knowledge of 
plastics processing was vital for marketing.6
 The caprolactam technology base was important for other products as 
well. Most of Special Products’ initial activities were spin-offs from capro-
lactam production or research. For instance, the Dow phenol process was 
uncompetitive, and in this sense not very successful in its primary function. 
Nevertheless, the process provided the opportunity for producing benzal-
dehyde and benzoic acid. Finally, the best example of DSM’s increased ca-
pabilities in organic chemistry and the importance of caprolactam research 
is the lysine case. DSM’s attempts to synthesise lysine required an extensive 
base in organic chemistry. Without caprolactam, DSM would not have 
been able to undertake this attempt.
 Although the primary objective of the lysine project failed, its second-
ary effects were major. The lysine project led to an accumulation of knowl-
edge that could be applied to other products as well. The pyridine project 
started with an intermediate from the acrylonitrile-based process. More 
important for the long-term development of DSM, the knowledge of the 
separation of the D- and L-lysine widened when research included me-
thionine. This knowledge could be applied to phenylglycine and, in turn, 
further deepened DSM’s capabilities in this field. The accumulated knowl-
edge was vital to the establishment of specialty amino acid production in 
the late 1980s. This body of knowledge also provided one of the incentives 
to acquire Andeno and was used as input into the cooperation with Tosoh 
that led to the production of aspartame. These acquisitions complemented 
DSM’s capabilities and sparked further development of the fine chemicals 
activities.
 The caprolactam technology base was also important for Dyneema 
and Stanyl, projects that could profit from knowledge of fibre manufac-
ture built through application research that had been started in relation to 
caprolactam production, and of application research more broadly in rela-
tion to plastics. The links with plastics were pivotal in the development of 
a technology base in high performance materials. 
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 In summary, DSM was able to shift its technology base through generic 
technological capabilities (see also figure 6.1). Generic process research, 
development and engineering capabilities, the extensive research DSM did 
on catalysis, and application research on caprolactam and plastics were 
pivotal in the development of a new technology base from an existing one. 
Fertiliser research, for instance, built process research, development and 
engineering capabilities that also enabled research on caprolactam. This 
clearly shows the importance of these types of research for diversification 
projects and the development of the company.
 This mechanism of shifting technology bases through generic techno-
logical capabilities is what Pisano points to in his dual output model of 
R&D. In the case of DSM, however, the secondary effects of research 
projects were much broader than generic knowledge of how to improve 
the efficiency and effectiveness of R&D projects. Research projects, more-
over, sometimes built sets of knowledge that could be transferred from 
project to project. The spin-offs from lysine research are examples of this 
mechanism. Such capabilities are specific, and deepen and extend existing 
technology bases but do not build new bases. The spin-offs from lysine re-
search, for example, extended DSM’s base in fine chemicals and provided 
a foundation for the company’s business in this field, but did not build a 
new technology base.
 
Patterns and Drivers of Diversification
The shifts in technology base reflect the three transformations DSM went 
through over the course of its history. Its pattern of transformation emerged 
step by step, through a series of strategic shifts. Until 1970, DSM entered 
new businesses mainly because it had the necessary raw materials in-house 
and simply assumed that it could find a market. For instance, DSM started 
large-scale manufacture of nitrogen fertilisers primarily because it could 
extract hydrogen from its coke oven gas, not because the market for fer-
tilisers boomed. Such feedstock-driven diversification continued after the 
Second World War, but the feedstock links between coke and chemicals 
were first loosened, and later cut, while the Central Laboratory grew in 
size and scope. Although feedstocks remained important, the ability to de-
velop or otherwise obtain technology increasingly steered diversification. 
The shift from feedstocks to technology as a driver of diversification was 
gradual. Expansion became the key word, boosting capacity of existing 
products, taking up new lines of business and loosening, later cutting, the 
ties between chemicals and coal and coke.
 The diversification and expansion of DSM’s chemical businesses took 
place at a time when markets were growing fast. After 1970 growth stag-
nated, but DSM aimed to make a Large Leap Forward, pushing ahead 
with expansion and diversification to replace the coal and coke businesses. 
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Note: boxes contain research projects, grey rectangles generic technological capabilities and 
the ellipses specific technology bases. Arrows indicate direct links.
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The Large Leap Forward was a major break with previous patterns. Mar-
kets came into play more fully and the perceived commercial attractive-
ness of diversifications became a central concern. DSM also drastically 
reorganised and established divisions. The not-so-spectacular growth of 
many markets after 1970 caused headwind, however. From the late 1970s 
onwards, DSM tried to refocus, shifting away from its large-scale, low-
profit bulk chemicals into fine chemicals and high performance materi-
als. By the middle of the 1980s, the tide had turned and DSM focused 
on innovation and renewal, intensifying the move into high value-added 
products.
The Role of Research in Diversification
The importance of diversification increased over the course of DSM’s his-
tory as the company repeatedly transformed itself. Diversification became 
particularly important after 1966, when DSM rid itself of its coal-related 
businesses and expanded in chemicals (Graph 6.1). 
 One quick way of showing the contribution of research to diversifi-
cation is to count the number of diversifications that built on research 
(Graph 6.2). This shows that throughout the history of DSM, research 
has played an important role in establishing new lines of business. The 
importance of research as an enabler of diversification varied in a wave-like 
pattern over time, however (see also table 6.2). In the feedstocks phase, 
technology was acquired and internal capabilities were built. DSM hired 
engineering contractors to build several plants for fertiliser manufacture, 






































































































































Sources: see tables 3.1 and 5.1.
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but soon after improved the ammonium sulphate process. Technology ac-
quisitions complemented internal capabilities, as in the case of nitro phos-
phates and the once-through urea process. The Central Laboratory was 
established before the Second World War, but embarked on a process of 
growth in the 1950s. Research became increasingly important, both initiat-
ing and enabling diversifications, and the successes of research contributed 
to its growing importance.
 In the 1970s, the importance of research for diversification declined. 
The research-based diversifications in that decade were in fine chemicals, a 
field DSM did not yet emphasise in its strategy at that time. DSM targeted 
further diversification in plastics and resins to expand and reach large-scale 
production, but purchased technology or took over companies to do so. 
Taking over other companies was a new means for DSM to diversify and 
expand, but the role of in-house research was as small as in technology ac-
quisitions. After diversification, R&D optimised processes and improved 
product quality.
 The 1980s were a renaissance for research.7 The economic situation 
improved and research had more room to take initiatives and enable di-
versification. The jump in the number of research-based diversifications 
at the end of the 1980s reflects the output not only of the corporate de-
velopment programmes but also of other research projects that had been 
started around the middle of the 1980s. In that decade, moreover, com-
Graph 6.2. Diversification and research-based diversification.
Sources: see tables 3.1 and 5.1 
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plementary technology also became an argument for taking over other 
companies.
 In all of the periods, DSM typically entered businesses late with a 
defensive innovation strategy, aimed at keeping up with the competition 
Table 6.2. Business strategy and R&D at DSM, 1925-1990.








- Acquisition of technol-
ogy main method of 
diversification before 
1940.
- Build-up of R&D:
- Meeting threats.
- Enabling diversifica-
tion, particularly after 
1945.
- Strong integration of 
business strategy and 
research.
1960s Expansion. - Major capacity 






- Initiating: generation of 
options for management.
- Enabling diversification: 
R&D necessary to enter 
markets.
- Strong integration of 
business strategy and 
research.












- Research followed busi-
ness strategy.
1980s Towards products 
with high value-
added.
- Focus on bulk chemi-
cals with strong com-
mercial/technological 
position.





- Strong integration of 
business strategy and 
research.
Compare: E. Homburg (2000). Epiloog: DSM Research op weg naar de 21e eeuw. 
H. Lintsen, Ed. Research tussen vetkool en zoetstof. Eindhoven/Zutphen: Stichting Historie 
der Techniek/Walburg Pers, 118-135.
254 the company that changed itself
and if possible overtaking them (Table 6.1). In the case of fertilisers, par-
ticularly in the case of urea, and also in caprolactam, this proved to be a 
successful strategy. DSM tried to obtain a strong technological position, 
and from that position tried to market its products. 
 The only exceptions to this rule are lysine and Dyneema. Although 
they both built on elements of the technology base built around capro-
lactam, these projects entailed new markets and new technologies for 
DSM and such projects very often fail.8 From this perspective the success 
of Dyneema, even though it took a long time, is perhaps more surprising 
than the failure of the lysine project.
 As in the case of Dyneema, it took time before DSM could enter the 
fine chemicals field and could build a substantial business. The fragment-
ed, low-volume businesses of the fine chemicals sector differed significantly 
from the bulk chemicals sector and the possibilities to acquire know-how 
were limited. The entry into fine chemicals built strongly on initiatives 
originating from research and in-house work. It could build on existing 
technological capabilities as DSM’s strongholds in process research and 
catalysis were just as important for its fine chemical products as they were 
for bulk chemicals. The in-house work was small-scale in the 1970s, how-
ever, and the expansion of DSM’s fine chemicals interests got a significant 
boost in the second half of the 1980s from the acquisition of Andeno and 
the establishment of aspartame production, which were typically defensive 
actions. 
 Although lysine was a new market and a new technology for DSM, 
its failure shows the limits of feedstock-driven and technology-driven re-
search and diversification from a business point of view. The technological 
and feedstock links with caprolactam and the possibility to manufacture 
synthetic lysine fuelled an optimistic view of market development before 
any market development work had led to results. This optimism reigned 
not only in research but also in the production and marketing organisa-
tions, and in top management. Although research and marketing tried 
very hard and built a large network of relationships, the efforts to find a 
market lacked focus. Market development work covered a wide range of 
possibly interesting applications and market segments. This made it very 
hard to create a strong interface between research and marketing, which in 
turn contributed to the failure of the lysine project. 
 In the cases of urea and caprolactam, the target markets were clear, as 
were the demands set by customers. These markets, moreover, grew tre-
mendously. The 1950s and 1960s were a unique time of high growth in the 
chemical industry and in this context a technology-based and feedstock-
based strategy worked very well. There was not much need to worry over 
the question of whether products could be sold. Together with the failure 
of the lysine project, stagnating growth of markets led to the departure 
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from existing practice formulated in the Large Leap strategy, with diversi-
fication issues being focused increasingly on the attractiveness of products 
rather than the availability of feedstocks and the potential to develop tech-
nology. 
Causes of Waves
A wave-like pattern in the importance of research for diversification is not 
unique to DSM. The study of Du Pont by David Hounshell and John 
Smith shows a similar pattern for instance, although the boundaries of the 
periods differ slightly. Ernst Homburg’s study of research in the Nether-
lands also shows a wave-like pattern.9 
 In the case of DSM, the wave-like pattern was caused by several fac-
tors. In the first place, market conditions and the company’s results are 
important. In hard times, research is under pressure. DSM economised 
on research in the 1970s just as it economised on other functions. When 
the company’s results improved in the 1980s, research gained more room 
again. In this way, the importance of research fluctuated with business 
results.
 In the second place, Homburg has shown the importance of bandwa-
gon behaviour in the directions companies chose for research management: 
firms follow their competitors. This perspective suggests that companies 
hold each other in a blind embrace, with no leaders and followers, but re-
sulting in companies moving in the same direction.10 Intriguing from this 
perspective is the direction companies choose in their diversification paths. 
Fertilisers in the 1930s, plastics and fibres in the 1950s and biotechnol-
ogy and materials in the 1980s were all fashionable fields, attracting many 
firms. The example of DSM, with cases like urea and caprolactam, shows 
that such strategies can even be successful if markets grow fast enough 
and costs are cut as well. This perspective also highlights the difficulties 
encountered with lysine and Dyneema, cases in which there were few firms 
to follow. 
 A third factor in the wave-like pattern of the importance of research 
is management. The faith and confidence management had in research 
influenced the extent to which research could take initiatives. In the 
1950s, the importance of research was beyond challenge, but this changed 
around 1970. The failure of the lysine project dented the self-confidence 
built over the previous years and led to a more critical attitude towards 
research, both inside and outside the Central Laboratory. Faith and con-
fidence in the results of projects, and especially the sustained faith and 
confidence of the project leader, have been shown to be important factors 
contributing to the success of innovation. The example of DSM points to 
the importance of faith and confidence at business and top management 
levels.11
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 Graph 6.2 (page 252) shows the potency of having faith and confidence 
in research. The 1950s and 1960s were a time when many diversifications 
built on research. This shows that research needs room to take initiatives 
to reach such productivity. When this room was walled off and became 
smaller in the 1970s, productivity promptly declined but it grew again in 
the 1980s when room for research increased. An initiating role, or what 
Graham and Pruitt have called the formulation of a technical vision, is 
essential for research to play an important role in the long-term develop-
ment of a company.12
 In summary, research, diversification and management’s views of re-
search were strongly interrelated and varied in a wave-like pattern over 
time. The initiating role of research, the room business management gave 
to research, was a function of several parameters: economic circumstances, 
bandwagon behaviour, and the faith and confidence management had in 
research. Research contributed strongly to diversification in the 1950s and 
1960s, and again in the 1980s; whereas in the 1970s, diversification took 
place mainly through technology acquisitions.
Unpredictability, Short-term and Long-term Research, and Business 
Management
In DSM’s diversification process, the secondary effects of research projects 
have been important, but from a managerial perspective these effects make 
the results of research projects hard to predict. Of course, at the start 
of lysine research no-one expected that it would lead to alpha-picoline. 
Through research on the acrylonitrile-based lysine process, however, re-
search on pyridine started and when that failed, it led to the establishment 
of alpha-picoline production. Making the example more narrow, even the 
failure of the pyridine project, which had a shorter time range than the 
lysine project, led to a successful, but unexpected, diversification. This 
example shows that secondary effects, along with problem shifts and un-
expected turns and results, make the issue of the effectiveness of research 
a persistent one, basically because it is very hard to determine what the 
results of any one particular project are or will be.13 Andries Sarlemijn and 
Marc de Vries argue that rationality in R&D is only piecemeal. Each step 
in the process that eventually leads to a new product might be managed 
rationally, but the overall results and directions of research develop over 
time and step by step.14
 Nevertheless, management needs to find a response to this unpredicta-
bility. In the 1950s and 1960s, this response was simple and straightforward. 
Not only research management, but also top management and business 
management, accepted the unpredictability of research. In an atmosphere 
where faith and confidence in research was high, it was accepted that some 
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projects would inevitably fail. This may have been only partly rational, be-
cause many projects failed, but from the perspective of the 1950s and 1960s 
such failures were more than offset by the successes. ‘Research is a gamble’, 
as Dick van Krevelen phrased it.15 
 From the late 1960s and early 1970s onwards, however, DSM increas-
ingly attempted to manage this uncertainty. An important reason for this 
was the shift in focus towards markets, but the most crucial factor was the 
increased involvement of business management, the divisions. In the 1950s, 
the Central Laboratory was able to take the initiative towards the develop-
ment of the HPO process without being influenced by production, but 
after 1970 such initiatives had to be coordinated with the divisions. The 
case of the HPO process also shows the merits of coordination. Business 
management became involved at a time when the process was ready to be 
commercialised, but at this point its judgement only threatened to make 
years of research useless.
 The management literature has highlighted mismatches between the 
research and production functions of companies to argue that the research 
management practices of the 1950s and 1960s failed to integrate research, 
production and marketing.16 The case of the HPO process, however, shows 
that the Central Laboratory did not take initiatives out of its own curiosity 
or out of scientific interest but on the basis of an analysis and a view of the 
long-term interests of the company. Researchers considered the production 
of ammonium sulphate alongside caprolactam as a threat, long before it 
became difficult to market ammonium sulphate and long before business 
management reached the same conclusion. On the basis of its analysis, the 
Central Laboratory conducted research to reduce or remove ammonium 
sulphate production. The relevance of this research became clear in the 
1970s.
 As business management showed no interest in the HPO process 
around 1960, the rational thing to do would have been to stop research. 
Similarly, researching Dyneema seemed to make little sense. The Central 
Laboratory had some experience and knowledge in the field of synthetic 
fibres through application research on caprolactam, but lacked the capa-
bilities to introduce a new fibre. In the 1970s, moreover, neither the Plas-
tics division, which was in principle related to Dyneema through poly-
ethylene, nor the Chemical Products division, which was related through 
caprolactam, backed research into the new fibre.
 The examples of Dyneema and the HPO process show the potency of 
having faith and simply continuing research. These examples also show 
that to some extent tensions between research and business are unavoid-
able. Crudely put, research will by nature focus more on the long term and 
business management more on the short and medium term, reflecting the 
different incentives and environments they face. 
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 The issue of the relationship between research and business was not 
unique to DSM, although other companies perhaps had to confront it 
earlier. It is striking, however, that the issue of aligning the research and 
production functions gained considerable weight after DSM organised 
its divisions. In the 1950s, a triangle between top management (Jan van 
Aken), business management (Jef van Waes) and research management 
(Gé Berkhoff ) was organised and this management triangle was an im-
portant bridge between research and production functions. In the 1960s, a 
more elaborate management structure developed, but top management in-
volvement remained strong and put business and research management on 
an equal footing. The structure for research management became strained 
in the early 1970s when the divisions were established and the company 
made a quantum leap in chemical business growth. The balance of power 
tilted towards business management who, under the circumstances they 
were facing, were more interested in short-term incremental improve-
ments than in long-term projects that might, but at the same time might 
not, lead to a new line of business or an improvement of an existing pro-
cess or product. Some divisions shifted more to the short term than others 
but the heyday of long-term research had definitely passed. The failure of 
the lysine project had also dealt a blow to confidence in research. 
 Graham and Pruitt also note in their history of Alcoa research that the 
establishment of divisions pushed research to the short term.17 At DSM, 
the stronger say of business management combined with stagnating mar-
ket growth and declining confidence in research. In this way an organisa-
tional change reinforced already difficult circumstances for research. The 
matrix organisation of the Central Laboratory and the appointment of 
directors of research (werkgebiedmanagers), as well as stronger top manage-
ment involvement toward the end of the 1970s, readjusted the balance of 
power more in favour of research. For the divisions, the matrix opened 
the black box of the laboratory at least to some extent, and the directors 
of research functioned as a bridge between research and production. The 
corporate development programmes of the mid-1980s similarly performed 
such a bridging function.
 In her book about RCA, Graham implicitly pleads for a better under-
standing of research by business managers, but the example of DSM shows 
that the way in which the relationship between research and business is 
organised is important as well.18 The management triangle of the 1950s and 
the research directors of the 1970s and 1980s provided a bridge between 
business and research, and an essential tool to align their diverging in-
terests. Such alignment is open-ended but nevertheless necessary. It is not 
so much from the tensions between research and business that research 
derives its value, but from the process of alignment. 
 Hounshell has argued that all companies struggle to find a balance be-
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tween research focused on the short term and research focused on the long 
term.19 DSM is no exception, but the 1980s were a more balanced period 
than the 1950s and 1960s on the one hand and the 1970s on the other. In 
the 1950s and 1960s, research had much freedom to take initiatives and 
start projects, but at the same time, production and marketing functions 
were not involved in such initiatives. In the 1970s, by contrast, marketing 
and production issues pushed research toward short-term projects. In the 
1980s, particularly through the corporate development programmes, DSM 
found a balance between short-term business interests and long-term re-
search interests.
Meeting Threats: Research and Existing Businesses
Technological Maturity
Up to this point the related issues of diversification and the management 
of research have been emphasised, but enabling diversification was not the 
only role of research. A large part of the work consisted of improving and 
maintaining market positions. In the 1950s, researchers had to lower the 
amount of biuret in urea because of competitive threats. In the 1980s, re-
searchers worked to reduce the amount of ammonium sulphate produced 
as a by-product of caprolactam through small changes to the process to 
improve the economics of caprolactam production. Although it was often 
not spectacular, the importance of such work can hardly be overestimated. 
The chemical industry is a competitive industry, and the markets for bulk 
chemicals are cyclical, requiring an ongoing effort to cut costs and improve 
product quality. Moreover, such work is hard to outsource.
 Research in relation to existing businesses could have a narrow scope, 
and focus on small incremental improvements to a plant’s processes, but 
could also have a broader scope, and include research on alternative pro-
cesses. The Central Laboratory was the driving force work with a broad 
scope; in narrowly-scoped work, the staff engineers and operators of pro-
duction plants played an important role alongside research. Chemiebouw 
played a role in both broadly-scoped and narrowly-scoped work for existing 
businesses, but the importance of this role declined somewhat after 1970 as 
Chemiebouw, like many other departments, was reduced in size through 
the company-wide economising programmes. DSM had hired engineering 
contractors mainly to acquire technology but after 1970, following a trend 
across the chemical industry, external firms were hired to do engineering 
work even in projects that relied on in-house technology.20 In the narrow-
scope area, the Central Laboratory conducted projects that were too large 
or too complex for staff engineers and Chemiebouw to handle, such as the 
reduction of ammonium sulphate by-product in caprolactam in the 1980s.
 Broadly-scoped research projects in relation to existing businesses were 
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set up in the 1950s and 1960s in particular. The results were mixed. In urea, 
the continuous effort to improve production technology paid off, but in 
caprolactam, the studies into the caprolactone process and a number of 
other alternative processes produced hardly any results. This type of re-
search was constrained in the 1970s, but when it increased again in the 
1980s, the results were again limited. New urea and caprolactam processes 
were investigated but could not be implemented. Work on urea was cut on 
the grounds of the supposed technological maturity of the stripping pro-
cess. The fertiliser activities were in decline and consequently the research 
budget fell. In this increasingly tight budget, diversification got priority 
instead of research for existing businesses. This choice reflects DSM’s refo-
cus on innovation and diversification, but is striking in the light of the dif-
ficult position of the fertiliser division. One would sooner have expected 
a strategy of cost cutting and further rationalisation through incremental 
improvements. Research was successful and new products were introduced 
in 1990, but these activities were later sold off. 
 The case of urea shows that the opportunities to improve a technology 
decline in the long term: from the major leaps of the 1950s and 1960s, the 
opportunities to improve urea processes declined to relatively small steps 
in the 1980s. This is a life cycle or maturation process. With the urea strip-
ping process, efficiency of urea production reached a high level, which in 
turn narrowed the window of opportunity for process improvements and 
new processes. Even the urea stripping process, however, had no ‘shut-
down economics’ over other full recycle processes. Plotkin suggests that in 
the 1950s and 1960s, new processes reduced costs, or had other advantages 
that made it economical to shut down existing capacities or could force 
competitors out of business.21 If there ever had been such processes, the 
urea stripping process was not one of them.22 DSM introduced this process 
as markets grew. The fast growth of markets made it necessary to periodi-
cally expand capacities substantially, providing a chance to introduce new 
or improved processes. The growth of markets slowed down after 1970, 
and DSM’s urea business got into trouble. The need for capacity additions 
declined, leading to a much more unfavourable environment for process 
innovation.
 As the work of Utterback suggests, technological life cycles are cou-
pled to the development of markets. Peter Hutcheson, Alan Pearson and 
Derrick Ball have applied Utterback’s model to a study of innovation in 
ethylene production processes, arguing that the segmental stage occurred 
in the period between 1945 and 1970 and the systematic phase after 1970. 
Despite the obvious problem that it is difficult to speak of product inno-
vations in a bulk chemical like ethylene, Hutcheson et al. show a pattern 
similar to urea, pointing to the catalytic effect of high market growth on 
process innovation in the chemical industry between 1945 and 1970.23
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 Utterback and Hutcheson et al. leave management out of the picture, 
however. By the 1980s, the stripping process was technologically ‘mature’ 
in the sense that major improvements and major cost reductions like those 
of the 1950s and 1960s were no longer possible. Research in the 1980s 
aimed at such a major leap but failed. Later, Stamicarbon showed that 
the stripping process could be further improved, but these improvements 
were based on engineering and less on research, and were relatively small. 
Research and business management chose innovation instead of rationali-
sation and failed to align research to the development of the market. This 
put further downward pressure on the position of urea production.24
 The case of caprolactam is also interesting in this perspective. The HPO 
process rationalised the existing caprolactam process but did not provide 
such an advantage that replacement of existing capacities that had not yet 
reached the end of their life was viable. As market growth stagnated after 
1970, incremental improvements could raise production enough to meet 
market growth and made existing processes a moving target for new pro-
cesses. The success of incremental improvements narrowed the window of 
opportunity for broadly-scoped research for existing business after 1970.
 The case of caprolactam also shows the increase in minimum viable 
scale of plants in the chemical industry. In 1952, DSM entered caprolactam 
with a plant of 3,600 tons per year but only about twenty years later it built 
the first HPO unit at a capacity of 70,000 tons per year. The risks involved 
in scaling up a process increased accordingly but, more importantly from 
a business management point of view, capital requirements also increased 
and made it expensive to introduce a new process. In the 1950s and 1960s, 
the minimum size at which a plant would be economical had also in-
creased as a result of innovation and market growth. 
 Technological ‘maturity’, then, is primarily a function of the develop-
ment of the market, the success of incremental improvements, and man-
agement’s response to both. Technological maturity is not a static state 
reached at some point in time, but management has some room to respond 
and its response affects the maturation process. In the 1980s, management’s 
focus on (high) growth in new products catalysed the maturation process 
in urea. The alternative would have been to align research and production 
in existing products very closely and put emphasis on engineering.
Acquisitions: Absorptive Capacity
In the case of urea and caprolactam, research had established the business 
and continued afterwards to maintain or improve DSM’s commercial and 
technological positions. But research in relation to existing businesses was 
also important in businesses that had not been built on in-house research. 
The first of DSM’s innovations was the improvement of the acquired am-
monium sulphate process, which was important to meet pressure from 
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competitors. Research was central in a defensive innovation strategy to 
maintain market position, but particularly to improve that position. Re-
search was crucial for catching up and overtaking competitors.
 Research on acquired technologies also helped anchor these technolo-
gies in DSM’s technology base. Berkhoff ’s work on ammonium sulphate 
enlarged and extended DSM’s base in fertilisers, like Chemiebouw’s work 
on the first once-through process laid a foundation to develop recycle pro-
cesses. ASED’s once-through process fitted with DSM’s existing techno-
logical capabilities. The process was established, but had to be developed 
to industrial scale, which required some process research but mainly devel-
opment and engineering work. In this way it provided a stepping-stone to 
the expansion of the technology base in fertilisers. 
 This mechanism also worked in some of the cases where companies 
were taken over. The acquisition of Andeno fitted well with both DSM’s 
business and its research in fine chemicals. It could therefore stimulate 
DSM’s own research and business in this sector. Chem-Y, on the other 
hand, presented both new markets and new technologies for DSM and 
little research was done for Chem-Y in Geleen. The company was divested 
in the end.
 Although acquisitions were typically a much faster route to diversifica-
tion, the example of Chem-Y shows that acquisitions could also fail, just 
like research projects. Anchoring technology and company acquisitions in 
market and technology bases is vital for the success of these acquisitions. 
Research provided an important part of the absorptive capacity necessary 
to track, acquire and integrate external technology and companies. Re-
search in itself provided no guarantee for success however. In the case of 
ABS, for instance, research worked on product and process improvements, 
but ABS could nevertheless not maintain its position in DSM’s portfo-
lio.25 
Other Roles of Research
In the introduction, several roles of industrial research were distinguished. 
The case of DSM shows that meeting threats and enabling diversification 
were the most important roles of R&D. The Central Laboratory func-
tioned as a training house for future managers as well. Business and top 
managers usually started their careers at DSM in the research organisation. 
Some remained a researcher only for a short time, while others remained 
for a longer period and then moved to a business management function. 
The highest research managers, like Berkhoff and Van Krevelen, did not 
move into top management, however.26
 Another role of industrial research is that it enabled companies to con-
trol the rate and direction of technological change, primarily by means of 
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patents.27 In the case of Dyneema, patenting provided a strong defence 
against competitors. Conversely, patents of other companies often pro-
vided the starting point for in-house R&D. The HPO project started from 
patents of Spencer Chemical, like the caprolactone project started from 
patents of Union Carbide. The Central Laboratory could depart from pa-
tented technology and build an independent position, as in the case of the 
HPO process. R&D sometimes failed to build an independent position or 
to invent around patented technology, as in the case of caprolactone. The 
in-house work could also provide bargaining power to obtain a license, or 
to obtain favourable licensing terms. In EPDM, DSM’s own work, its pa-
tent position and its licenses were tools to bend Montecatini’s position. 
 Viewed from the perspective of Montecatini, the case of EPDM shows 
that patents were typically insufficient to prevent competition and to con-
trol technology in the chemical industry. Even in polypropylene, the pa-
tents of the Italian firm did not prove strong enough. DSM had a similar 
experience in the case of its urea stripping process. Snam Progetti patented 
ammonia stripping, and in this way worked around DSM’s carbon dioxide 
stripping patents. Patents on processes are typically weaker than product 
patents. In this way, firms in the bulk chemicals sector of the chemical in-
dustry, which relied strongly on process technology for their competitive-
ness, were handicapped in using patents to control technological change. 
Typically, many companies worked in a particular field, always threatening 
each other, and always requiring a large effort even to keep up. Finally, 
markets were so often so large that it was impossible for one firm, or a 
combination of firms, to build a monopoly.
 The control of technological change is related to an industry’s struc-
ture. The absence of such control and the impossibility of any one com-
pany gaining a monopoly position are defining characteristics of the bulk 
chemical industry, particularly in the period after the Second World War. 
 On the other hand, patents, combined with the know-how of how to 
engineer an industrial plant, could build an attractive licensing business. 
In the case of DSM, the urea stripping process is an excellent example of 
the mechanisms of licensing. This process was a breakthrough, but Stami-
carbon started to license it immediately. The urea market was very large 
and several other companies and engineering contractors were offering 
technology. A potential producer would always find a source of technol-
ogy. From the perspective of DSM, not licensing would not have meant 
less competition.28 Stamicarbon sold large numbers of licenses on DSM’s 
urea process and also on other DSM technologies (see graph A3 in the ap-
pendix). Licensing developed into a profitable business.
 Stamicarbon also played an important role in DSM’s R&D. It was ini-
tially the only party to show an interest in the HPO process. In the 1980s, 
it also stimulated, and partly paid for, fertiliser research, particularly the 
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work on urea. Conversely, R&D on integrated urea and ammonia produc-
tion stopped when Stamicarbon reached the same, negative, conclusion as 
DSM’s fertiliser production unit. For the Central Laboratory, Stamicarbon 
provided an extra outlet for its research and sometimes also an extra source 
of funds.
 Stamicarbon projects also provided an opportunity to learn. The first 
HPO plants were built for other companies, for instance, and the first 
two licensed stripping plants had larger unit capacities than DSM’s own 
plant. Stamicarbon was also more international than DSM in the 1960s 
and 1970s. They worked for many foreign companies and had contacts 
with many engineering contractors that specialised in the engineering and 
construction of plants for the chemical industry. These contacts could be 
valuable: a tender for a caprolactam project in Mexico in 1980 triggered 
an evaluation of DSM’s own technology. Stamicarbon’s international out-
look provided a setting for training managers as well. Leo Kretzers and 
Ruud Selman, for instance, had worked for Stamicarbon before becoming 
responsible for the management of production units (plastics in Kretzer’s 
case, and fine chemicals in Selman’s case).
Research and the Development of DSM
In an article from 1996, Simon de Bree, then chairman of DSM’s Manag-
ing Board, paraphrased a researcher of the company who had said that 
PV = RT (the law of Boyle and Gay-Lussac) really means that the prod-
uct of price and volume (in other words, turnover) equals the product of 
research and technology.29 This ‘law’ is one way of saying that research 
played a central and crucial role in the development of DSM, both in 
enabling and initiating diversification, and in maintaining and improving 
established market positions.
 In the first place, research enabled many diversifications for the com-
pany and contributed substantially to DSM’s three transformations. Ac-
quisitions, either of technology or of companies, competed with research 
in its role of enabling diversification. Like research projects, however, ac-
quisitions can also fail. In fine chemicals, for instance, the lysine project of 
the Central Laboratory failed, but so did the acquisition of Chem-Y. Suc-
cessful acquisitions depended on starting research on what the company 
had bought and on buying what fitted the company. 
 The importance of research in enabling diversification shifted with 
management attitudes towards research in a wave-like pattern over time. 
After a build-up phase in the 1930s and 1940s, management gave research 
much room in the 1950s and 1960s to take initiatives and to work on 
subjects research thought relevant. The Central Laboratory played a cru-
cial role in many diversifications after the Second World War. The room 
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management gave research decreased in the 1970s, but again increased in 
the 1980s, although not to the levels of the 1950s and 1960s. After 1970, the 
importance of research for diversification similarly declined and increased 
again. This wave-like pattern also shows that the management of research 
is an open-ended process: bridging research and business interests, as well 
as long-term and short-term interests, remain crucial challenges.
 A second role of research in the development of DSM was the mainte-
nance of existing businesses. Research worked with the engineering depart-
ment and plant staff to cut costs and improve product quality. This type of 
research was, and remains, of paramount importance for competing in the 
chemical industry and is an inevitable in-house function of firms.
 After 1970, however, the slowdown in growth of many markets com-
bined with the increased minimum viable size of plants to make the intro-
duction of improved processes risky and difficult. In the 1980s, moreover, 
DSM also emphasised innovation and diversification in relation to estab-
lished lines of business, and this further narrowed the opportunities for 
broadly-scoped research in relation to existing businesses. Management 
also plays an important role in research on existing products and pro-
cesses.
 This review of the role of research in diversification and in the main-
tenance of existing businesses at DSM shows a pattern that differs from 
that of the R&D pioneers and the large companies that have been studied 
so often in the history of industrial research. DSM established a research 
organisation in response to diffuse threats, and its research organisation 
grew out of works laboratories and existing (but small scale) research work. 
After the Second World War, research did not diverge from other company 
functions. Business strategy and research were closely related and integrat-
ed. DSM’s research organisation played an important role in diversifica-
tion but also in the maintenance of existing businesses. 
 On the other hand, DSM’s wave-like pattern followed a general pat-
tern. The example of DSM shows that 1970 was a turning point. Com-
pared to the 1950s and 1960s, research got less room to initiate and enable 
diversification, while broadly scoped research for existing businesses be-
came more difficult. The period between 1945 and 1970 was exceptional, 
however.30 Markets grew at unprecedented rates while technology devel-
oped fast; the opportunities for innovation seemed endless. The 1970s and 
early 1980s were a more difficult period, but research at DSM recovered 
to some extent after 1985. The next chapter, a short epilogue, investigates 
whether this trend continued in the 1990s.
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In July 1988, Hans van Liemt, the then chairman of DSM’s Managing 
Board, said at a press conference: ‘Our large competitors are so aggressive 
that we have to concentrate on seven or eight areas, and not on twenty.’1 
This statement signalled a change of course: DSM embarked on a process 
of focus, both in its business and in its research.
The Chemical Industry and DSM in Transition
The chemical industry changed profoundly in the 1990s. Companies in 
Western Europe, Japan and the United States continued to suffer from 
cost disadvantages in raw materials and labour, and continued to face in-
creasingly stringent environmental regulations. In addition, stock markets 
added pressure to improve (short-term) profitability and to decrease cycli-
cal ups and downs in financial results. Internationalisation tied national 
economies together and shifted production around the world. For Euro-
pean chemical companies, the United States and Asia became focal areas 
in their efforts to increase sales outside their home region.2
 In response to these structural changes, chemical companies sought 
new, profitable businesses for growth, a continuation of the innovative 
strategies of the 1980s. They also retreated from areas outside their core 
and from areas they considered unattractive. Companies sought leadership 
positions based on what they considered to be their core competencies. A 
wave of mergers, divestments and acquisitions changed the landscape of 
the chemical industry. Some well-known and old companies like Hoechst 
and ICI ceased to exist in their previous forms while other companies 
changed their portfolio substantially.3
 At DSM, top management reached the conclusion that the company 
could build a strong competitive position only if it focused on a limited 
number of core activities. Leadership (both commercial and technological) 
and growth potential were important parameters in choosing the compa-
ny’s strategic direction. Moreover, DSM aimed at internationalisation to 
spread turnover across Europe, Asia and the United States. Turnover in 
countries outside Europe should double.4
 The strategy of focus and internationalisation changed the company’s 
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course. In the late 1980s, activities in fertilisers had already been scaled 
down through the divestment of several production sites.5 DSM also grad-
ually retreated from its energy-related activities and sold its interests in 
plastics processing.6 
 Expansion in fine chemicals continued, however. In 1992, DSM formed 
a Fine Chemicals division, and a year later this division drafted a strategy 
that aimed at substantially boosting turnover. Top management approved 
this strategy. Research intensified and the acquisition of companies speed-
ed up as well (Table 7.1), leading to a sharp increase in fine chemicals turn-
over after 1993. The acquisition of Gist-brocades in 1998 enabled DSM to 
take the next step in its reorientation from bulk to fine chemicals. This 
Dutch company produced penicillin and ingredients for the food indus-
try, including flavour enhancers and preservatives. The takeover brought 
fermentation and enzyme technologies as well. Gist-brocades had much 
experience with the use of enzymes in food and feed products and com-
plemented DSM’s work in this field. In other words, DSM’s capabilities in 
fine chemicals ensured the fit with Gist-brocades.7
 DSM paid 2.9 billion Dutch guilders (about 1.3 billion euro) for Gist-
brocades. The company became the world’s largest supplier of interme-
diates for pharmaceutical and food products. DSM merged its existing 
activities in fine chemicals with Gist-brocades into a Life Science Products 
cluster, reflecting the broadening scope and the strategic importance at-
tached to these activities. With Gist-brocades, the turnover of Life Science 
Products more than doubled and accounted for about 26% of DSM’s total 
turnover. Operating profits in this cluster made a similar jump (see also 
graphs 7.1 and 7.2.). DSM’s takeover of Gist-brocades was a major one.8
 Besides fine chemicals, DSM also included performance materials in 
its core businesses. Amidst other performance products, Dyneema grew 
into an important business. Stanyl also flourished, after a number of dif-
ficult years. DSM also bought several companies to boost its performance 
materials business.9
 In the early 1990s, top management included bulk polymers such as 
polyethylene in DSM’s core, but in 2000 it reached the conclusion that re-
structuring in the chemical industry in the 1990s had left DSM vulnerable. 
Competitors in bulk polymers often had their own feedstock base and they 
were more focused and very large. In fact they had only grown larger and 
more focused in the 1990s. Moreover, DSM had been fully state-owned 
until 1989, when the Dutch state sold two-thirds of its interest in the com-
pany, and was fully privatised in 1996 when the state sold the remaining 
third. Top management concluded that the cyclical nature of bulk chemi-
cals made the company’s stock unattractive. DSM embarked on a new 
course, focusing on fine chemicals, specialties and performance materials. 
In 2002, the company sold its interests in polyethylene, polypropylene 
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and ethylene to the Saudi company SABIC and used the revenues to buy 
the vitamins and fine chemicals activities of the Swiss pharmaceutical firm 
Hoffmann-La Roche, a deal that was formally closed in 2003.10 
 DSM paid 1.8 billion euro for Roche’s vitamins and fine chemicals 
division, making it the largest takeover by a Dutch company in 2002, 
and added 7,500 employees in more than fifty countries to its Life Sci-
ence Products cluster.11 Like the acquisition of Gist-brocades, the takeover 
added a big chunk to DSM’s turnover and operating profit. Turnover in 
Life Science Products and Nutritional Products, the name DSM gave to 
the former Roche division, added up to 49% of total turnover in 2004. 
Operating profits from these two clusters amounted to 56% of total profits 
(Graphs 7.1 and 7.2).
 With the acquisition of Roche’s division, the takeover of Gist-brocades 
and the divestment of bulk polymers, DSM completed its third transfor-
Table 7.1. DSM’s acquisitions in fine chemicals, 1977-2002.
Sources: DSM annual reports 1988, 1997. Q. B. Broxterman, W. H. J. Boesten, H. E. 
Schoemaker & B. Schulze (1997). DSM gets the biocatalysis bug. Speciality Chemicals 17(6), 
186-188, 190, 193, in particular 186. E. Homburg (2000). Epiloog. DSM Research op weg 
naar de 21e eeuw. H. Lintsen, Ed. Research tussen vetkool en zoetstof: zestig jaar DSM Research 
1940-2000. Eindhoven/Zutphen: Stichting Historie der Techniek/Walburg Pers, 118-135, in 
particular 129. Draft of this chapter, July 2000, 18. H. Strijkers (2002). DSM, een konink-
lijke eeuwling: kroniek van de laatste 25 jaar. Het Land van Herle 52(3), in particular 64, 74, 
79, 81, 92. Nieuwsfeiten. Business Value 2002, 16(5), 5, 7, 9-10, in particular 10.
Company Acquired Remarks
Chem-Y 1977 Sold to Kao Co. in October 1992
Aspartame 1985 Technology joint venture with 
Tosoh
Andeno 1987
Plaine Chemicals SA 1988 Closed in 1997
ACF Chemie 1991
Fine chemicals of Bristol-Myers Squibb 1993
Chemie Linz 1996 Majority share
1998 Full ownership
Deretil (pharmaceutical intermediates) 1996 Majority share
Alpha Drug India Ltd. 1997 Majority share
Gist-brocades 1998
Catalytica Pharmaceuticals 2000 
Roche Vitamins and Fine Chemicals 2003 
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mation. From coal-mining, the company had stepped into fertilisers and 
then diversified into chemicals, and around 1975 it had started a careful 
search for high value-added products. This search came to full maturation 
in the 1990s and transformed the company from a producer of mainly bulk 
chemicals to a producer of mainly fine chemicals and performance mate-
rials. Melamine and caprolactam remained in the portfolio as important 
industrial chemicals.
 Research played a major role in this third transformation. The Central 
Laboratory had pushed DSM’s entry into fine chemicals in 1969 and start-
ed a process of capability building that ensured the fit with Gist-brocades 
and the vitamins and fine chemicals division of Hoffman-La Roche. The 
Central Laboratory similarly pushed the development of strong polyethy-
lene fibres, resulting in the commercialisation of Dyneema. Capabilities in 
materials provided the foundation for expansion in the 1990s.
Graph 7.1. DSM turnover profile, 1997-2004.
Sources: DSM annual reports 1998, 2000, 2003 and 2004. Notes:
– The graph shows the years before and after the acquisition of Gist-brocades and 
Roche’s vitamins and fine chemicals division. The year 2000 was added for reference. 
The annual reports do not offer enough details to regroup figures for earlier years in 
the clusters DSM adopted in 1998.
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Business and Research in the 1990s
DSM’s shifting business strategy also had consequences for DSM Research. 
In the early 1990s research expenditure had grown somewhat, reaching 
4.7% of chemical turnover in 1993, but it declined after that year. Research 
expenditure remained relatively stable between 3.5 and 4%, well above the 
level of the 1970s and early 1980s (see graph A2 in the appendix). Within 
the research budget, the share of corporate funds fell and DSM’s business 
units paid for a larger part of the budget. Moreover, increasing amounts 
were spent on fine chemicals and specialties.12
 The issue of the alignment of research and business reappeared on 
the agenda. In 1993, DSM Research replaced its functionally-organised 
departments by seven sectors. Six of these sectors had a direct link with 
DSM’s business units. For instance, research on fine chemicals was now 
concentrated in one specialised sector instead of being spread across several 
departments. The seventh sector of DSM Research consisted of several ge-
neric research activities that were too small to split up among the six busi-
ness-oriented sectors. This seventh sector included analysis, for instance. 
















for 1997, 1998, 2000)
Performance Materials
DSM Nutritional Products 
(formerly Roche Vitamins 
and Fine Chemicals)
Life Science Products
Sources: DSM annual reports 1998, 2000, 2003 and 2004.
Notes: see graph 7.2 and:
– DSM’s ‘other activities’ incurred losses in 2003 and 2004.
– Fourth quarter profits from Roche’s division are omitted from the figures from 2003.
– Profit figures for 2000, 2003 and 2004 follow the EBIT standard, which compares best 
with figures from 1997 and 1998.
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Jan Zuidam, who had become head of DSM Research in 1991, wanted to 
secure the links between research and business and improve the market-
orientation of research. At the same time, he wanted to prevent short-
term marketing issues from becoming dominant. According to Zuidam, 
research should be a ‘partner in business’ and should fit in with business 
strategy. Supporting DSM in its efforts to excel in its core activities became 
a key goal of research.13 
 In the 1990s, the trend towards decentralised research continued and 
gained momentum. DSM’s divisions increased their own research through 
acquisitions of companies with substantial research facilities. This led to 
the growth of research on locations outside Geleen, where DSM’s central 
research facilities were located. After the acquisition of Gist-brocades, the 
number of DSM researchers employed in Geleen was less than 50% of 
the overall R&D workforce (Graph 7.3). Decentralisation also meant in-
ternationalisation because DSM bought several foreign companies with 
research facilities. As a result of this decentralisation and internationalisa-
tion, research became more fragmented than before 1990. After the acqui-
sition of Gist-brocades, DSM Research started to develop new procedures 
to coordinate centralised and decentralised research, and to keep the lines 
between research and business short.14
 Decentralisation and market orientation were developments that had 
started after 1970. In the 1990s, structural changes in the chemical industry 
and acquisitions added further weight to them. The takeover of Gist-bro-
cades in particular was important in this respect. Business interests were 
emphasised more than in the 1980s, but not as much as in the 1970s. DSM 
sought a balance between short-term and long-term interests and research. 
Other companies chose a similar course and emphasised the link with 
business and markets in the conduct of research. Some companies chose a 
stronger decentralisation of research, however.15
 At other Dutch-based companies, too, the relative importance of R&D 
outside the Netherlands increased. This trend caused concern, as indus-
trial research seemed to be relocating abroad. However, the increase in 
R&D conducted outside the Netherlands was due mainly to takeovers 
of foreign companies with research facilities. The research efforts of the 
acquired firms typically came on top of the effort in the Netherlands. Nev-
ertheless, growth in R&D typically occurred abroad.16 For DSM, the more 
fragmented and decentralised R&D practice across locations in various 
countries meant a break with the period before 1990. DSM’s research fa-
cilities in Geleen had long been the centre of the company’s research. In 
the 1990s, research at Geleen continued to be important, but no longer 
was the centre of gravity of DSM’s research.
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‘Growing Ideas’: Internal and External Research
DSM stabilised the budget for fundamental research in 1994. Increasingly, 
however, DSM Research sought contacts with researchers at universities, 
research institutes and other companies. In the 1980s, DSM Research had 
started to seek such cooperation to compensate for DSM’s increasing di-
versification and the increasing diversity of the knowledge fields that were 
of interest to the company. Contacts were established mainly with Dutch 
universities. In the 1990s, by contrast, DSM increasingly sought interna-
tional contacts. Moreover, the company’s increasing focus in business and 
research led to a similar focus in external research. DSM Research sought 
to generate new opportunities for DSM at lower costs. Funding of univer-
sity research and joint research with other companies and research insti-
tutes were to generate tangible results for DSM’s business units. This also 
meant that business units paid part of the costs of external research.17
 In the Netherlands, the relationships between universities and compa-
nies also changed through the establishment of so-called Leading Tech-
nological Institutes (LTIs, Technologische Top Instituten) in which several 
companies, the Dutch government and universities participate. DSM is 
involved in the Dutch Polymer Institute (DPI) and the Wageningen Cen-
Graph 7.3. Number of researchers at DSM’s central research facility in Geleen (Nether-
lands) and at other research facilities.
Cf. E. van Royen (2000). Steenkolenveredeling en industriële research bij Staatsmijnen. H. 
Lintsen, Ed. Research tussen vetkool en zoetstof: zestig jaar DSM Research 1940-2000. Eindho-
ven/Zutphen: Stichting Historie der Techniek/Walburg Pers, 12-29, in particular 27. Source 
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tre for Food Sciences (WCFS). Cooperation between industry and univer-
sities is closer than in the IOP structure of the 1980s. DSM, and the other 
companies involved, participated in drafting research programmes for the 
DPI and the WCFS. Research is fundamentally oriented, but broadens 
DSM’s own work.18
 DSM not only made more use of university research, but also con-
tinued to cooperate with other companies in the field of research. The 
company started to emphasise corporate venturing as well. Corporate ven-
turing built a business development function to find potentially profitable 
ideas and start-up companies that might develop into a DSM business 
unit. In order to qualify as venturing targets for DSM, these start-ups 
had to have strategic value, fit with DSM’s technologies or markets, and 
promise financial performance; on the other hand they were offered access 
to DSM’s capital and to its resources in the field of management, market-
ing and research. Besides business development, corporate venturing built 
mechanisms to spin out ideas that did not fit the company.19 The Ventur-
ing unit’s task was to generate growth for DSM by ‘growing ideas into 
flourishing businesses’.20
 The combination of corporate venturing, cooperation with other com-
panies and use of university research gave rise to a more ‘open’ research 
and innovation process at DSM in the 1990s.21 This trend can be seen at 
other companies as well, in varying degrees and forms. The decrease in in-
house fundamental research has caused concern however, even though it 
might be compensated by increasing collaboration with universities. With 
the increased emphasis on business interests and market orientation, the 
declining level of fundamental research might lead to a similarly strong 
short-term orientation of research, and might also damage DSM’s ability 
to integrate external knowledge and to translate it into an advantage in its 
View of chemical plants at Geleen (The Netherlands), near DSM’s headquarters. On this 
site DSM built its first chemical plants. Today, DSM is active in 49 countries and shares 
the Geleen site with other companies. 
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business. This integration and translation capability, which has been called 
‘absorptive capacity’ in economics, lay at the heart of some of DSM’s inno-
vation successes of the past. In the case of Dyneema, spinning and market-
ing know-how relating to synthetic fibres had to be integrated. In the case 
of urea and caprolactam, DSM used external knowledge as a springboard 
for the development of in-house technologies.22
 In the 1990s, the wave-like pattern in the importance of research contin-
ued as business interests were again emphasised within DSM Research and 
within top management. Takeovers, and external research more broadly, 
played an important role. The continuation of this wave-like pattern fur-
ther emphasises the uniqueness of the period between 1945 and 1970, and 
the open-ended nature of research management. A continuing effort is re-
quired to balance research and business. Key parameters are mutual com-
mitment and room for research to develop its own vision of the company. 
Or, as DSM Research’s management put it in an introductory brochure for 
new researchers in the early 1990s: “The tension between applied science 
on the one hand and the dynamics of the business on the other is what 
makes working at DSM Research so fascinating.”23
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Appendix
Managers of Central Laboratory, CRO and DSM Research
1. Research as part of DSM’s chemical sector (Chemische Bedrijven), 1940-1949.
– Heads of the Chemical Sector:
D. P. Ross van Lennep 1930-1947 Reported to top management.
J. S. A. J. M. van Aken 1947-1949
– Research managers:
G. Berkhoff 1940-1949 Reported to head of chemical sector.
– Financial and personnel director, Central Laboratory:
H. A. J. Pieters 1940-1948 Reported to Berkhoff.
2. Research as a corporate activity, from 1949 onwards.
– R&D managers:
G. Berkhoff 1949-1961 Reported to top management.
F. L. J. Sixma 1961-1963
L. J. Revallier 1963-1980
D. H. E. Tom 1978-1985 Between 1978 and 1980, together with 
Revallier.
D. J. Venderbos 1985-1992
J. Zuidam 1992-1998
E. M. Meijer 1998-2005
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– Heads of Central Laboratory:
D. W. van Krevelen 1948-1959 Reported to R&D manager (Berkhoff ). 
Responsible for research process.
J. Selman 1948-1955 Reported to R&D manager (Berkhoff ). 
Responsible for finance and personnel. 
In 1955 Van Krevelen took over Selman’s 
job.
F. L. J. Sixma 1959-1961 After Berkhoff left, Sixma took over 
his tasks, combining the positions of 
R&D manager and head of the Central 
Laboratory.
Sources: 
F. J. G. Kwanten (1993). Onderzoek bij Staatsmijnen in Limburg/ DSM Centraal Laborato-
rium/DSM Research 1940-1990. DSM Research Report R 89 8061 (1 September 1993). 14, 
18, 28, 29, 42. E. Homburg (2000). Epiloog: DSM Research op weg naar de 21e eeuw. H. 
Lintsen, Ed. Research tussen vetkool en zoetstof: zestig jaar DSM Research 1940-2000. Eind-
hoven/Zutphen: Stichting Historie der Techniek/Walburg Pers, 118-135, in particular 131. 
H. Strijkers (2002). DSM, een koninklijke eeuwling: kroniek van de laatste 25 jaar. Het 
Land van Herle 52(3). 131. E. Homburg, with contributions by A. van Rooij (2004). 

























































































Graph A1: Research personnel, 1950-1999
Cf. E. van Royen (2000). Steenkolenveredeling en industriële research bij Staatsmijnen. H. 
Lintsen, Ed. Research tussen vetkool en zoetstof: zestig jaar DSM Research 1940-2000. Eind-
hoven/Zutphen: Stichting Historie der Techniek/ Walburg Pers, 12-29, in particular 27. 
Source for total number of researchers: DSM annual reports 1987-1999.
Notes: The peak in 1966 is caused by the integration of the Central Experimental Station 
(coal-related research) with the Central Laboratory.
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Sources: Turnover figures from RAL, 17.26/18B inv. no. 83: Bedrijfseconomisch Verslag 
1950-1956, and DSM annual reports 1957-1999. Frank Veraart compiled research costs for 
the period 1949-1970. Research cost for 1970-1999 compiled by Siep Schaafsma.
Notes: see next page.
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Notes:
Chemical turnover is the sum of DSM’s chemical activities. Turnover from energy (coal, 
coke, coke oven gas, natural gas, oil), electricity, construction, and the item ‘other activities’ 
from the annual reports are excluded.
The declining ratio of research expenditure to chemical turnover until 1953 was caused by 
rapidly-increasing turnover.
The peak in 1966 was caused by the integration of the Central Experimental Station (coal-
related research) with the Central Laboratory.
In 1987, DSM deconsolidated its natural gas activities, and consequently chemical activities 
now represented a much higher percentage of DSM’s turnover. The difference between 
research costs as a percentage of chemical turnover and as a percentage of total turnover 
became negligible after this year.
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Sources: Stamicarbon Reference List, 1 February 1985. Stamicarbon Reference List at: 
www.stamicarbon.com. Accessed 5 July 2005.
Note: Stamicarbon included plants of DSM and its subsidiaries in its reference lists. These 
plants have been excluded from this graph, however.
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Sources
Interviews 
Dr H. G. Bakker 16 March 2005
Dr J. A. Bigot 8 December 2003
7 February 2005 Discussion of draft chapter.
D G. Evens 26 July 2005
J. T. J. van Goolen 5 December 2003 With D. J. van Waes.
18 January 2005 Discussion of draft chapter.
Dr R. van Hardeveld 29 August 2005
R. Kirschbaum 7 January 2005 Interview/discussion of draft chapter.
Professor E. M. Meijer 21 June 2004
Dr L. J. Revallier 18 January 2005
Dr B. C. Roest 29 July 2005
Professor A. H. de Rooij 8 December 2003 With D.J. van Waes.
7 February 2005 Discussion of draft chapter.
23 May 2005 Discussion of draft manuscript.
Dr S. E. Schaafsma 27 June 2003
22 January 2004 Discussion of draft chapter.
21 April 2004 Discussion of draft chapter.
R. E. Selman 27 June 2003
19 July 2005 Discussion of draft manuscript.
Professor J. J. Steggerda 8 August 2005
D. J. Venderbos 1 July 2005 Discussion of draft manuscript.
W.J.W. Vermijs 29 August 2005
Dr H. de Vries 29 July 2005
D. J. van Waes 15 July 2003 With E. Homburg
J. Zuidam 27 July 2005 Discussion of draft manuscript.
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E-mail correspondence:
Dr S. E. Schaafsma 28 February 2005
9 March 2005
D. J. van Waes 28 January 2005
Interviews during previous projects (with E. Homburg):
J. Barendse 22 September 1999
J. Damme 23 November 2000
J. P. M. van Waes 4 April 2000
17 May 2000













46 Polychemie (production unit for plastics)
Corporate archives, DSM headquarters, Heerlen:
Abbreviation: CADH Corporate archives on research.
Archives of top management:
– Minutes of top management meetings: 1949-1990.
– Appendixes to these minutes (references starting 
with D.V. and RvB).
Personal papers:
Dr H. G. Bakker
Dr J. A. Bigot
Dr L. J. Revallier
Dr S. E. Schaafsma









Nieuws DSM Zuid-Limburg 1974-1975
Nieuws DSM Limburg 1975-1976
DSM Limburg Nieuws 1976-1980
Nieuws DSM Limburg 1980-1984
DSM Limburg Nieuws 1984-1990
DSM Nieuws 1990
Trade journals:
Chemical & Engineering News 1970-1990
Chemische Industrie 1970-1990
i successive titles listed.
Unpublished Reports Concerning the History of DSM and DSM Research
F. J. G. Kwanten (1993). Onderzoek bij Staatsmijnen in Limburg/DSM Centraal Laborato-
rium/DSM Research 1940-1990. DSM Research report R 89 8061 (1 September 1993).
H. J. Merx (1950). Overzicht van de ontwikkeling van de productie en de afzet van meststoffen, 
teerproducten, benzolkoolwaterstoffen en enkele andere producten der Chemische Bedrijven van 
de Staatsmijnen in Limburg. Heerlen: Staatsmijnen. 
H. J. Merx (1955). Chronologisch overzicht van de geschiedenis van de Cokesfabrieken en het 
Gasdistributiebedrijf 1912-1952. Heerlen: Archief van de Staatsmijnen in Limburg. 
H. J. Merx (1955). Chronologisch overzicht van de geschiedenis van het Stikstofbindingsbedrijf 
1925-1952. Heerlen: Archief van de Staatsmijnen in Limburg. 
G. F. te Roller (1990). Een halve eeuw Centraal Laboratorium. Een serie gesprekken met oud-
researchdirecteuren van DSM. Heerlen: DSM Corporate Public Relations. Unpublished 
manuscript.
F. W. R. Röthig (1959). Archiefdocumentatie betreffende de algemene gang van zaken bij de 
ontwikkeling van de projecten “Fenol - Caprolactam - Nylonzout” van de Staatsmijnen in 
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Limburg van 1937 t/m 1959 (oktober). Heerlen: Staatsmijnen, Bureau Secretariaat en Cor-
respondentie. 
F. W. R. Röthig (1960). Het ureumproject van de Staatsmijnen in Limburg (Archiefdocumen-
tatie 1940-1960). Heerlen: Staatsmijnen. 
F. W. R. Röthig (1960). De algemene gang van zaken bij de ontwikkeling van het polyolefinen-
project van de Staatsmijnen in Limburg van 1935 t/m 1959. Deel I: ethyleen. Heerlen: Staatsmij-
nen, Bureau Secretariaat en Correspondentie.
F. W. R. Röthig (1960). De algemene gang van zaken bij de ontwikkeling van het polyolefinen-
project van de Staatsmijnen in Limburg van 1935 t/m 1959. Deel II: polyethyleen - algemeen en 
hogedruk-polyethyleen. Heerlen: Staatsmijnen, Bureau Secretariaat en Correspondentie. 
F. W. R. Röthig (1960). De algemene gang van zaken bij de ontwikkeling van het polyolefinen-
project van de Staatsmijnen in Limburg van 1935 t/m 1959. Deel III: lagedruk-polyetheen. Heer-
len: Staatsmijnen, Bureau Secretariaat en Correspondentie.
F.W.R. Röthig (1965). De contacten van de Staatsmijnen met derden op het gebied van mela-
mine, melamine-harsen, en melamine-perspoeders. Heerlen: Staatsmijnen, Centraal Archief.
F.W.R. Röthig (1966). Chronologisch overzicht van het ontstaan en de organisatie van het 
Centraal Laboratorium van de Staatsmijnen, Geleen. Heerlen: Staatsmijnen, Centraal Labo-
ratorium.
F. W. R. Röthig (1968). Toepassing lysine voor menselijke voeding en als therapeuticum. Con-
tacten CL/DSM met derden. Heerlen: Staatsmijnen, Centraal Laboratorium. 
H. Strijkers. DSM en melamine. Unpublished and undated manuscript.
P. F. G. Vincken (2000). Van Staatsmijnen in Limburg tot DSM Chemie. Unpublished 
manuscript.
Draft chapters for: H. Lintsen, Ed. (2000). Research tussen vetkool en zoetstof: zestig jaar 
DSM Research 1940-2000. Eindhoven/Zutphen, Stichting Historie der Techniek/Walburg 
Pers.
– T. van Helvoort. Omzien in verwondering: Chemische expansie van Staatsmijnen en de rol 
van research (1945-1967). Veldman & Van Royen report B. Undated.
– T. van Helvoort. De omarming van de polymeer-chemie: polyetheen (1952-1967). Veldman 
& Van Royen report F. Undated.
– T. van Helvoort. Synthetische rubbers: de verlokkingen van een enorme markt. Veldman 
& Van Royen report G. Undated.
– E. Homburg. Epiloog: DSM Research op weg naar de 21ste eeuw. Draft, July 2000.
– J. Schueler. Diversificatie en de plaats van research in de DSM-organisatie (1967-1980). 
Veldman & Van Royen report I. Undated.
– E. van Royen. De Nederlandse Staatsmijnen, chemie en research (1901-1945). Veldman & 
Van Royen report A. Undated.
– F. Veraart. Fenol (1939-1964). Veldman & Van Royen report C. Undated.
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– F. Veraart. Het ureumstrippingproces. Veldman & Van Royen report D. Undated.
– F. Veraart. Melamine uit ureum. Veldman & Van Royen report E. Undated.
– F. Veraart. Lysine (1957-1969). Veldman & Van Royen report H. Undated.
– F. Veraart. De renaissance van research (1980-1990). Veldman & Van Royen report J. 
Undated.
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